Cartel agreements represent one of the most serious threats to market competition, often resulting in inflated prices, restricted output, and reduced innovation. In response, leniency programs have been adopted globally as strategic enforcement tools to detect and dismantle cartels by incentivizing self-reporting among conspirators. This paper critically examines the effectiveness of leniency programs in dismantling cartel structures through a comparative analysis; focusing on the experiences of the United States of America, Canada, and other jurisdictions with mature and tested leniency frameworks. Through a comparative analysis of established jurisdictions such as United States of America, Canada, South Africa and Kenya, the study assesses how leniency policies are effective in combating cartel agreements; incentivize whistleblowers and cooperation with competition authorities. The study then turns to Ethiopia, critically assessing the legal framework and the practices in underpinning its competition law regime with regard to leniency program. Special focus is given to the Ethiopian legal framework, assessing its current capacity to implement and benefit from such programs. By comparing Ethiopia’s legal framework with international best practices, particularly United States of America, Canada, South Africa and Kenya, the research critically evaluates the operational efficiency, enforcement mechanism, and limitations of Ethiopia’s current leniency regime. Through a mixed(doctrinal and empirical) legal research analysis, the paper uncovers key gaps in the implementation and enforcement of Ethiopia’s leniency provisions, including issues related to legal framework, the practice, and stakeholder awareness that hinder the full realization of leniency programs in Ethiopia. The study concludes by offering legal and informed recommendations to strengthen the Ethiopian framework, arguing that a well-designed and credibly enforced leniency program is essential for uncovering covert cartel behavior and promoting competitive market dynamics.