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# THE RISE OF POPULAR PROTESTS IN GONDAR AND ITS IMPLICATION SINCE 2016

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**BAHIR DAR UNIVERSITY**  
**FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE**  
**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND**  
**INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

**THE RISE OF POPULAR PROTESTS IN GONDAR AND**  
**ITS IMPLICATION SINCE 2016**

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**KEBEDE YIMAM (PhD Candidate)**

**August 2019**  
**Bahir Dar, Ethiopia**

# THE RISE OF POPULAR PROTESTS IN GONDAR AND ITS IMPLICATIONS SINCE 2016

A thesis submitted to the department of political science and International studies  
in partial fulfillment of the degree of master in political science.

By  
TAMU ALEMU

**ADVISOR: KEBEDE YIMAM (PhD. Candidate)**

August 2019  
Bahir Dar, Ethiopia.

# The rise of popular protests in Gondar and its implications since 2016

By Tamu Alemu

Approved by board of examiners

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Internal examiner	-----	-----	-----
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External examiner	-----	-----	-----

## Declaration

I declared that, this thesis titled as the rise of popular protest in Gondar and its implications since 2016 is my original work and has not been presented for any degree in other institutions. I also acknowledged all the references used in the study.

Name                Tamu Alemu

Signature -----

Date of submission-----

# The rise of popular protest in Gondar and its implications since 2016

Bahir Dar University

This thesis titled “The rise of popular protest in Gondar and its implications since 2016” by “Tamu Alemu” had been submitted for the examination with my approval as an advisor.

Name :-----

Signature:-----

Date:-----

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## List of acronyms

ADP=====Amhara Democratic party

FGD=====Focus Group Discussion

TPLF=====Tegrean People Liberation Front

CUD===== Cooperation for Unity and Democracy

EPRDF=====Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front

ACLED=====Armed Conflict Location and Event Database

HWR= =====Human Right Watch

SIT=====Social Identity Theory

ECHR=====European Court for Human Right

CSA=====central statistic Agency

EPPF=====Ethiopian People Patriotic Front

EPDM=====Ethiopian People Democratic movement

ANDM=====Amhara People Democratic Movement

FBC=====Fana Broadcasting Corporate

AGUDM=====Arbegnoch/Ptriotic/ Ginbot-sebat Unity for Democratic Movement

USA=====United States of America

ESAT=====Ethiopian Satellite Television

VOA=====Voice of America

BIC=====Boarder and Identity Commission

PDRE=====Peoples of Democratic Republic Ethiopian

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## Abstract

*In most cases popular protest is nothing; it is a call to equality, justice, fairness, and indiscriminate. The researcher had explored the rise of popular protest in Gondar and its implication since 2016 by posing major research questions and objectives. Thereby, the researcher employed qualitative case study with transformative philosophical paradigm by collecting qualitative data from both primary and secondary sources through interview, focus group discussion and documents review. Available (convenience) sampling had been employed to select 10 city dwellers and 10 FGD discussants; snowball sampling was used to select five political activists and purposive sampling had been used for three political appointees and one head of police office. In general 29 participants were selected to the study. The researcher had analyzed data by using thematic data analyzing method. The researcher had identified different factors contributed to the popular protests that erupted on 13 July 2016, following to the detention of Wolayit Amhara Identity Committee members by Tegryan police forces in Gondar. Although the detention of colonel Demeke Zewudu can be seen as triggering factors, the finding of the study confirm that, the people of Gondar had deep rooted grievance caused by historical, economical and political marginalization of Amhara people by the ruling. Onwards from July 13/2016 the popular protest in Gondar challenged the government forces; however, the incumbent government deployed additional number of police and defense forces in the town. Then the magnitude of the protest had become immense by establishing concealing structure via both violent and non-violent mechanisms. The finding asserts that, the popular protest in Gondar since 2016 had both negative and positive implications. It increased sense of solidarity between Amhara and Oromo people through their slogans. It also results the raise of Amhara nationalism, political reforms at local as well as national level, and releasing of politically motivated prisoners. Despite of this, the protests had results the displacement of Tegryans from Gondar, high tension between TPLF and ADP political parties and lawlessness in the city administration.*

**Key words:-** popular protest, grievance, marginalization, political elites, violent protest, non-violent protest.

# **CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION**

In this chapter the researcher had discussed the overall background of the study as the contemporary world had shaken by waves of popular protests due to different reasons. Then the clear research gaps had been identified in the statement part of the study. The general and specific objectives with conceding research questions have been identified; further, the chapter gave details to the readers about the significance of the study, limitation of the study, and the general scope of the study.

## **1.1. Background of the study**

Popular protest can be conceived as any violent or none violent actions of the people to challenge the existing political order to establish a new order of life. It can be seen as a movement towards democracy. Protest is collective enterprises to establish a new order of life and maintained that in the beginning, a protest is amorphous, poorly organized and without form (Blumer, 1951:199). Thus it is a means of expressing public opinion about how things ought to be done.

There have been periods in history when large numbers of people protested about the way things were, demanding change, such as in 1848, 1917 or 1968 (Isabel Ortiz and et'al, 2013). From the 1976 to 1992, there were 146 protests worldwide (John Walton and David Seddon, 1994). Another important wave was give a free rein to in 1989–1990 with the end of the cold war and characterized by claims for democracy and political change (Larmer, 2010). Recent experience around the world also demonstrated that, popular protests have been become a defining feature of contemporary political conflicts, and that in the end, reaching political settlements needs their active involvement and cooperative engagement.

Protests are more prevalent in lower income countries (304 protests), followed by Latin America and the Caribbean (141 protests), East Asia and the Pacific (83 protests) and Sub-Saharan Africa (78 protests). Fascinatingly, the period 2006-2013 reflects an increasing number of global protests (70 events), organized across regions (Isabel Ortiz and et'al, 2013). In 2007 and 2008, numerous major cities worldwide witnessed riots, most of them in Africa (Patel and McMichael, 2009).

Historically, the Ethiopian society contested the power and authority of the state through peasant rebellion in different provinces (Bale, Gojjam and Tigray), the Ethiopian student movement, the urban uprising that triggered the Ethiopian revolution in 1974, and the long civil war waged between the state and armed groups of EPLF, TPLF, OLF and others (Yeshtila and et'al, 2005). However, the state has remained dominant and resilient, coping with the resistance mainly by military and authoritarian means. With the overthrow of the Derg, the current regime has introduced ethnicity-based federalism as a way to deal with secessionist challenges. The post 1991 political dynamic of Ethiopia had four phases; those are transition phase (1991-1997), consolidation phase (1998-2005), domination phase (2006-2010), and contestation phase (2011-present). The marginalization of competing forces has been started in 2005 (Yeshtila and et'al, 2005).

The run-up to the May 2005 parliamentary election was a turning point, as the EPRDF was confronted for the first time with a real opposition. Following the announcement of the result, the opposition CUD rejected the results, renouncing its seats and calling upon its sympathizers to engage in civil disobedience. Authorities heavily repressed the demonstrations that followed, leaving around 200 people killed and thousands detained. The disproportionate and indiscriminate nature of the government's response to the protests was blamed on the leadership's suspicion that the actions of the CUD and the protesters were a plot by Amharas to return to power by force

Even though the EPRDF constitution in Article 30/1 declared that, "everyone has the right to assemble and to demonstrate together with others peaceably and unarmed, and to petition, Violence broke out when opposition supporters demonstrating against the ruling party's alleged vote rigging were confronted by state security forces on the streets of Addis Ababa and towns across the country. From November 2015, Ethiopia has experienced an unprecedented wave of popular protests. The government responded to the protests with a heavy hand, resulting in thousands of casualties and tens of thousands of people arrested, and charged with terrorism offenses.

Gondar is one of the ancient and historical city which is expanded significantly around 1635 under the rule of Fasiladàs, the son of the city's founder, Suseniòs. It has magnificent churches, church paintings, castles, palaces, and above all the legendary hospitable and kind inhabitants. Gondar had served the political and trade center of Ethiopia for centuries. By the federal arrangement of Ethiopia since 1991, the city is belonging to Amhara regional state; it had been the center of north Gondar zone, and now a day it is the center of central Gondar zone since 2017.

Despite of its historical richness, in the last two and half decades, Gondar has been one of the areas badly affected by the horrors of wars and disturbance. In the post 2005 national election, the people of Gondar strongly oppose the statement of the government autonomously declared that the winning of the EPRDF, immediately after the closing of ballot boxes. The people had demonstrated on the streets of the city against the election results announced by the national electoral board. Teachers, high school students, civil servants and urban dwellers were the participants of the demonstration. Immediately, after the demonstration, many people had detained in different military camps (mostly in Birsheleko military camp). The government had responded thorough violent means to their largely peaceful protests.

In the post 2005, for example, both folk and popular music began to openly embrace themes that highlighted grievances broadly shared by Gondar people. The rapid mobilization of an apparently apolitical and atomized population against a repressive state and under repressive conditions begs explanation. Protests in Gondar aggravated in July 2016 against arbitrary detention and demanding the self-determination of the ethnic Amhara particularly in Gondar community.

In the contemporary Ethiopian political condition, one ethnic community would not worry for the other. The collective identity cultural landscape of Ethiopia transcended to the ethnic based ties. However, the 2016 popular protest in Gondar had brought back things. They displayed unprecedented slogans “the blood spilling over Oromo’s is our blood too”. It was distinctive on the Ethiopian politics in the post 1991; yet, it had not studied as one political incidence which had national as well as local significances. This is way the researcher intended



to examine the popular protests in Gondar since 2016. The researcher intended to focus only on exploring major factors of protests, mechanisms that are used in protest and major implications of the protests at national politics of Ethiopia and local politics of Gondar city.

## **1.2. Statement of the problem**

The question of protests emergence has long been central to theory and research in the field. Virtually all of the theories in the field attempt to explain why popular protests arise when and how they do. Social movement's theorists see protest as "politics by other means," and it is now well recognized that extra-institutional and institutional politics are intertwined and interdependent. As Collier (2004) points out, the two lines of thought, of the political scientists and economists. He argued that a rebellion and protests is dependent on two variables: motive and opportunity. While political scientists would rather focus on the motives behind rebel action, economists would look into the opportunities for protests.

On the one hand, resource mobilization theory describes popular protests as emerging in response to an increase in the resources needed to sustain collective action and in the availability of formal social movement organizations to coordinate the overall effort (McCarthy and Zald, 1997; Tilly, 1986). The political process model stresses the importance of expanding political opportunities as the catalyst for initial mobilization (McAdam, 1982). On the other hand, social identity theorists argued that, social categorization according to some trivial criteria as the 'blue' or the 'red' group suffices to make people feel, think and act as group member (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Van Stekelenburg et al, 2010). Grievance theory of protests, differently from the natural resource mobilization and social identity theories, argues that, people participate in protests to express their grievances stemming from relative deprivation, frustration, and perceived injustice (Berkowitz, 1972; Gurr, 1970; Lind and Taler, 1988).

Socio-economic aims never disappeared from the agenda of popular protests, and self-evidently, they are inseparably interwoven with political demands. Some of the largest protests in world history related to the economic crisis, massive protests against the international financial institutions and their neoliberal policies of 'structural adjustment' occurred between the mid-

1970s and the end of the 1980s (Seddon and Zeilig, 2005). Nevertheless, the 1990s protests were ‘more explicitly political and with more far-reaching aims and objectives’ (Ibid). Since the early 2000s, there have again been witnessing massive and continuous protests that claim substantial political and economic change similar to the protests in the decades before.

People mobilize against their state in response to current or anticipated deprivation, but they do so only if it is in their interest (Veronique Dudouet, 2009). The deprivation can be rooted in access to either material or political resources although both are often linked through the mechanisms for distributing a society’s wealth. Most political scholars agreed on the level of deprivation and oppression is varied due to the nature of the government. The more one state is being democratic; the people had slackly obliged to oppose their government. In contrast, while the government is being non democratic, the people will have grievance that obliged them to opposition movement. There for, to understand the state of popular protests in Ethiopia, there is a need to conduct empirical studies beyond to the above theoretical debates by taking selected areas.

Ethiopia registers an annual economic growth rates close to 10% since 2006 for successive 10 years; however, the EPRDF has controlled the political trajectory of the country and displayed an authoritarian mode of governance, primarily through maintaining a solid grip on the country’s military and intelligence services. This authoritarianism is perceived to be driven by fears of national disintegration. As a result, small ideologically driven elite seek to maintain their privileged status at the expense of other groups, leveraging on rhetoric about sacrifices made during the guerrilla war against the Derg. Political inequality and oppression became the characteristics of the government (World Bank, 2017).

Although many survey researches have been conducted in Ethiopia to examine the causes, and extents of popular protests, most of the investigations have focused at the protest of Oromo people. For instance, ACLED (2017) and Human Right watches (2017) had investigated the causes and extents popular protest in Ethiopia. They had detail explanation about the extent of popular protests in Ethiopia; those affirmed that, the protests were as “wild fire” which is easily transmitted from one area to the other area of the country. They had identified the Addis Ababa master plan was the cause for the protest. They had concluded the issue of land as the major

cause for the popular protests. Yet, the other long lived structural factors of the protests were not discussed; they failed to investigate anything about the major mechanisms that were used in the protests.

Getachew Metaferia (2016) did investigation on the state of Ethiopian popular protests and identified ethnic federalism as major cause of popular protests. He exhaustively discussed about the protests in Amhara and Oromo ethnic groups against Tegryan dominated ruling. However; why those protests were only in Amhara and Oromo ethnic groups differently from others was not clear; Rather, it implies the existence of other factors which were not addressed.

The researcher couldn't find out studies on the popular protests in Gondar except some; only a few studies indirectly raise the concern of the researcher. For instance, Sandra F. Joireman and Thomas S. Szayna (2000), conducted study "Ethiopia prospective case: examine ethnic based violence of Tegrays over Amhara" under political process model. They had argued Amhara have had influence in Ethiopia in the past. However; in recent years after the coming of EPRDF, it becomes marginalized from the economic sectors. Although they had such conclusion, they did not imply how this marginalization affects the people of Amhara since their intention was to analyze the political cause as well as political consequences.

ALCED (2017) had argued, there was solidarity between the Oromo and Amhara people in the aftermath of the popular protests; but, how it could be possible? Which group was forefront for the solidarity of the two people? What were the further implications? Those questions were not answered in its study.

Getnet (2017) conducted a study on "framing of the 2016 Amhara uprising by local and international media: EBC and VOA radio in focus". He conclude that, the role of social media to mobilize the protest were significant. However; other mechanisms than social media, were not assessed since his objective was related to media framing.

Amaru (2018) had conducted study to investigate the causes of ethnic conflict between Amhara and Tegray. She had concluded the cause for the conflict was the land of wolkayt as we had observed the slogans on Gondar protest in 2016. Yet, for most political scholars, land/resource/

problems may not be sufficient conditions for the protests; other necessary conditions must be there. So, the necessary conditions for the protests in Gondar were not understood in the study.

Since Gondar is one of Ethiopian city where the people repeatedly express their grievance as well as popular protests challenges the EPRDF's government, there were no adequate investigation on causes why the people oppose the government; the researcher believes, the efforts to study about the factors, the mechanisms, and the implication of popular protest in Gondar is still not worth mentioning and is not deeply examined. A closer examination of structural factors provides a useful point of entry into the consideration of mass mobilization in a context with a circumscribed opportunity structure and limited resources. In considering the Gondar case and how rapid mobilization underpinned by broad expectations of solidarity under risky conditions was possible. Having this in mind, the researcher conducted the study to assess the factors of popular protest in Gondar under grievance theory of popular protests. Thus, the researcher was willing to conduct the research to fill the above knowledge gaps.

### **1.3. Objectives of the study**

#### **1.3.1 General objective**

The purpose of this case study is exploring the rise of popular protests and major implications in Gondar city since 2016. At this stage popular protest can be defined as any attempts and activities against the government which is expressed through different ways that requires collective actions and mobilization to achieve the group's common interests.

#### **1.3.2 Specific objectives**

At the end of the research, the researcher has intended to achieve the following objectives.

- ❖ To explore the major factors of popular protests in Gondar since 2016.
- ❖ To assess the mechanisms that used to mobilize the popular protests in Gondar.
- ❖ To identify the major implications of the protest in Gondar.

#### **1.4. Research questions**

The researcher raised the following research questions those are aligned with the objectives of the study.

1. What are the major factors that insist popular protests in Gondar since 2016?
2. What are the major mechanisms that are used to mobilize the popular protests in selected area since 2016?
3. What are the major implications of the protests in Gondar for current politics of Ethiopia?

#### **1.5. Significance of the study**

Recently, for most political scientists and researchers, dealing about popular protest is being identical with dealing about the process of democratization that the people intends to achieve their common goals by opposing the perceived economic or political inequalities practiced by existing government. Hence the study had great significance to show the effort of the Gondar people towards democracy by opposing the repressive and oppressive EPRDF's ruling. In addition, the study will give adequate explanation about the factors, mechanisms and implications of popular protests in Gondar which are helpful to make comparative analysis for other researchers when they deal similar cases in different parts of the country other than Gondar.

#### **1.6. Scope of the study**

The study had been delaminated in both conceptually and geographically. Geographically it was delaminated only in Gondar city. Conceptually, it focused only on exploring the rise of popular protests and the implications since 12<sup>th</sup> July 2016. The rationality behind this delimitation is the presumptions of the researcher, the July 12<sup>th</sup> popular protest in Gondar was unique phenomenon of its slogans which shout for unity while the country was swept by the ethno-centered movement. The problem is not deeply examined. In addition to this, the feasibility conditions also important.

### **1.7. Rationality of selecting the area**

Although protest and unrest were common in Ethiopian political history, the recent protest in Gondar that embraced on 12<sup>th</sup> July 2016 was unusual in different reasons. For instance, in the post 1991 Ethiopia had experienced ethno-federalism that increases ethnic tensions between different ethnic groups. As a result, all ethnic groups shout to be heard for one self. However the 2016 popular protests in Gondar had the voice of Oromo people in addition to their own interests. It was the call for all Ethiopian citizens to stand against the atrocity. They displayed unprecedented slogans “the blood spilling over Oromo’s is our blood too”. It was distinctive on the Ethiopian politics in the post 1991; yet, it had not studied as one political incidence which had national as well as local significances. This is way the researcher intended to examine the popular protests in Gondar since 2016.

### **1.8. Limitation of the Study**

Shortage of time as well as inconsistency of time schedules with the other activities of the researcher was the major limitations of the research. On the other side, limitations were being faced from informants. Because some of the informants were the leaders of institutions, they were busy and had no sufficient time for interviews. Even if some of them who had enough time were also reluctant to give the required data as per the essential time. So, the researcher had challenged those problems to get valid data on the course of the study.

### **1.9. Operational definitions of terms**

- **Popular protests:** it is any attempts and activities against the government which is expressed through different ways that requires collective actions and mobilization to achieve the group’s common interests.
- **Factors:** actions, decisions, speeches, narratives, and incidences that had not accepted by the people in the study area.
- **Mechanism:** instruments and methods used by the people to mobilize the protests.
- **Implications:** negative or positive outcomes of the popular protests which had local and national repercussion.

### **1.10. Organizations of the study**

This thesis had been organized in to five chapters. The first chapter consisted of the introductory part which includes the background of the study, statement of the problem, objective, significance, scope, and operational definitions of terms. The second chapter had detailed practical and theoretical review of literature that had relevance to the study. The third chapter discussed about methods and methodology of the study; chapter four deals about the finding data under each thematic areas. The last chapter consisted of the findings and conclusions and recommendations of the study. References and appendixes were also the parts of the paper.

## **CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE**

Under this chapter, the researcher tried to explore the conceptual, theoretical as well as practical literatures regarding to popular protests. The question of popular protest is familiar in the field of social science; there are a number of theoretical and conceptual debates between and among the scholars in the field. The historical development of the concept of popular protest would be discussed from different theoretical perspectives. The world protest experience including Ethiopian would be assessed in the thesis in its empirical literature review parts.

### **2.1. Conceptualization of popular protests**

No definition of popular protest enjoys a scholarly consensus and there probably will never be such a definition because definitions inevitably reflect the theoretical assumptions of the theorist. There are a number of competing frameworks in the field and each conceptualizes protests differently. Even scholars within the same school define protests differently depending on their particular theoretical formulation. There is a vast array of specific protest behaviors that people might exhibit.

Wright et al. (1990) have proposed a framework based on three distinctions: the first between inaction and action, the second between actions directed at improving one's personal conditions (individual action) and actions directed at improving the conditions of one's group (collective action). In other ways, the Collective behavior theorists view protests as not institutionalized social change efforts (Jenkins 1983). The third distinction is between actions that conform to the norms of the existing social system (normative action like petitioning and taking part in a demonstration) and those that violate existing social rules (non-normative action like illegal protests and civil disobedience).

Marxists viewed revolutionary protests as both normal, and inevitable under capitalism, because capitalism contains and generates endemic structural contradictions. The main contradiction that inevitably leads to efforts geared toward structural change is the existence of two classes with mutually exclusive interests. He linked inequality and other properties of the society to the rise of revolutionary movements. Similarly, Blumer (1951) defined protests as collective enterprises



to establish a new order of life and maintained that in the beginning, a protest is amorphous, poorly organized and without form. Slightly different from collective theorists, Mass society theorists view protests as phenomena which occur when previously unorganized individuals hand together to change some part of their social milieu.

Mass society theorists usually emphasize the characteristics of "mass societies" which make protests possible: cultural confusion, social heterogeneity, weak cultural integration mechanisms, and a lack of attachments to secondary group structures. The concept of political protest is necessary to discuss the broader concept of political participation that can be loosely defined as the set of activities which aim to modify the current state of affairs (Verba and Nie, 1972). They argued that political participation refers to "those activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take. This definition mainly considered those actions undertaken to influence the government. Indeed, for a long time political participation was meant as an activity related to electoral behavior and to political recruitment.

On the one hand, political participation can be "conventional" and refers to all those acts belonging to the constitutional process of interest aggregation and representation, which are mediated by political institutions, and which define the relationship between political authorities and citizens within the political arena. On the other hand, political participation can be "unconventional", which is non-institutionalized direct political action that does not aim to disrupt or threaten the stability of liberal democracies. In this sense, unconventional political participation overlaps with "political protest". In fact, "direct political action generally, and political protest in particular, do not necessarily assume anti-regime protests; rather, it may form one element of an expanded repertory of political action" (Kaase and Marsh 1979).

Hence, political protest is considered "a means of political repress, namely the use of tactics as petitions, demonstrations, boycotts, rent or tax strikes, unofficial industrial strikes, occupations of buildings, blocking of traffic, damage to property, and personal violence (Marsh and Kaase 1979). The analysis of protest politics shows that many of these forms of activity, such as petitions, demonstrations, and consumer boycott, are fairly pervasive and have become

increasingly popular during recent decades. In this thesis, the concept of protest can be conceived as any violent or peaceful activities of the people who temporarily or permanently challenge the existing political order or the work of government.

## **2.2. Theories of popular protest**

Although there are several plausible theories that could explain the patterns of popular protests, basically, in this study, three potential theories and two models can be discussed to clarify concepts of popular protest. Those are grievance theories, Social identity theory, resource mobilization theory, informational cascades model, and political process model.

### **2.2.1. Grievance theory of protest**

There is a quite long history in the study of protest, with much of the early research on protests focused on questions related to levels of inequality and deprivation. Gurr (1970) and ( Davies, 1962) articulated models suggesting that the gap between expectations and achievement would contribute to the willingness of people to protest in particular, it was fueled by movements in this perceived deprivation. A variant of the relative deprivation argument posits that inequality is a cause of internal dissent and revolution. Structural inequality has been linked to the mass political violence characteristic of revolutionary movements in the developing world, although the evidence is mixed as to whether it is income or land inequality that is of greatest importance (Russett 1964; Midlarski 1988; Muller and Seligson 1987). The inequality either land or income generates discontent among those who go without, resulting in large-scale political violence that, if handled poorly by the state, can evolve into civil war.

Ethnic grievance is conventionally seen as the principal means by which mass political action is realized in multiethnic countries. Perceived as having a mobilization advantage over other interest groups (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Horowitz 1985), ethnic groups can cultivate a collective sense of injustice stemming from political, economic, or social discrimination (Gurr 1970). Such grievances induce individuals to rebel against the government because their own welfare is seen as linked to the group's status, particularly when discrimination by other groups leaves socioeconomic expectations unfulfilled. Prominent among grievance model was relative deprivation theory.

Prominent among grievance theories was relative deprivation theory. Feelings of relative deprivation result from comparison of one's situation with a standard as it one's past, someone else's situation, or a cognitive standard such as equity or justice (Folger, 1986). If comparison results in the conclusion that one is not receiving what one deserves, a person experiences relative deprivation. Runciman (1966) referred to relative deprivation based on personal comparisons as egoistic deprivation and to relative deprivation based on group comparisons as fraternalistic deprivation that is particularly important for engagement in protest.

Next to relative deprivation, social psychologists have applied social justice theory to theorize on grievances and protest (Tyler and Smith, 1998). Social justice literature distinguishes between two classes of justice judgments: distributive and procedural justice. Distributive justice is similar to relative deprivation; it refers to the fairness of outcomes. Procedural justice refers to the fairness of decision making procedures and the relational aspects of the social process (Tyler and Smith, 1998).

Grievance theory of protests, differently from the natural resource mobilization and social identity theories; it argues that, people participate in protests to express their grievances stemming from relative deprivation, frustration, and perceived injustice (Berkowitz, 1972; Gurr, 1970; Lind and Taler, 1988). The grievance theory challenged the resource mobilization theorists, for their argument that, strong resource base serve as a mechanism for mobilizing protest; and those who had better resources had advantage to mobilize protests. Yet for grievance theorists the above argument will be valid only when extractable resources are contested and controlled by protest forces (Regan and Norton,(n.d). There are structural "reasons" for expressing discontent; it is the ability to mobilize resources that determines the extent of internal conflict.

Grievance theory falsified the arguments of game theorists that the rational person will not protest against inequality; inequality alone is not sufficient to generate protest (Ilichbach, 1994) through the counter argument that, anger moves people to adapt a more challenging relationship with authorized; then subordinate people became despise and mobilize groups against the state.

Protest needs consensus and rational common interests and common ideologies. Hence, it requires framing to bringing mechanisms between the more individual as well as the more emotional to the concepts of grievance interpretations (Klandermans, 1984).

### **2.2.2. Social identity theory of protest**

In the 1970s, a social psychological identity perspective on protest emerged in the form of social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Tajfel and Turner (1979) showed that social categorization according to some trivial criterion such as the 'blue' or the 'red' group suffices to make people feel, think and act as a group member. Compared to this 'minimal group paradigm', real world intergroup conflicts with histories, high emotional intensity attached to them and sociopolitical consequences can be seen as 'maximal group paradigms' that bring powerful group membership to mind (Van Stekelenburg et al., 2010). SIT proposes that people generally strive for and benefit from positive social identities associated with their groups. The only way for participants in minimal group studies to obtain a positive social identity is by identifying with the groups into which they are categorized, and then ensuring that their group comes off best in the only available comparison between the groups (i.e. giving more rewards to the in-group than the out-group).

People who conceive status positions as variable see protest as a possible method to heighten group status, especially when the low group status is perceived as illegitimate. Members of a low-status group who perceive the dominant group's position as illegitimate and unstable can use a variety of strategies to obtain a more positive social identity. They may, for instance, redefine characteristics of their own group previously seen as negative (Black is beautiful!); or they may engage in social competition of which protest is the clearest expression.

Groups in conflict often differ in power and status, and changing status relations and their perceived legitimacy are crucial in understanding intergroup conflict. Traditionally, SIT studies have focused on low-status groups collectively challenging the actions of high-status groups. However, members of high status groups may also challenge the authority in solidarity with members of low-status groups (Subasiç et al., 2008). At the core of this political solidarity is psychological change in the self-categorization of members of high-status groups through which it is no longer the authority but the minority that best embodies the relevant norms, values and

beliefs that define who 'we' are and how 'we' should relate to each other. Through this process, high-status members squeeze low-status members' cause as their own and become willing to collectively challenge the authority. Moreover, members of high-status groups may perceive their own identity to be threatened too if they believe that their status is being eroded or that low-status groups are becoming more powerful (Van Stekelenburg et al., 2010). For instance, sociological approaches show that structural social changes – immigration flows, increasing political power of minorities or economic contraction – induce threats to majorities who may react with exclusionary measures (Koopmans, 2004) or protest (Van Dyke and Soule, 2002). Interestingly, social psychological approaches show that it is perceptions of competition rather than actual competition that invoke hostility to minorities (Sniderman et al., 2004).

### **2.2.3. Resource mobilization theory of protest**

Grievance theories came under attack in the 1970s by scholars arguing that grievances do not provide a sufficient reason to participate in protest. Indeed, grievances abound while protest does not. Therefore, they continue, the key question to address is: why do some aggrieved people become mobilized, while others do not? Sociologists and political scientists suggested availability of resources (McCarthy and Zald, 1977) and the presence of political opportunities (McAdam, 1982) as key to protest mobilization. Groups with more resources and opportunities are more likely to mobilize.

Claiming that grievance is too common a condition to explain the actual variation in political mobilization, other scholars have focused on the resources available to dissidents as an explanatory variable (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978). The resource mobilization hypothesis suggests that groups overcome the free rider problem by using resources to facilitate communication, offer selective benefits, or impose sanctions. Since social movements deliver collective goods, few individuals will "on their own" bear the costs of working to obtain them. Explaining collective behavior requires detailed attention to the selection of incentives, cost-reducing mechanisms or structures, and career benefits that lead to collective behavior (Oberschall, 1973).

Social movements are based upon aggrieved populations which provide the necessary resources and labor. Conscience constituents, individual and organizational, may provide major sources of support. And in some cases supporters-those who provide money, facilities, and even labor-may have no commitment to the values that underlie specific movements. The capacity to control and organize resources is what ultimately determines a group's mobilization. Empirical support for the idea that collective action increases with greater access to resources finds support in some studies (Khawaja, 1994), while others claim that the relationship is not necessarily linear (Jenkins et al, 2004).

#### **2.2.4. Why grievance theory to explain the case?**

At the heart of every protest are grievances, be it the experience of illegitimate inequality, feelings of relative deprivation, feelings of injustice, moral indignation about some state of affairs, or a suddenly imposed grievance (Klandermans, 1997). Suddenly imposed grievances refer to an unexpected threat or inroad upon people's rights or circumstances (Walsh, 1981). Grievances resulting from violated principles refer to moral outrage because it is felt that important values or principles are violated.

In fact the existence of multiple identity, language, ethnicity, religious, culture and create a mosaic Ethiopia which dated back more than three thousand of years. The social categorization according to some trivial criterion such as the 'blue' or the 'red' group suffices to make people feel, think and act as a group member (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). SIT proposes that people generally strive for and benefit from positive social identities associated with their groups. However, the above argument formulated by social identity theorists failed to explain the case of popular protests in Gondar from the onset through the slogans that read at the demonstration.

In accordance to resource mobilization theorists, suggested availability of resources (McCarthy and Zald, 1977) and the presence of political opportunities (McAdam, 1982) as key to protest mobilization. Groups with more resources and opportunities are more likely to mobilize. However, natural resource could be managed in a democratic way in different courtiers of the world. Hence, the structural "reasons" for expressing discontent; it is the ability to mobilize resources that determines the extent of protest must be examined. Grievance is not socially

constructed by protest entrepreneurs as some political elites argued, yet it lie at the core of motivation to organize in response to mal-distribution of resources as well as political access which contains broader aspects of life. Since protest is a movement towards better life for groups, it requires understanding of factors of protest, mechanisms of protesting and popular expectations from broader point of view. It is a wrong generalization that popular protests caused by single factors; however it requires multiple and complicated factors. Having this in mind, the rise popular protest in Gondar since 2016 must be analyzed through the more comprehensive interpretation out of both resource mobilization and social identity point of view. There for grievance theory of protest best explain the case of popular protest in Gondar since 2016.

### **2.3. Cascade model**

Another approach to collective action emphasizes the informational constraints on individual choices. Scholars working in this tradition employ cascade models premised on the notion that individual actions have informational effects on the likelihood of mass mobilization (Schelling 1978; Kuran 1991). This suggests that the lack of information on how others might behave is a chief impediment to political mobilization because an individual's decision to join in collective action will depend on her expectations about what others will do, particularly when political mobilization might provoke a punitive response by the government. In short, an individual's likelihood of joining collective action increases along with her expectations about the number of others who will do the same, which would lower the costs of her participation.

### **2.4. Political mobilization model**

The political mobilization model tries to analyze the political causes and political outcomes of protests. It emphasizes the role of political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes, along with protest cycles and contentious repertoires. Research on state repression has underscored the reciprocal relationship between political mobilization and regime responses (Lichbach 1987; Olzak 1989; Davenport 1995). Governments have an incentive to suppress protests as quickly as possible, lest they become more threatening forms of dissent. But greater resistance can also be provoked when governments apply repression indiscriminately. Inter-ethnic or inter-religious hatreds are probably the most common explanation for protests. Inter-

group hatreds must be greater in societies which are fractionalized than in those which are homogenous. Political exclusion can occur either through generalized repression or because some particular group is victimized (Jagers and Gurr, 1995).

The case of Gondar protest under this study would best explained under political process model because of the model focuses on investigating the political factors that inspire popular protests as well as political out comes. The model emphasized on the mobilizing structure and its process. The protester under this mode had expected to maximize political opportunities to be effective. Having this in mind the researcher had affiliated to express the case under the political process model.

### **2.5. Peaceful and violent protests**

Although it is difficult to classify protests, most political scholars agreed on protest can be either peaceful or violent. Peaceful protest fits into the broader spectrum of collective action. It is impossible to completely parse protest from collective action. Therefore; Peaceful protest is frequently used to describe protests that are not violent, mirroring the treaty language determining the scope of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly. Nonviolent resistance is a civilian-based method used to wage conflict through social, psychological, economic, and political means without the threat or use of violence. Peaceful protest may follow a predictable cycle, but it appears to unfold differently for each country.

Various forms of collective expression, gatherings or assemblies, in public places (demonstrations, marches or public rallies) undertaken by individuals united by shared objectives, and include verbal and non-verbal forms of expression (e.g. pamphlets distribution, performing music, dance or theatre, satire, graphics, posters or slogans). It also encompasses actions that may be characterized as “direct action” or “civil disobedience” (e.g. blockades, sit-ins, occupations or boycotts). The term protest is also an emotive one. For many, it provokes thoughts of social justice movements and the positive exercise of rights. For others, in particular repressive governments and conservative forces in society, the term is associated with disorder, chaos, unrest and challenges or threats to authority.



## 2.6. Causes of popular protests

The conditions under which social movements occur have been the subject a long and vigorous debate. Marx believed that social movements/revolution occurs as a result of the contradictions or irresolvable tension in societies, in particular related to economic changes. workers begin to appreciate social satisfaction and to resent what they perceive as the embezzlement of their productive labor by the bourgeoisie; thus they seek greater socio-economic advantages through existing political means, but if these fail to deliver (particularly in times of economic crisis) they will resort to protest and revolutionary organization (Marx 1848, quoted in Davies 1962). Charles D. Brockett (1992) pointed that, land is the most important resource in rural societies, and access to sufficient land is invariably the fundamental desire of most peasants. Accordingly, it has long been thought that the mal-distribution of land is the key determinant of rural unrest, particularly unrest in its most dramatic forms, rebellion and revolution. However, Muller and Seligson(1987) claim that this conventional wisdom is wrong. Their cross-national longitudinal data analysis of 85 states finds both that landlessness is irrelevant as an explanation for political violence and that land inequality has only weak predictive value. Instead, they discover a stronger relationship for mass political violence with national income inequality.

Contrary to Marx's expectations revolutions did not occur in all advanced industrial societies. This led Davies (1962) to theorize that social protest movements are more likely to occur not when people are in dire poverty but when there is some improvement in their living conditions and their expectations start to raise i.e. relative deprivation. This situation leads to a dissatisfied population with an unsatisfied state of mind, which results in revolution not only because of insufficient supplies of food or shelter, or means of liberty and democracy, but because people essentially want more capital. Davies (1962) supports this notion by saying that "It is the dissatisfied state of mind rather than the tangible provision of 'adequate' or 'inadequate' supplies of food, equality, or liberty which produces the revolution" (Davies 1962). In most protests there is a combination of calls for higher expectations and more opportunities to satisfy basic needs, "which may range from merely physical (food, clothing, shelter, health, and safety from badly harm) to social (the affection ties of family and friends) to the need for equal dignity and justice" (Davies 1962).

But Tilly (1978) pointed out that Davies' theory does not explain how and why different groups mobilize to achieve change. Tilly distinguishes four components of collective action: the organization, mobilization of resources, common interests, and opportunity. Collective action is a means of mobilizing group resources when people have no institutionalized means of making their voices heard, or when their voices are repressed by government. The classical view of Plato that poor people have protests to seek material security of life and property was extended to include the Enlightenment values of liberty and democracy from the 18<sup>th</sup> century onwards, to which a postmodern stratum has been added about "equal dignity and justice", reflecting the race-based revolutionary movements of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

If particular individuals or small groups are dissatisfied with the government's performance, this will not lead to a revolution unless there is awareness that there are other people who are dissatisfied as well, and they have the willingness to change and show their desire to unite together and stand against this government (Gottschalk, 1944). This means that revolution happens when people unite together, no matter what their positions or hierarchy in society are, against the ruling system; their unification gives them more strength to overthrow the ruling government. Gottschalk stated that the demand for change, which starts with provocation, should be combined with "solidified public opinion" to reach its goals (Gottschalk 1944). Still, these two factors are not enough for a protest to be carried out; "hopefulness" of success (Gottschalk 1944) is the third cause to be added to the preceding two causes of protests. In order for people to be able to reform, they should have a hope that their revolution will be successful.

This issue is also related to the state of mind mentioned by Davies (1962). People's mind plays a great role as an effective factor that brings change; if people are hopeful that their protest is going to succeed, it is more likely to succeed because they will effectively put their best efforts into making it successful (whether because of optimistic hope or a sense of having nothing to lose). Unlike to Tilly and Smelser (1963) identified six conditions for the development of social movements: structural conduciveness; structural strain; spread of generalized beliefs; suggested ways of remedying them; precipitating factors and trigger factors. These four conditions of Tilly, do not lead to development of social movements unless there is leadership, a means of regular communication, funding and material resources.

Touraine's (1977, 1981) analysis differs from Smelser's principally in allowing that social movements may develop spontaneously to achieve desired social changes rather than being responses to situations. His ideas include: historicity there are more social movements today because people know that social activism can be used to achieve change; rational objectives and strategies regarding how injustices can be overcome; interaction in the shaping of social movements i.e. movements develop in deliberate antagonism with established organizations and with rival social movements. In the same vein, John Locke (1689) declared the right of people to revolt in "Two Treatises of Government". He proclaimed that all people have the right to life, liberty, and estate; people could carry out a revolution against their government when it acted against their interests, and replace this government with a new one that served the interests of citizens. Locke saw the revolution as the safeguard against any regime that does not support its people's interests. In the above-mentioned perspectives, the core argument is that protest is a legitimate right for people; citizens have the right to revolt against the regime degrades them; lack of democracy, reforms, food supplies, freedom and others are all reasons that lead people to revolt. In other words, the legitimate right of the citizens to revolt is when their governments violate the basic principles of existence.

According to popular perceptions grievances are often seen as the main causes of rebellion. However, some suggest that, those factors which determine the financial and military viability of a rebellion are more important than objective grounds for grievance. We find little evidence for grievances as a determinant of conflict. Neither inequality nor political oppression increases the risk of conflict. However, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (2004) find some evidence that societies characterized by 'ethnic dominance,' i.e., where one ethnic group makes up 45-90 percent of the population, have a systematically higher risk of civil war.

Classical theories proposed that people participate in protest to express their grievances stemming from relative deprivation, frustration, or perceived injustice (Berkowitz, 1972; Gurr, 1970; Lind and Tyler, 1988). Scholars of social movements, however, began to question the effects of grievances on movement participation and proposed that the question to be answered is not so much whether people who engage in protest are aggrieved, but whether aggrieved people engage in protest. They suggested that efficacy, resources and opportunities would predict protest participation (Klandermans, 1984; McAdam, 1982; McCarthy and Zald, 1977).

Meanwhile, scholars such as Reicher (1984), Simon et al. (1998) and Klandermans and De Weerd (2000) began to explore the role of collective identity in protest behavior. Recently, the role of emotions has drawn the attention of protest researchers (Van Zomeren et al, 2004). Discussions about politics within networks increase efficacy and transform individual grievances into shared grievances and group-based anger, which translates into protest participation.

## **2.7. Emotion and protest**

The study of emotions has become a popular research area in the social psychology of protest. Such was not always the case. As rational approaches were the state of the art, emotions were often regarded as some peripheral ‘error term’ in motivational theories. Sociological emotional approaches focus on the social nature of emotions whereby concepts such as emotion norms, emotion work and emotion culture play a major role (Goodwin et al, 2001] for a sociological take on emotions and protest). Group based appraisal theories of emotions have reintroduced emotions to the social psychology of protest. Thus people experience emotions on behalf of their group when the social category is salient and they identify with the group at stake (Devos et al, 2002). Anger is seen as the prototypical protest emotion (Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2009). For those of us who have been part of protest events or watched reports on protest events in the news media, this is hardly surprising. Indeed, it is hard to conceive of protest detached from anger. Van Zomeren et al (2004) show that group-based anger is an important motivator of protest participation. Leach and colleagues examined readiness for political action among advantaged but disadvantaged group members can also perceive the in-group advantage as unfair and feel guilt and anger about it. Anger related to in-group advantage, and to a lesser degree guilt, appears to be a potent predictor for protest (Leach et al., 2006). Anger moves people to adopt a more challenging relationship with authorities than subordinate emotions such as shame and despair (Taylor, 2009) or fear (Klandermans et al., 2008), and the situation is seen as hopeless, invoking a ‘nothing to lose’ strategy leading to non-normative protest (Kamans et al., 2010).

## **2.8. Mobilization and protests**

When an individual participates in protest this is the result of a sometimes lengthy process of mobilization. Mobilization is a complicated process that can be broken down into several, conceptually distinct steps. Klandermans (1984) proposed to break the process of mobilization down into consensus and action mobilization. Participating because of common interests or ideologies requires a shared interpretation of who should act, why and how. Movements affect such interpretations by the information they disseminate, a process known as framing (Snow and Benford, 1988). Hence, framing is the bridging mechanism between the more individual social psychological concepts of grievances and emotions and the more sociological concepts of meaning and interpretation. Action mobilization is further broken down into four separate steps: people need to sympathize with the cause; need to know about the upcoming event, must want to participate and they must be able to participate (Klandermans and Oegema, 1987). The first step accounts for the results of consensus mobilization. It distinguishes the general public into those who sympathize with the cause and those who do not. The more successful consensus mobilization has been, the larger the pool of sympathizers a mobilizing movement organization can draw from.

The second step is equally obvious as crucial; it divides the sympathizers into those who have been target of mobilization attempts and those who have not. The third step divides the sympathizers who have been targeted into those who are motivated to participate in the specific activity and those who are not. Finally, the fourth step differentiates the people who are motivated into those who end up participating and those who do not. The net result of these different steps is some (usually small) proportion of the general public that participates in protest. With each step, smaller or larger numbers drop out until an individual eventually takes the final step to participate in an instance of collective political action.

## **2.9. Rebellion and protests**

One of the earliest expressions of popular protests was rebellion. Peasant rebellions have occurred throughout history. When the king saw his subjects in open rebellion, it was a pretty clear sign that the public's support for his government was eroding. Unpaid taxes was another clue; when rulers saw their tax receipts dwindle and heard reports of tax collectors being killed,

they knew that public opinion was turning against them. For centuries rulers have established secret police forces to find out which people oppose the government and to eliminate them.

(Russell G. Brooker )

### 2.10. Conceptual framework

After reviewed theoretical literatures, the researcher had developed a conceptual framework that precisely indicates the factors of popular protest, mechanisms that used in protest activities, the objectives of popular protests, and major requirements to have effective protests.




Diagram 1: articulated by the researcher based on the literature.

## **2.12. Empirical literatures**

### **2.12.1 Protests in the world**

In recent years the world has been shaken by protests. From the Arab Spring to the “Indignations” (outraged), from Occupy to food riots. There have been periods in history when large numbers of people rebelled about the way things were, demanding change, such as in 1848, 1917 or 1968 (Isabel Ortiz and et’al, 2013). Today we are experiencing another period of rising outrage and discontent. Some of the largest protests in world history related to the economic crisis, massive protests against the international financial institutions and their neoliberal policies of ‘structural adjustment’ occurred between the mid-1970s and the end of the 1980s. John Walton and David Seddon (1994, 39) in their hitherto most encompassing study on ‘austerity protests’ report that 146 protests worldwide for the period from 1976 to 1992 with a peak in the years 1983–1985. Austerity protests can be defined as ‘large-scale collective actions including political demonstrations, general strikes, and riots, which are animated by grievances over state policies of economic liberalization, implemented in response to the debt crisis and market reforms urged by international agencies’ (Ibid.). Another important wave was unleashed in 1989–1990 with the end of the cold war and characterized by claims for democracy and political change (Larmer, 2010). Socio-economic aims never disappeared from the agenda of popular protests, and self-evidently, they are inseparably interwoven with political demands. The ‘IMF riots’ of the 1970s and 1980s already addressed material and democratic concerns at the same time (Seddon and Zeilig, 2005). Nevertheless, the 1990s protests were ‘more explicitly political and with more far-reaching aims and objectives’ (Ibid).

Many political and academic debates on this period are shaped by hegemonic Western ideas of liberal democracy and ‘good governance’. In contrast, within many societies in the global South, social forces existed whose claims went far beyond liberal concepts of democracy and participation, thereby linking political to economic change (Ayers, 2006). Since the early 2000s, they have again been witnessing massive and continuous protests that claim substantial political and economic change similar to the protests in the decades before. For instance, South African post-apartheid politics has been shaped by workers’ struggles and service delivery protests since the early 2000s (Alexander, 2010). Isabel Ortiz and et’al (2013) identified 843 protest events

reflects a steady increase in the overall number of protests every year, from 2006 (59 protests) to mid-2013 (112 protests events in only half a year). Following the onset of the global financial and economic crisis began to unfold; there is a major increase in protests beginning 2010 with the adoption of austerity measures in all world regions. Protests are more prevalent in lower income countries (304 protests), followed by Latin America and the Caribbean (141 protests), East Asia and the Pacific (83 protests) and Sub-Saharan Africa (78 protests). An analysis of the Middle East and North Africa region (77 protests) shows that protests were also prevalent prior to the Arab Spring. The majority of violent riots counted in the study occurred in low-income countries (48% of all riots), mostly caused by food-price and energy-price spikes in those countries. Interestingly, the period 2006-2013 reflects an increasing number of global protests (70 events), organized across regions.

On the heels of the struggles against colonialism and apartheid, several waves of popular protests in the global South in the last decades can be identified (Larmer 2010; Seddon and Zeilig 2005). In the course of the ‘Arab Spring’, since December 2010, mass protests have attempted, and at least in some cases succeeded, to overcome regimes in Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, Yemen and several other states. Beyond these well-known events, myriads of uprisings, strikes and many other forms of protests both on the local and the national scale can be observed all over the globe and particularly in Africa. In 2007 and 2008, numerous major cities worldwide witnessed riots, most of them in Africa (Major and Ekine, 2012; Patel and McMichael 2009). In most cases, people gathered in the streets and markets and marched to symbolic public or private places, sometimes plundering shops or setting fire to buildings or barricades. In most cases, riots, demonstrations and strikes focused not only on the high cost of living but also on social inequality and political repression, as well as on ruling parties and presidents who had often been in power for many years or even decades (Patel and McMichael 2009). A common feature of virtually all protests is that a broad range of participants from various segments of the respective societies are involved, sometimes pursuing different goals, but acting within the same structural political-economic conditions. The recent riots and other protests, in the same way as the ‘IMF riots’ of previous decades, are an integral part of the process of global capitalist restructuring (Seddon and Zeilig, 2005), hence popular protests against particularly oppressive



forms of capital accumulation (Ibid). Material concerns remain central to social struggles, in Africa as elsewhere.

### **2.12.2. Popular protest in Ethiopia post 2005 national election**

Although Ethiopia registers an annual economic growth rates close to 10% since 2006 for successive 10 years(World Bank, 2017), the EPRDF has controlled the political trajectory of the country and displayed an authoritarian mode of governance, primarily through maintaining a solid grip on the country's military and intelligence services. This authoritarianism is perceived to be driven by fears of national disintegration. As a result, small ideologically driven elite seek to maintain their privileged status at the expense of other groups, leveraging on rhetoric about sacrifices made during the guerrilla war against the Derg. Political inequality and oppression became the characteristics of the government. Consequently, Protests erupted in Ethiopia in 2005 against election results and Violation civil as well as political rights of the citizens.

On Sunday evening (i.e. 15 May 2005), just hours after the polls were closed, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi declared a one-month ban on all demonstrations and protests in Addis.

Immediately after the provisional results were released, university students in Addis Ababa started the first major protest against the alleged vote rigging in the polls by the ruling party and defied the demonstration ban of the government. Two waves of major urban violence took place in June and November 2005. There were further pro-CUD protests starting in late December 2005, and continuing into early 2006. Students boycotted school and college classes, resulting in widespread school closures, and there were widespread arrests and beating of students and teachers suspected of instigating the boycotts. They started the protest on Monday, June 6, 2005, inside the university campuses. On Tuesday (i.e. June 7, 2005) other students' protests were reported in various regional towns like Bahr Dar, Awassa, Gondar and Jimma – areas that were not under the demonstration ban. In Amhara, there were instances of communal violence against Tigrayan communities, as well as reports of armed banditry. By most estimates, tens of thousands were detained, many released without charge after some months, and some charged later with criminal offenses (UN institution of peace, 2007).

Since November 2015, Ethiopia has experienced another unprecedented wave of popular protests. The government responded to the protests with a heavy hand, resulting in thousands of casualties and tens of thousands of people arrested, and charged with terrorism offenses. Protests in Gondar aggravated in August 2016 against arbitrary detention and demanding the self-determination of the ethnic Amhara particularly in Gondar community since July 2016. Despite of resolving the problem though peacefully, the House of Peoples' Representatives, the Lower Chamber of Federal Parliament, endorsed the State of Emergency Declaration on 20 October 2016 that outlines broad restrictions on a range of human and democratic rights.

### **2.12.3. The role of interest groups in protests**

Interest groups would be valid measures of protests. They are remarkably unrepresentative of the public as a whole. The wealthy and the educated members of society are much more likely to be organized into interest groups and employ representatives. The poor and uneducated are much less able to speak to the government through lobbyists. Nevertheless, legislators, staffers, and other government personnel do pay attention to what interest groups say (Herbst.S, 1998).

### **2.12.4. The role of Media in protests**

Many government officials, and many regular citizens, look to the media to understand the views of the public. In Herbst's (1998) study, she found that legislative staffers also considered the media to accurately present public opinion as well as grievance. According to (Russell G. Brooker) Media, such as television, newspapers, and magazines are important because of the news they choose and how they portray the issues. In other terms, they are important in determining the political agenda (what people in the government are thinking about) and in framing the issues (how the issues are being considered).

## **CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY**

The chapter had detailed about the data those are collected from different sources via verity instruments; it also discussed on the general philosophical paradigm and research approach with the specific design and methods those are employed to conduct the study. The area under the study had been described; and the rationality that researcher had selected the area is also available under the chapter. To the end, the major ethical considerations on the course of the study have got adequate explanation.


### **3.1. Description of the study area**

The study area is located in North Western Ethiopia, 748 km from the capital Addis Ababa and with a distance of 178 km from Bahirdar town which is the capital city of the Amhara region. It stretches along a ridge in the northern Ethiopian highlands. The town is situated at an elevation of 2,200 meters, and is surrounded on three sides by a crown of 3,000- meter high mountains. It has a total area of 293 sq km (2015). Gondar was founded by Emperor Fasilides about the year 1635, and grew as an agricultural and market town. It is a city and a separate woreda in Ethiopia, which was once the old imperial capital and the capital of the historic Begemder Province from 1632-1868. Located in the Central Gondar Zone in the Amhara Region, Gondar is North of Tana Lake on the Lesser Angereb River and SouthWest of the Simien Mountains. The city administration of Gondar is comprised of 20 kebeles and one satellite town .The city has a latitude and longitude of 12°36'N and 37°28'E with and elevation of 2200 meters above sea level. The city is nicknamed "The Camelot of Africa" due to the presence of a group of royal castles (From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia). Even though, there are a lot of infrastructures that should be fulfilled by the municipality the dwellers suffer from shortage of a lot of infrastructure since its origin. The annual rainfall in the town reaches up to 1,172 mm (Tewodros Ferede, 2011). Rainfall variability in time is considerably high especially at the beginning and end of the main rainy season. The agro-ecological climatic zone is “winaDega” with a mean annual temperature ranging from 12.90C to 26.40C and an average of 200c.

The 2007 national census reported a total population of Gondar of 206,987 households, of whom 98,085 (49.47%) were men and 108,902 (50.53%) were women in which 1998 are headed by male and 273 are headed by female households. According to 2007 census conducted

by Gondar town municipality, the town is generally characterized by rapid population growth with a growth rate of 4.4% (CSA; 2007); The 2015 CSA projection shows that Gondar city would have around 323,900 peoples.

The major ethnic group of the town is the Amhara (CSA, 2007). There are two major reasons that the researcher had select Gondar as study area. The first reason is that the state of popular protest in Gondar is not adequately researched; the researcher wants to investigate the issue. The proximity of the area to the researcher is economically feasible.



### **3.2. Philosophical paradigm**

The researcher conducted this study on the line of transformative philosophical paradigm with epistemological stand points. Because, a transformative worldview holds that research inquiry needs to be intertwined with politics and a political change agenda to confront social oppression at whatever levels it occurs (Mertens, 2010). Transformative philosophical worldview focuses on the needs of groups and individuals in the society that had been marginalized or disenfranchised (Kincheloe, 2008). In most case, transformative philosophical paradigm can be used interchangeably with critical theory paradigm. Critical researchers endeavor to bring to light the beliefs and actions that limit human freedom with the ultimate aim of transforming the situation. The task of researchers is to confront those in positions of power and expose the oppressive structures that subjugate people and create inequality. Epistemologically, critical theory is subjective in that it is assumed that no object can be researched without being affected by the researcher. Critical researchers try to be self-conscious of their own epistemological presuppositions and communicate them clearly when entering into an investigation so “no one is confused concerning the epistemological and political baggage they bring with them to the research site” (Kincheloe & McLaren, 2005).

The research contains an action call for reform that had changed lives of the participants, and the institutions in which individuals work or live. Hence, the researcher had intended to analyze the interests of the protesters as factors; mechanisms to mobilize the protests activities those were important to brought change in the work and bureaucracy of the incumbent government. Moreover, specific issues need to be addressed that speak to important social issues of the day, issues such as inequality, oppression, domination, suppression, and alienation; that is way the researcher had selected the popular protests in Gondar since 2016.

### **3.3. Research approach: Qualitative approach**

Research approaches are plans and the procedures for research that span the steps from broad assumptions to detailed methods of data collection, analysis, and interpretation. Qualitative research is an approach for exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem. Qualitative research focuses on the process that is

occurring as well as the product or outcome; researchers are particularly interested in understanding how things occur (Merriam, 1988).

The researcher had raised “what are” questions to explore the factors of popular protest in Gondar, the mechanisms used to mobilize the protests and the major implications of the popular protests since 2016. Therefore, the researcher collected qualitative data from primary and secondary sources through interview, FGD, and document review; then analyze the data thematically by using both inductive and deductive approaches respectively.

Qualitative researchers typically gather multiple forms of data, such as interviews, observations, documents, and audiovisual information rather than rely on a single data source. Then the researchers review all of the data, make sense of it, and organize it into categories or themes that cut across all of the data sources. This inductive process illustrates working back and forth between the themes and the database until the researcher has established a comprehensive set of themes. Then deductively, the researcher looks back at their data from the themes to determine if more evidence can support each theme or whether they need to gather additional information. While the process of qualitative data analysis begins inductively, deductive thinking also plays an important role as the analysis moves forward (Creswell & Brown, 1992).

The researcher tries to develop a complex picture of the problem under study. This involves identifying the many factors involved in a situation, and generally sketching the larger picture that emerges. A visual model of many facets of a process or a central phenomenon aids in establishing this holistic picture (see, for example, Creswell & Brown, 1992).

### **3.4. Research design**

The objectives of the study are to exploring the factors, mechanisms, and the major implications of popular protests in Gondar since 2016. Thus the researcher used case study design from the different types of descriptive research. Under this descriptive case study, researcher primarily concerned with finding “what” questions. The researcher had explored the situations that were existed in the study area.

In accordance to the literatures in the field, the aim of case studies is providing the precise description or reconstruction of a case (see Ragin and Becker, 1992); it help to derive richer, more contextualized, and more authentic interpretation of the phenomenon of interest than most other research methods by virtue of its ability to capture a rich array of contextual data (Anol Bhattacharjee, 2012). It can help understand a topic and lead to causal analysis (Uwe Flick, 2009). Therefore, the case study design had been employed as design for the study because the researcher intended to make a detailed analysis of the overall exploration of the state of popular protests via selecting a sample of subjects from a large number of populations of political activists, city dwellers, civil societies, political leaders, and security officers by collecting valid data.

### **3.5. Sources of Data**

Primary and secondary data are used in order to that, the researcher had had enough information. Primary data are collected from of political activists, civil societies, political leaders, and security officers. Focus Group Discussion also used to collect further primary data. Indeed, secondary data are collected through documents review.

### **3.6. Samples and Sampling Techniques**

In order to obtain reliable data for the study, various sampling techniques had been employed. The researcher used non- probability sampling techniques. Among that, purposive sampling employed to select a head the city administration, two heads of ADP at the city administration as well as a head of police office in Gondar city administration assuming that those individuals would have adequate knowledge and experiences what the researcher needs to explore.

Two sub-cities had identified purposefully where the protests were started in 2016 (Maraki and Arada) on 12<sup>th</sup> July and 1<sup>st</sup> August respectively; availability (convenience) sampling had been employed to select 10 individuals from two sub-cities until the researcher had got saturated data. It was also employed to select 10 civil servants for FGD. Convenience sampling enables to get informants or respondents who believed to be representative of the population. In addition, snowball sampling was available since it helps the researcher to identifying samples from the networks to select five political activists until the data saturation level. Snowball sampling

would help to identify the case questions of the interest people and collected precious information from the population sampling (Creswell, 2013).

### **3.7. Data gathering instruments**

In this study, different data gathering instruments had been employed to have reliable and valid data from the sources. The researcher used semi-structured interview frequently; focus group discussion and document reviews were also the others means of gathering data.

#### **3.7.1 Interview**

According to Yelew (2011:179), interview can be categorized in to three sub divisions; those are structured, semi-structured, and unstructured interviews. Semi-structured interview is mostly similar to open ended questionnaires; it enables the researcher to get detailed information about the issue under the study. Semi structured interview minimize the individual biases of the researcher and it also reduce the difficulties for junior researchers. As a result semi-structured interview used frequently for police and political leaders, city dwellers and political activists to get detailed evidences about factors of popular protests, major mechanisms used to mobilize the protest and the implications of the protest in the selected area.

#### **3.7.2 Focus group discussion**

According to Krueger,R.A (1900), FGD is important to get reliable information since group members influence each other by responding to ideas and comments in the discussion. It is flexible and information rich by nature and it allows the emergency of a useful discussion about a broad topic. In this thesis FGD will employed for ten civil servants assuming that those civil servants could explain the factors which inspire the people to protest freely as well as deeply. Again the researcher had expected that, those civil servants are being familiar with the day to day activities of at least local government while it passed political as well as economic decisions that affect the life of the people.



### **3.7.3 Documents review**

The thesis is being supported by data that are collected from different documents which contains valid information. Different legal documents, annual reports of different national and international institutions, proclamations, journals, newspapers, press and electronic media reports, speeches of political and public figures, and books had been reviewed to extract data about the proposed questions of the study. Yalaw (2011) elaborates that, the researcher can use document review to collect data about the past and present events.

### **3.8. Methods of Data Analysis**

Qualitative data had been collected through interviews, focus group discussions, and documents reviews are being organized under different thematic areas analyzed simultaneously during the data collection processes. Data were analyzed thematically in line with research questions. Patton (1987) indicated that, three things occur during qualitative data analysis; data are reduced through summarization and categorization, displayed, and patterns and themes in the data are identified and linked. According to Creswell (2008), thematic analysis is the prime feature of qualitative research.

Issues intended to be addressed by the researcher analyzed by using findings that are obtained from interview, Focus Group Discussion, and documents review analyzed through thematic discussion with triangulation method to check the truthiness of the data; Triangulation is the technique of maximizing the accuracy of information through the reliance of varied sources. In triangulation technique, involve the use of a diversity of informants and a range of documents which compares different interviews and perception of the same subject in the contrast of different vantage points.

### **3.9. Field work experiences**

The researcher had conducted this study based on the pre-planned procedures and allotted budget with the given time break. The time from October 2018 to January 2019 was for proposal development. After the approval of the proposal by the university staffs in February 2019 the actual field work has been started.

Firstly I went to Gondar from Belessa 90 kms east of Gondar city on April 15/2019. I had met the head of the Gondar city administration and ask his permission to be participant in my study after I aware about the purpose of the study. However, he was busy by the time and gave appointment for 25 April 2019 at local time 2:30 Am. Then I turn my focus to the other two informants who had a position of ADP chief executives at city administration level. After I went to their office I asked permission as usual. The response was similar with former; yet I had an appointment for April 26/ 2019.

On the second day, my destination was the Gondar city police commission office on April 16/2019 at local time 2:30. I took my first interview after I had had his volunteerism to be participant in the study. I had taken data on my not book since he was not ok to take records. In the afternoon, I had organized my note to be more legible and tried to correlate the response with the objectives.

On 17<sup>th</sup> April 2019, I had got two politically active individuals who had great role during the process of the popular protests. I asked their permission by telephone. Then on the morning I had interview with the first one, and I had contacted the other in the afternoon in bole garden restaurant where it found in Maraki sub city;I had took audio records from both individuals. At the end both had recommended to meet other individuals by giving their addresses.

On April 21 and 22, I had interview with three interviewees who were selected though snowballing. Only one of them permitted to take records; I had taken notes from two individuals. On the April 25 and 26 was an appointed date by the ADPs chair executives and the vice head of the city administration. I had taken the interview from 4:00 to 10:00 with all of the three political appointees independently each consumes not more than an hour.

On wards my focus was on city dwellers; in Maraki and Arada sub cities where they are selected purposely as I had stated in the methodology part. On May 20/2019, I had taken interview with fife residents in Maraki sub city who were available from nine I had asked to be participants. Four individuals could not participant due to their absence of permission. From the

fife available participants only two were ok to take records. I had taken note as much as possible during the interview. On the next day I went to Arada sub city; I had got other fife individuals who were volunteers to participate in the study while two refuses my questions. They gave valuable data for my study, yet four of them were not interested to take records.

My last travel to Gondar was on June 10/2019 to take FGDs with civil servants in the city administration from two selected sectors through lottery system. I had asked 12 individuals from different sectors; and had got appointment to meet on June 13/2019 in Walia general secondary school compound at 3:00Am. Then we meet on time and I took the data based on the cheek lists I had prepared. Due to the consensus, I could not take video or audio records.

After I had collected data from different sources, I had transcripts from the audio records and make data minimization which were not relevant for analysis. Then I tried to put in the line of the objectives and questions to make easy for organization. At the end I had discussed and triangulate the data.

### **3.10. Ethical consideration**

The researchers should be guided by research ethics which are usually acceptable. All sorts of ethical consideration are kept intact throughout the whole process of the study. The researcher made the participants to be aware about the general purpose of the study; and ask their permission to be participants. Only the volunteers are participated in the study process. As a result no data are collected out the consent of the participated and used in the study as they provided without fabrications and bending to personal biases. Since the issue is more politically sensitive, the researcher was confidential to informants for whatever information they provided to them. Moreover, the researchers strongly condemned plagiarism. Any parts of the other's assumptions, conclusions and ideas in the research provided with proper citation. At the end, the researcher acknowledged the participants for their participation and valuable data which were important to conduct the study.

### **3.9. Trustworthiness of the research**

The credibility and dependability of the research were insured by the use of both secondary and primary data sources through multiple methods of data gathering instruments such as interview, FGDs and documents review. To be more confident, the researcher tried to cross-check the data from different participants through triangulation method of analysis.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **4. MAJOR FACTORS, MECHANISMS AND IMPLICATIONS OF POPULAR PROTEST IN GONDAR SINCE 2016**

In this chapter of the thesis, the researcher tried to display data that were collected from different sources through interview, FGDs and document review after it had analyzed under basic thematic areas that had identified the onset of the study. Triggering as well as structural factors had been available in this chapter. In addition, the major mechanisms that used to mobilize are explained with different topics and sub- topics. Then major negative and positive implications resulted from the Gondar protest had been discussed under chapter four.

#### ***4.1 Factors for the rise of popular protest in Gondar***

It is difficult to find out one and single causes for the rise of popular protests. It is an area of controversies among the scholars in the field. For instance Marx.G (1975) believed that the cause of popular protests is the existence contradiction or tension between the society among who have and have not. On the other hand, Charles D. Brocket (2005) identified mal-distribution of land is the motivating factors for protests. Yet, Mueller,E (1972) did not agreed by both Marx's and brocket's assumption; they give emphasis on the existence of inequality as the cause of popular protests. The researcher had discussed the factors of popular protests in Gondar in the following section of the study.

#### **4.1.1 Structural Factors**

##### **4.1.1.1. Lack of economic opportunities**

Since the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) came to power in 1991, it has governed by the principle that national security will best be served by an intrinsic combination of equitable as well as rapid economic growth and democratic advancement. The establishment and consolidation of an effective development state, combined with a form of democratic federalism ensuring peoples' participation in administering their own affairs, have been seen as the two key pillars driving Ethiopia's "renaissance" from 1991. Through the

promotion of a development statist vision, and the state controlling many sources of rent and owning around two-thirds of businesses in the country, Ethiopia registers an annual economic growth rates close to 10% (World Bank, 2017).

However, the economic growth is accompanied by growing inequalities between regions and localities of the country as all of the interviewee had affirmed. Participants of the FGDs approved on, the absence of industries which carries a large number of labor and professional workers in Gondar town. They replied that the only industry that had built in Gondar is “Dashin Brewery” which is intentionally constructed to addict the productive citizen of the area. During the years of the protests, the people have banned the product not to be drunk in Gondar as well as the whole Amhara claiming that the profit of the factory distributed for Tigrayan elites who had dominated the government since the EPRDF came to power were being the main beneficiary of the economic boom.

Informant (KI, 01: on 25/04/2019) insured that, “various mega projects with huge amount of budget by the name of government development projects” were headed by Tegrians or pro-Tegrians; they provide investments on the bases of personal affiliation. Based on the evidences those are extracted from the informants and decussates, the people of Gondar was marginalized not only the countries politics but also from the economic benefits. The key investment area in Gondar town was on the hands of Tegrians or a person who comes out of Gondar including the small scale enterprises. Informant (II, 10: on 21/05/2019) replayed that, a few years before, if you go the market Arada where the largest market place in Gondar, you may feel that you are not in Gondar. Rather, you may think you are purchasing goods in either Axume or Mekele. Personally he suspects that, it might be the reason why the Arada cloth shops mostly owned by Tegreans had been fired in the year 2017.

The other interviewee (II, 12: on 21/05/2019) said as presented below.

...almost all market opportunities were dominated by the Tegrian including sugar distribution for tea shops and city residents. The indigenous Gondar people had no or little chance in private ownership; most people ordered to be dependent on remittent from the diasporas who migrate in to different parts of the world, mostly caused by TPLFs political influence on the region. When the exploitation is becoming more structural the people were waiting for a more triggering cause

and opportunities. July 13/2016 that was the time prepared by supreme almighty God.

In parallel, unemployment rate and underemployment have risen, particularly among educated youth that extends from the minimum 4.64 in 2016 to the maximum 12.65 in 2013 (documented on Gondar city worker and social service department). This indicates that the unemployment rate of Gondar is much greater than the national unemployment rate which recorded the minimum 1.94 in the year 2016 and the maximum 2.25 in the year 2013(world bank,2013). In 2009 for example, as indicated in the World Bank data base (2011), the general unemployment stood at 20.5% in Ethiopia however it exceeds to 62% (documented on Gondar city worker and social service department) in Gondar at the same time. In addition, allegations of public corruption have spread. This has fuelled sentiments of economic marginalization, particularly among non-Tigrayan people, and fed social tensions.

One informant (II, 11: on 21/05/2019) elaborates the cause by citing Amharic proverb “ **ከረሀብ ጦርነት ይሻላል**” in literal translation “ better war than hunger”. The extreme inequality with high unemployment forced the youths to protest against the ruling claiming to bring structural change in Ethiopia.

#### **4.1.1.2. Unresolved Wolkayt Issue**

There are many evidences that show the forceful annexation of Wolkayit Amhara to Tigray region in post 1991. For instance, Amaru Adane(2018) in her exhaustive revelation asserted that, a border re-drawing of the two woreda (mean that Amhara-tegede and Tigray-tsegede) does not follow constitutional and legal involving of all actors from both sides, instead driven by political elites. She reads the statement which extract from informants below hear:

There was a referendum ten years (when she conduct the thesis) ago in Gechew that was monitored by house of federation in which the people voted to remain in the Amhara region, but the results of that referendum had never seen the light of day. ...the TPLF has settled southlands of peoples from Tigray to the Amhara territory in the last decades to deliberately change the demography of the region. The wolkayt and tsegede areas that were the forcefully annexed to Tegray was cause of protest in the last summer in Gondar and Bahir Dar.

Wolkayt is one of several, fertile, and strategic areas governed formerly under Gondar provinces in Tegede district until the TPLF annexed it in to Tegray region in the new ethnic boundaries drawing in 1992. According to some historical literature, TPLF had got control the area of Wolkayt during the civil war period around 1984 when the military junta had withdrawn from the area (Chuchu, 2019). This evidence had been strengthening by the saying of the informants.

Informants (KI,03, and 04: on 16/04/2019) unequivocally argued that, the TPLF military forces were landed at Wolkayt and took a military base on it in the 1980s. In the aftermath of the civil war, the coalition force tried to establish the territorial boundary of the region on behalf of the charter they had adopted. However, the dominant force TPLF, annexed the area to Tegray region without a full consent of the people by force and fake as well as more sophisticated tactics Amhara activists and peoples accuse the TPLF settled a predominantly Tigrayan-speaking population at the area, in spite of the Amhara's historical ownership of the district. The Amhara community has long opposed the government over the Wolkayt district.

In accordance to informant (KI, 01, and 02: on 21&26/04/2019), although the lower political leaders had raised the issue of Wolkayt in different meetings at regional level since from 2005 and onwards, the higher level political elites were reluctant to answer. Even they had criticized as populist and inefficient resulted from their stand on Wolkayt should be belonging to Gondar zonal administration regardless of evaluating their leadership performance.





**Map II**

The 30 regions of the PDRE, 1987-1991)



**Map III**

Map of Ethiopia region in the post 1995

As we seen from the above two maps those are drawn in 1988 and 1995 respectively, we see the common border of Eritrea with Gondar provinces; there were no common border between Tigray and Sudan in the first map located on the left side of this paper. Whereas in the second map which was drawn in the 1995 (after the coming of EPRDF to the power), the Tigray territory had expanded west ward to the former Gondar province to create border connection with Sudan; and they cut off the common border of Eritrea and Gondar for tactical as well as strategic purpose pretense by TPLF. Tegray also expands its regional boundary south wards to the northern wollo provinces of Amhara region.

Informant (I,05: on 17/04/2019) states that,

In recent years, the hitherto sporadic, fragmented, and disorganized sanger gathered momentum and found an organizational expression through the “Wolkayit Committee” that launched a legal campaign of self-definition by recognizing their distinct identity as Amharas. They believe they are wrongly placed in Tigray region. They presented their claim at various levels of governance: at the levels of District, Zone, State, and Federal Governments. The central claim of their demand is the right to self-definition as Amhara rather than Tigryan.<sup>1</sup> The demand for self-definition was however not an end in itself. Through self-definition, they sought to advance what is otherwise known as a demand for ethno-cultural justice. They sought to redress the neglect of their

<sup>1</sup> Map taken from <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/province> of ethiopia

culture as Amhara (holidays, songs, dresses, styles, etc), the marginalization of their language (Amharic) as a medium of providing social services (e.g. education, administration, justice, etc), and their exclusion or severe marginalization in representative political and administrative institutions. They also feel politically dominated by the Tigrayan majority that came up with a series of land laws that affected the transfer of land to Tigrayan investors and settlers thereby increasingly displacing the indigenous inhabitants.

Although legal resolution of the problem could have been easier, they resorted to political foot balling (playing back and forth between the Region and the Federal government) and outright military violence which has ultimately led to the recent uprising in Gondar. Consequently, the demand has been met with repressive violence almost at every turn. The coordinators, conscious residents, and activists have been routinely harassed and intimidated, arrested, detained, beaten or otherwise abused by local government officials. The right to freely assemble, associate, and organize on the matter has been brutally suppressed. There for, a few members of individuals had organized the WAIC and had discussed on the issue at the relatively free area in Gondar. However the TPLF police forces had tried to detained the individuals that ring the bale for protest.

#### **4.1.1.3. Pseudo history Amhara as oppressor**

Amhara has suppressed the production, reproduction, and dissemination of the intellectual knowledge of the people to form Ethiopian colonial state (e.g. see Assefa jeleta, 2011). One informant (I, 05: on 17/04/2019) argues to strength the writing of Assefa Jaleta, some Oromo people regard, the Ethiopian state as an empire in which the highlander Amhara dominated and conquered the peaceful people of the south. They believe that the Amharas took their land and made them serve/work.

Interviewee (II,16: on 20/05/2019) had argued that, the reason why most ethnic groups consider Amhara as an enemy of the other is the result of fabricated history that deconstruct the personality of peoples as well as kings from Amhara for more than two decades. For instance the promotion of “anole” in Oromia’s Arsi zone to commemorate Menelik II’s Oromo victims was the best illustration for fabricating history. As a result, tensions notably rose in 2014 following a promotion of a monument. The expulsion in 2013 of thousands of Amharas by regional officials from Southern People’s Regional State and Benishangul-Gumuz , according to

a report by The Human Rights Congress of Ethiopia, is raised to support the allegations that the government deliberately targets ethnic Amharas.

According to informant (I, 06: on 17/04/2019),

It is “sem ena werk” (wax and gold) politics to demonstrate that Ethiopian history is deep, rich and complex enough to generate categories of political understanding that link it with the universal dimensions of democracy. It is clear for everyone who reads Ethiopian history, that it experienced a number of battles with outsiders as well as it had internal confrontation for power as similar as different states of the world. The unity of the country did not come through the benevolence of all other minor ethnicity groups. It is the result of centuries struggle and battle which was predominantly seen or marked through the reign of Theodros, Menelik, and Haile Selassie and others.

The FGD discussants (on 10/05/2019) argued that, The Amharas have always been the dominant force in protecting the country from invaders. They sacrificed themselves in several religious and patriotic wars because they are the creators of the unity of the country. All Amharas know that their forefathers have paid a price for the unity of the country. It is in their blood. They don't want to let go. This is true history of Amhara which is written by different historians.

The people of Amhara had played a significant role by making Ethiopia independent, uncolonized, free, and autonomous state during the period European scramble Africa; he was Menelik II who did patriotic and heroic history at the battle of Adwa against the colonial power of Italia in 1896 by organizing more than 120,000 troops from all corners of the country within a short period of time by launch a single paragraph edict.

The discussants argue that, if one asks, how the troops had organized by a single call. The answer would be clear; it would be the majestic trust ship of the people to the emperor or it would the patriotic and heroic nature of the Ethiopian people.

It is also interesting to note, how Dr Fikre Tolossa, in his recent Amharic book entitled ‘ የኦሮሞና የአማራ እውነተኛው የዘርምንጭ’ pages 152 to 154, challenges TPLF’s fabricated history. It reads **ገፅ:152-154:**

አዲስ ምኒልክ ደም መፋሰስን እናስቀር ብለው ንጉሥ ጦናን ለመነት።ንጉሥ ጦና ግን ኃይሉን አሟጦ መዋጋት ስለመረጠ በምኒልክ ሠራዊት ላይ ከባድ ጉዳት አደረሰ። በመጨረሻ ግን ቆሰለና ተማረከ ዳግማዊ ምኒልክ ጦናን አይቀጡ ቅጣት ከመቅጣትና መንግስቱንም አሸቀንጥረው ጥለው ሥልጣኑን ለጦር መሪዎቻቸው ከመስጠት ይልቅ ደግነት የተሞላበት ምህረት አድርገውለት እንደሚገብርላቸው ቃል ካስገቡት በኋላ ወደ ሥልጣኑ መለሱት ምኒልክ ተበቃይ አልነበሩም። ይቅርባ፣ በተጨማሪም እውነታ ላይ የተመሰረተ ምክንያታዊ አስተሳሰብ የነበራቸው እና ራሳቸውን እንደጥሩ ክርስቲያን የሚያዩ ሰው ነበሩ። በጦርነት ላይ የሴት ልጅ ጡት መቁረጥ ፍጹም ከባሕሪያቸው ውጪ ነው። እንዲህ ዓይነቱ ውንጀላ መሰረተ—ቢስ እና ከተንኮለኞች የመነጨ ነው። በርግጥ ዳግማዊ አጼ ምኒልክ ከሩህነቡ። አገራቸውን ለመውረር የመጡ ምርኮኞች ጣልያኖችን እንኳ በርህራኄና በደግ አያያዝ ነበር። ሰው ጡት ቆርጠዋል/አስቆርጠዋል/ ብሎ መፈረጅ አግባብነት የሌለው ትንሽ የፓለቲካ ጠቀሜታ ለማግኘት የሚነዛ ርካሽ ፕሮፓጋንዳ ነው። ምኒልክን ጡት ቆርጠዋል ብለው ለማስጠላት ሀውልት ያቆሙ አካላት በድርጊታቸው ማፈር እና ያንን አሳፋሪ ሀውልት ምማፍረስ ይገባቸዋል። ምኒልክ በግላቸው እንደዚያ ዓይነት ተግባር ጨርሶ አይፈጽሙም። .....እኔ ባደረኩት ምርምር ጡት መቆረጡን የሚያረጋግጥ አንድም ሰነድ አላገኘሁም።

As translated by the researcher:  
Emperor Menelik had adjured king Tona to stop civil war; however, king Tona preferred to defeat Emperor's force as much as possible. Yet the king had woodened and submission by the Emperor Menelik force. Then emperor Menelik had mindfully apologized for his did instead of harassing and detaining the king. Definitely, Emperor Menelik was forgiving, sympathetic, proud and logical king; he had not evil personality to cut breasts at the time of war. The name calling campaign on emperor Menelik as brutal and breast cutter is none sense; it is conspiracy by evil minded individuals to get two-bits profits. So, individuals who blame Menelik as breast cutter should have compunctions and abashed by their work; they have to destruct the monument. I never got evidences that show Menelik as breast cutter.

Professor fikre tollosa strengthening the interdependency of Ethiopian ethnic groups. He referred historical instances where the gallant Ethiopian people stood side by side to defend the country from foreign invaders. The book also asserts that the current distorted view of Ethiopian history in some quarters imply that the Amhara's ruled Ethiopia by force imposing their power and will on Oromos and other ethnic groups as false presentation of history of Ethiopia. In fact, in his book, he demonstrates that the roles and contribution the Oromos made in the making of Ethiopian state and history. He states that the kings of Ethiopia during the last 700 years were or have an Oromo ethnic back ground.

In accordance to informant (I, 07:on 21/04/2019),

Menelik II created the current Ethiopia by modernizing the peripheral areas of the time. However; he is considered as Amhara colonizer, expansionist and oppressor by a few writers of the secessionist or pro-nationalist writers particularly from Tegrian and Oromo extremists. From the very beginning, TPLF has been working hard day and night to build a wall between the Oromo and Amhara peoples. It is very clear for TPLF, unless the two elites and people are kept infighting, loot its resources as it wishes & destroy the very social fabric of the country. Thus the media, security, military, the law, all governmental departments, etc. were unashamedly used by TPLF to ferment discord and animosity among the people. TPLF has to go to the extent of fabricating white lies to ignite a war and deep hatred between the two cousins. They are seen cringing and wincing by the mere mention of the shameful acts. They lack the confidence of true Ethiopian citizenship. They revise Ethiopian history to put themselves in the best light while distorting and mangling Ethiopia's true history. For instance, they say Ethiopia's history is no more than 100 years old. They had blacken Ethiopia's true history to lighten up their own history fabricated in the workshop of their warped minds. This can be seen as turning point of fabricating history to deconstruct the history of Amhara rulers and peoples by those secessionist writers.

Like TPLF, Fascist Italy had tried for five years to pit the two cousins against each other after dividing Ethiopia along ethnic enclaves. The TPLF current plan is not only a copycat from fascist Italy, but it also goes deeper. While the fascist Italy's ultimate goal was to divide and rule, TPLF's is deeper than that. It also consists of ethnic cleansing of the Amhara primarily because TPLF's leaders cut their political teeth with deep hatred of the Amhara people. As Fascist Italy did not succeed, TPLF is certainly bound to fail as well thanks to the thousands of years of intermarriage and complex social relationships at the grass root level. That is why the slogan persuaded the two cousins to close their ranks quickly.

History should be written or spoken as it had happened. It must not be edited or corrected. However, from the previous discussion, we can understand that the Ethiopian history had distorted for the sake of political gain in contrast to the principle of writing history. This historical distorted narration had considered the Amhara people as historical victimizer over the other peoples of Ethiopia; in its effect different ethnic groups had taken payback actions inspired by fake narrations of evil minded political elites.

#### 4.1.1.4. Hostility of TPLF and Amhara

Unfortunately, the enmity of TPLF and Amhara is not flourished accidentally after the coming of EPRDF to the power. It has its own base as long as the coming of colonial power particularly Italia. They had conducted deep investigation; and identified that Amhara people is being strong obstacle to achieve their goals. Then they had proposed to create hostility between Amhara and the other ethnic groups in the country. The members of TPLF were the vanguard sponsor of the agenda of dividing and rule.

Predominantly, through its narrative and discourse the current ruling party EPRDF/TPLF believed that the root cause of oppression and injustice in Ethiopia lays in “Amhara’s chauvinistic great nation” mentality, thus making its struggle a de facto attempt to eliminate this mentality within the Amhara. TPLF was started as “an anti-Amhara” front. In its 1970s manifesto declared Amhara are its arch enemy that must be crashed. The party has indoctrinated its ideology of hate to its members for close to half a century.

The parity’s staunchest cadres have believed what is written in their manifesto is true and must be adhered by every part faithfully. Some elites were on the sides of the political cadres to fabricate the story.

For instance, Kinfu Abraham (n.d), he wrote as follows:

...the consolidation and “centralization” were the concerns of all Ethiopian rulers from Tewodros onwards; with the exception of Emperor Yohannes IV was a “Federalist” at heart and in action. Their goals of centralization were mainly pursued by creating institutions which were appendages to the throne. The very large and heterogeneous population incorporated into the empire under Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity and Amhara rule chiefly by Menelik II differed from the power holders in language, culture, and religion and were dealt with initially in traditional terms. Amhara (and less frequently their local allies) were allotted land from whose people they were entitled to exact tribute. The result was the establishment of an alien ruling class, whose superior power, status, and economic situation was underlined by cultural and religious differences from the subject class.

This opposes the Amhara inclusive personality as well as Menelik’s traditional political wisdom. Tangibly and tangentially, we know for a fact that Menelik denounced the Treaty of Wuchale, united Ethiopians against the colonizing Italian forces, and he led Ethiopia toward modernity via his vision and his inquisitive mind. “Menelik was a brilliant and fascinating

emperor who was endowed with an extraordinary insight to traditional wisdom of politics. He was ready to handle both internal and external political matters properly.

Besides the above data those are extracted from documents, the informant (I,05: on 17/04/2019) argues that, the name calling campaign of TPLF against Amhara people starts from its conception in Dedebit forests without reading any historical references. One discussant (FGDs 09) said that, they wrote their manifesto ardently to handle power by disintegrating unity of the country; they preach all ethnic groups to create ethnic based political organization which fought against the Amhara society.

The anti Amhara sentiment had deeply cultivated in the mind of tegreans new generation; they had preached Amhara as enemies of Tigray people. This is evidenced by Tigray online, release the following article on social media in September 2018.

Amharas want one language for all Ethiopians, Amharic. Amharas want one religion in Ethiopia, Orthodox Christian. Amhara extreme nationalists since the time of Menelik II have been expropriating the Tigrayan history, Land, Geez Fidel, and other cultural assets as their own. Wearing the Tigrayan Royal Robe the Amharas pretended as the only rulers and founders of Ethiopia in front of the international community. They invaded other Ethiopian people's territories, evicted the indigenous inhabitants, looted their land, expanded their territories, and plundered other people's historical assets, artifacts, and material resources. Due to the geographic proximity and the rich history of Tigray the people of Tigray and their land was the biggest causality. The rest of Ethiopians were forced to accept 'Amharization' and most of them lost their identity on top of their land. When the TPLF/EPRDF came to power in 1991 all the folk tale created by the Amhara elites and "their brutal government" infrastructure was destroyed for good. However, the TPLF leaders made two huge mistakes in 1991, first they did not recovered all Tigray territories annexed by Amhara elites. Second they didn't help the many ethnic groups whose land was confiscated by the Amhara.

This is the continuation of accusing Amhara as invader, massacre, and ignorant people which is fully deviant from the popular value of Amhara. It has missions to misinform the other people. However, in the above narration, the writer hesitates to write which land where looted by Amhara from others and which areas are still annexed by Amhara belonging from Tigray. Rather it shows the existence of the claim to annex the lands of Amhara by TPLFs.

Informant (I, 09: on 22/04/2019) explained that, the ruling of Melese Zenawi had shaded the history of Ethiopia by introducing ethnic-federalism that divided the people on ethnic cleavages and to destruct one by the others.

On the other word, informant (07) explained that,

the Tegreran political elites, after they had taken all things on the hands and on the lands of Amhara, then they accused it as victimizer of all other ethnic societies; in effect the majority ethnic divisions make to revenge Amhara in its home land Ethiopia. Melese had committed ethnic cleansing on Amhara by cultivating ethnic hatred many times greater than he kill in body. Then the new generation of Tegray accepts what is told by their political “cadreas” as true and now striving to escalate the confrontation by the use of social media between the two cousins. Untold stories of atrocities are now surfacing out due to prevalent social media activism. Currently, people are protesting the systemic marginalization and brutal crackdown on any dissent.

The aftermath of 1991, Amhara people were becoming primary victims of torture, harassment, displacement and killing. For quarter a century, TPLF unabashed by corruption, tirelessly uses government owned media and other meanness to inculcate anti-Amhara hate among other ethnic groups. The official ideology, Revolutionary Democracy, stated Amhara’s were colonial powers and their struggle is to dismantle Amhara domination. To garner enough support to perpetuate its political hegemony, TPLF encourages others ethnic groups to take revenge against Amhara who are perceived as their former oppressors. This, negative campaign has led to the massacre and displacement of Amhara’s in Harar, SNNP, Gambella and Benishangul Gumuz regions.

As it is evidenced by most informants and discussants, the TPLF rule is the worst to Ethiopian in general and the Amhara people in particular; so the recent protest is the result of accumulated grievances. It is related to past mistreatment, discrimination, harassment, killing, torture, and economic marginalization.

Of course, the political elites of TPLF were successful in dismantling the solidarity of Amhara as a people as one of informants (17) replied. They had provided different nickname for Amhara as “neftegna”, and “timiketgna”. Those nickname were spoken not only by TPLF but also by the head of ANDMs like bereket simon, aleminew mekonene, tadese kassa and others. Particularly, the speech of Alemenew mekonen, “Amhara as chauvinists” was very awful for the people of Gondar that insist the people to stand against him and the government (interviewee 08 and 09).



Informant (13) said that,

...save the conscientious, principled and courageous surgeon, Prof. Asrat Woldeyes who stood up to challenge the wholesale genocide Woyane Tigres waged as soon as they invaded Ethiopia; Amara elites were dumb and numb. After subjected Asrat to a slow and painful death, Tigres with their partners in crime had a free reign to committed massacres of genocide proportion on Amaras similar in scale to the 6 million Jews gassed to death by Nazi Germans. Amara elites still wanted to be seen to be above ‘tribal’ politics. It is a sheer irony of fate that the Amaras who cried for the Oromo peasantry, greater social justice suddenly found themselves tongue-tied when the victims were their poor kin. It seems Amara elites are now set to in harmony for their crimes of both omission and commission.

Amhara political elites intentionally or negligently accepted the distorted history of Amhara even in the regional constitution. The preamble of the constitution reads as follows.

We the people Amhara national regional state: having been desirous today away with the negative impact hindering our overall development which the “age old oppressive system” had for long imposed upon us by cruelly suppressing our human and democratic rights and there by exposing us all to the scourge of poverty and backwards as a result of unjustified economic and social politics in place;...now therefore, have here by approved the whole text with undivided vote.

(See the preamble: Zikire Hig of Amhara National Regional State, 2001)

From the constitutional preamble we could ask which system was “old age oppressive system? It is clear by default; it was Amhara as the TPLF political elites tell. Those were meneliks son from the Shawan rulers as it was asserted in their manifesto. At the end of the day the Amhara people asks to end anti-Amhara movements in Gondar in the summer 2016.

#### **4.1.1.6. Political exclusion of Amhara**

There are no formal rules restricting the access of any ethnic group to power at a national level in Ethiopia. But informally, EPRDF has made no secret of its desire to keep a monopoly on power. All interviewee agreed on the political exclusion of Amhara started from the development of the transitional charter. The charter was prepared by the appointee individuals from the four sister parties. However, the Amhara people had not representative during the time. Nominally the people were represented by Tamrat Line (member of EPDM). They replied that, the people of Amhara excluded not only countries politics but also from its own regional politics against the constitutional rights of self-determination. Amhara thus become victims of

mass displacements, indiscriminate killings, dispossessions of property, and complete disruption of livelihoods. While harassment, arrests, exiles, and killings of individuals for political participation and expression of opinions is the common experience of all Ethiopians over the past 27 years, repeated identity-based attack of an entire group has been the unique experience of the Amhara than any other group until very recently.

One informant (KI, 01: on 25/04/2019) explained that:

If you are from Amhara, you have not the option to say no in the meeting of EPRDF rather you will have the right to hear what is said by the master mind of TPLF. He fiercely said, in the last 27 years, Amhara was under Tegrian Apartide in the condition that TPLF controlled all aspects of the Amhara. The Amhara high political leaders had appointed by the will of TPLF even it is being out of the ANDM's will; they serve for the interests of their master and themselves rather than serving the people. He exemplified that how the most recent ANDM leaders Alemnew Mekonen respect the interests of TPLF by publicly mudslinging the Amhara people whom he had claimed to represent. The people of Amhara become leaderless society

The above personal argument of the interviewee gets more explanation in Chuchu Alebachew's (one of key politician EPDM/ANDM) book titled “ዳገት ያበረታው የአማራው ፍኖት” he wrote as follows.

ብቁ የሆኑ የሀገር መሪዎችን በማፍራት በኩል ከራሱ አልፎ ለሀገር ይተርፍ የነበረው የአማራ ህዝብ የ1983 አ/ም መንግስታዊ ለውጥ ተከትሎ በመጣው የዘር ፖለቲካ አይደለም ለሀገር የሚተርፍ መሪ ማግኘት ቀርቶ እራሱን የሚመራ መሪ እንኳን ማግኘት እየቸገረው መጣ። በሚያሳዝን ሁኔታ የአማራ ህዝብና መሪዎች የአመራር ደሀ ሆነ።

Translated by the researche as:  
Amhara become in efficient in finding effective leaders despite of its richness of contributing wise leaders for the region/local as well as the national level due to the coming of ethno-centric politics since 1991. Surprisingly the people and the land of Amhara become poor of leaders (as the researcher translated).

Although there was viable political domination of TPLF over the other sister parties and over the countries holistic issue, the ANDM made argument that denied the supremacy of the TPLF (II, 11: on 21/05/2019). Thus, the ANDMs argument was nothing; rather it was closing the door that gives a chance to go out from prison. Due to this and other reasons, the people of Gondar publicly opposed the ruling by exposeal the insolence of the TPLF's government.

Finally, the rise of unprecedented political revolt in Gondar had been interrupted and inspired another part of the region like Gojam in order to trigger for Amhara regionalist movement.

#### **4.1.1.7. Abuse of human and democratic rights**

Human rights organizations have condemned “Meles Zenawi” his political record as though he were a routine despot with no agenda other than hanging on to power. Repression was particularly fierce in Gondar (II, 15: on 20/05/2019). The government used anti-terrorism laws, passed to assist the Western based ‘fight against terror’ to criminalize and prosecute any expression of dissent in Gondar (FGDs on June 10/2019). The Ethiopian government appears unable to tolerate dissent or engage in a meaningful dialogue with any form of opposition.

Assefa negash (1993) wrote an article which exposes the despotic nature of TPLF over Gondar titled as “massacre of Christians in the historic city of Gondar” his article he reads as follows.

Ethiopians are increasingly turning their God in prayer as they have lost confidence in the earthly power over them. This is not surprising in today’s Ethiopia where Ethiopians have been denied out not only from the right to life as free citizens, but also have even been denied the right to identify themselves as Ethiopians. ... Ethiopians are controlled today by an ethnic based regime which is sowing division among the various ethnic based and religious group of Ethiopia. Ethiopians are faced regimes that is disturbing their peace by the name of peace; suppressing democracy by the name of democracy; and maiming the people by the name of peace. Ethiopia appealed to their present ethnic rulers but their current rulers refuse to listen to them. Ethiopia is appealed to the international community and the western powers.

It shows about the oppressiveness the EPRDF’s regime from its inception, the people had opposed its system of dividing rule since from that time (1993: two years late from its victory).

There was no freedom of speech, freedom of life, freedom of movement, freedom of association, freedom press, and access of information, against the claim that democracy, as a system of self-governance requires that citizens be well informed of issues of public interest; as they could make informed and intelligent decisions taking into account all available alternatives. According to the informants (KI, 01 on April 25), there was no human rights protection, no freedom of speech, freedom of the press and freedom of association. Many youth in Gondar city had exhausted at night to unknown place and they were torched by the security and police forces of the time.

Informant (19) said that,

The people had ordered to listen only the government sponsored media by banning the other alternative information sources like ESAT. If an individual had listen or even suspected to listen ESAT or having satellite dishes, every one understand his or her next day destination would be prison houses. As one interviewee who was long lasting political activists told, to the researcher, the ruling had being a treat for Amhara on its survival as a people. That is a reason, why the amhara people stand for well-organized protest in Gondar where the stump of Amharaness had existed.

Due to the existence of excessive use of power by federal police and local militias, the people of Gondar had been aggrieved long years before the rise of protests in 2016. Yet the problem of oppression results extraordinary wave of popular protests in Gondar.

#### **4.1.1.8. In efficient social service delivery and deep rooted corruption**

Corruption had becoming a working norm for many officials. There were not only grand corruptions in higher level, there were plenty of mini/pity corruptions and bunch of corrupt officers/leaders almost in every level. It is not only their corrupt activities and behaviors of individual, officials but the less responsive system they created and the worst is the actions and measures to address those issues. In almost every office you go it become a norm to observe individuals who are not loyal and not committed to the service they assigned to serve. They appear to be careless to the public and government. There was lack of responsiveness in administration, starting from the federal to the local level.

Transparency International (2016) data shows that Ethiopia was ranked 111 out of 177 countries, with a score of 33 on the scale where 100 means very clean and 0 means highly corrupt on the 2015. The country has lost close to 12 billion dollars since 2000 to illicit financial outflows (Transparency International, 2016).

As stated by informant (I:16), in Ethiopia's economic transformation, corruption has become a way of life because instead of sticking to their pledge of honor, most of the leaders of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) succumbed to temptation to pursue personal wealth by using public offices for personal gains and self-enrichment. This argument by the above informants had been replied by informant (I: 10, 11, 05 and 06) indicates

that instead of setting good example for others to follow, the APDM leadership has now admit that the demand for personal wealth instead of common goods. Lack of effective and quality service delivery, social upheavals and corruption are very cardinal to the bureaucracy of Gondar city administration. In Gondar petty types of corruption, such as giving gifts on festive occasions to government officials and religious leaders, is systemic and common. FGDs stated that, in the administration sector official placement and recruitment, purchasing and selling procurement and appointment processes are generally awarded to people with close connections to the government and ruling party.

As many interviewee states there is long lasting tradition that motivate corruption. The proverb “sishom yalibela sishar Yikochewal” absolutely motivate the act of corruption. The political leaders and almost all civil servants are seeking benefits from the people. One informant (16) told that, if you want to get or renewed an ID card from kebele, you would have pay near to 500 birr or you would have cloth relation with power holders. At the same time, power seeking individuals obliged to pay from 20-30 thousands of Ethiopian birr to get political position at the sub city level. According to the interviewee’s response (II, 14 and 11: on May 21/2019), the system of placement in public officials and political appointees is not based on the merit; rather is depends on either the business or the patronage what you have. The system of meritocracy was totally devoid from the public sector in Gondar town. The uneducated person would have better position than educated individuals. It was very deep rooted problem that obliged to the people to have grievance that leads to protesting over the government.

The former Prime Minister Haile-Mariamdesaleghi give a television statement to EBC on 25 December 2016, the Addis Ababa master plan and the Wolkait issues were not the real causes of the public protests. The protests, according to the Prime Minister, were an expression of the public’s deep frustration stemming from the lack of good governance and, in particular, the ever-worsening corruption. The “deep reform” (tilique tehadeso) of Gondar city administration ANDM (now ADP) evidenced that there were type of client-patron relationship between individuals and leaders.

It can be easy to understand the extent of corruption by examining the nature of the ruling government. The EPRDF government had absolute power over the people in contrast to the constitutional principles formulated by it. So, it is logical that “absolute power corrupt absolutely”. In general, the rule of EPRDF was absolutely corrupted based on different perquisites. Those, unfair, unjust and undemocratic perquisites in the civil service and in the political- economy of the country from higher to the bottom level aggrieved the people to insist popular protest in different areas of the country that was firstly fired in Gondar was unprecedented.

Nevertheless, the existence of a number of factors and activities that contributed to the development of the protests is acceptable; there is grievance at the heart of every protest. There were inconveniences that create negative feeling in some groups and individuals. These have the power to create a will of protest in the mind of individuals that grows to collective needs. That growing condition also allows several politically, economically, historically motivated groups to wait and join the protest and to lead the protests.

#### **4.1.2. Triggering cause**

##### **4.1.2.1. Unconstitutional detention WAIC without informed the regional state**

The primary motive of EPRDF to answer the “identity questions” those were profusely spoken in the 1960s student movements; and had allowed to the people to organize along ethnic lines to make self-governed on their affairs without any external interference. To insure the above motive, the EPRDF Constitution in article 52 sub article guarantees the regions, “To establish and administer a state police force, and to maintain public order and peace within the State. The EPRDF constitution article 51 sub articles 14 reads that, “It shall deploy, at the request of a state administration, Federal defense forces to arrest a deteriorating security situation within the requesting State when its authorities are unable to control it. It means, the regional governments have a right to organize police forces at the regional and district level, the central government has the right to send in the federal police and armed forces whenever it deems a crisis to be exceeding a region’s capacities.

Whatever the EPRDF constitution read, the TPLF dominated government had control every aspects of the region, in practice it does not have to wait for a request by the regional government, and can deploy central forces at will. The interviewee (03, the head of police department in Gondar) asserted the incidents as below.

No one from either the regional government or federal government gave announcement orally or through telephone about the condition of Demeke and his colleagues. That was hidden and unlawful mission from Tegray regional government by the guarantee of the federal security officers. At the time, our institution tried to know the details from the regional government through telephone. But the regional government replied the issue was also new for them. Then we have suspected that, there would be certain hidden agenda; immediately we had tried to reverse the situation and save the life of innocent citizens as much as possible. However it was beyond our capacity resulted the death of 9 individuals by the federal police force. Despite of this we were lucky to save the life of Colonel Demeke with the collaboration effort of the city administration and elders or shimagles.

The July 2016 popular protest was sudden events; in which the Tigrayan police force tried to detain the members of WAIC in Gondar on unexpected time around 4:00 AM when everyone was sleeping in home. The time was preferable for the police force to kidnap the individuals without any obstacles. But the condition was not conducive as they had predicted. Colonel Demeke Zewudu challenged the police force until the people have been informed. The fatal clash between security forces and Amhara residents following the arrest of Wolkayt identity committee members and the trial of detained colonel Demeke Zewudu in Gondar unlawfully ignited regionalist grievances that inspired protests. To add the fuel on the fire, the National Intelligence and Security Service and Federal Police Joint Anti-Terrorism Taskforce told state affiliated FBC on 14 July that they have “detained individuals who were operating in areas called Soroka and Kurbi in north Gondar zone, Amhara regional state, and at Densha and its environs in western Tigray zone.” The task force also blamed individuals as having been “terrorist forces” operating from neighboring Eritrea. This resulted in a surge in unrest from August 2016.

## **4.2. Mechanisms used in the process of protests**

### **4.2.1 Violent mechanism**

#### **4.2.1.1 The military insurrection**

While the people come near to the police force, they distributed fake information claiming to control the anti-peace and terrorist individuals. However things dramatically changes when the very recognized activist Nigist Yirga told the reality for the people by traveling the town using motor bicycle. Then the people become emotional and anger; they felt a sense of hopelessness. Immediately, many peoples in the town and even many Kms away Gondar collected and had fought against the Tegrean police force that was supported by federal intelligence and federal police anti-terrorism joint force. The Fano had attacked the government forces and killed more than 11 soldiers; at the same time 9 individuals killed by the government force.

Most interviewees argues that, the gallantry of Collonel Demeke Zewudu could not be glitter unless it was supported by the members of the Fano from welkayt namely Sisay Babil and Setegni Takele who died during exchange of fire; Gobe Melkie who was in hospital to get optic medical treatment, later he went to Demekes home by covering one eye for exchanging fire. The others who had sacrificed their life in the process of protests were Gobe Melkie, Mola Ajawu, Muhabie Belete, and others unnamed on this paper. Those individuals had fought with the government force in 13<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> in Gondar city. After on, they had guerrilla fighting in different areas. The other individuals who were threaten the government force was Arega Alebachew by establishing military group (around 100 militia) from September-December 2017 in Kosa kebele where found in west Belesa district around 25 Kms away the Gondar town. Most probability, the number of insurgent groups who were logistically and technically supported by AGUDM had fought against the government force during the protests in Gondar.



#### 4.2.1.2. Destruction of property



*Photo I: Burned vehicles in Gondar on 15/July 2016*

During the course of the Gondar protest probably billions coast of government as well as private property had been destructed to express the popular hate on the ruling and it's collaborators. Only on 14<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> July many hotels and shops, two vehicles were destructed by the people. Different home tools and decorating materials had been burned and taken by individuals. Still there are hotels which did not either transformed to other owner or functioning. In the course of the popular protests, the Tegrean owned and government affiliated business owners were the target of the destruction. Hotels like Bahire salam hotel (see in the appendix), Ethiopia hotel, Bekafa hotel Chalachew hotel, Tana hotel, Shinta recreation, and Hamlet hotel with the furniture in had been partially distracted. In addition to those hotels, Ambasel PLC flour factory, Kibron trading, humera gold shop, Arada universal market center were affected by the protestors. More than 400 shops and business centers in Gondar, a historical town in Northern Ethiopia and the epicenter of recent political unrest and protests, have been burnt down to the ground on Thursday with 100 million birr (provisional estimates) in properties vanishing into thin air in a single day.

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<sup>2</sup> A photo taken from hand mobile of interviewee (I: 05: April 17/2019)

The reason why the people targets Tegrean own and government sponsored business institutions is to show the level of hate towards the government; it may be wrong to generalize destructing of Tegrean property is resulted from the hate of the Tegrean people. However, it is suspected that, those business owners had secure links with the power holders; and they are alleged to facilitate the conditions for polices to stifle the youths who had inconvenience with the incumbent government. There for the research affirmed that, the destruction of the property of Tegrean people were not caused by their identity, yet it was a response to their conspiracies on the Gondar people.

#### **4.2.1.3. Blockade**

The protest in Gondar had multitalented character that changes over a time from non-violent to violent again from violent to none violent means of protesting. Immediately, after the military clash between the security force and Fano on 14<sup>th</sup> July/2016, the people had blocked all high way roads and passageway inside the city. No vehicle were allowed to move from place to place; even the military vehicles had challenged by the people by dropping stones, poles, wood pieces, firing of tyre and hollow out the road.

The second round of blockage protesting was since from August 18-23 all high ways from Gondar to Mekele, Gondar to Humera, Gondar to Addis Ababa and Gondar to Metema high ways was blocked although the blockage in somehow confronted by military forces. For the third time the people of Gondar had declared the blockage protest to be effective from September 13-18 in the similar vein with the former blockades. It was not end by that, yet there were another wave of blocked in October 2016 against the declaration of the state of emergency at federal level to be effective in October 8/2016 for six months.

Food crop transaction from Gondar to Tegray region had been banded at different times. Although a few merchants went out from Gondar to sell food crops in Tegray market, challenges were happened at rural areas out of Gondar. On July 18/2016 the peoples a few Kms out of Gondar had prohibited the passage of wheat and oil of heavy loaded vehicle which was traveling to Tegray region had been distributed to the people around the area. This implies that, the rural people were the collaborators of the actions of blockade. The claim of blocking the

transaction of food crops to Tegray region was to call the people for collaboration, yet it was not to quardary the people of the region.

#### **4.2.2. None violent instruments**

##### **4.2.2.1 The propaganda of AGUDM**

AGUDM was formed in 2015 as a result of a merger between the military wings of the Eritrea-based Ethiopian People's Patriotic Front (EPPF) and Ginbot 7. It aims to combat the Ethiopian government. At the time, Ginbot 7 had just transitioned from a peaceful political opposition movement based in the US to an armed rebel group with a new base in Eritrea. Since the beginning of the protests in Gondar, the government has accused the Patriotic Ginbot 7 for Unity and Democratic Movement (AGUDM) rebel groups of infiltrating the movement. The government considers these groups to be terrorist organizations supported by external forces including Eritrea and Egypt.

According to the informants, AGUDM had a significant role by emblazon propaganda. They said that, tens and thousands of soldiers had taken adequate military training to quash EPRDF. It creates strong mental capacity on the people of Gondar in the condition that, the government had faced strong challenges. The ACLED dataset shows that rebel activity in 2016 was at its third highest since 1997.

So far in 2017, AGUDM has represented the most active rebel front in the country. The group significantly stepped up its attacks in June 2017, confronting government forces on several fronts in the Amhara region's Gonder zone, and claiming a rare attack in Addis Ababa on a government ammunition depot. The movement's leader recently announced that AGUDM's attacks would not collapse. The scale and spread of the protests has encouraged rebel groups and opposition movements to gather their forces into a single front against the current government, in a manner suggestive of the overthrow of previous (TPLF dominated) Ethiopian regimes. In parallel, unidentified armed groups have become increasingly active in Amhara, engaging in various clashes with state forces.

#### **4.2.2.2. The Diaspora's activism**

The Ethiopian Diaspora is estimated at two million, a significant number of whom remain actively engaged in domestic politics and critical of the ruling government (Dittgen and Demissie, January 2017). In accordance to interviewee (I, 07: on April 21/2019), diasporas activists, writers, bloggers and journalists play a key role in providing coverage of the recent protests, particularly on social media websites like Face book and Twitter, using the handle Gondar Protests. They have played multifaceted role by providing information what was happening on that moment; at the same time, they motivate the people to stand against the ruling. The effort of Gondar people would never been unless it was supported by the Diaspora abroad.

This was particularly important considering the limited press freedom and the increasingly severe government restrictions on communication and information-sharing platforms inside the country. The Diaspora's ability to coordinate and lead the protest movement in Ethiopia, however, is stymied by the lack of internet access in rural areas of the country, and by the government's increasing restrictions. The recent crisis is the first time that ethnic issues in Ethiopia have attracted such global attention, due in part to the Diaspora's ability to relay information that was blocked inside the country. Various international and regional bodies, as well as a number of human rights organizations, called for an independent, credible investigation into the crisis (HRW, June 2016).

Both the Diaspora and the people of Gondar support the Ethiopianist political organization. The protesters in Gondar had heard the voice of Oromo people out of their ethnic group. The Diasporas had contributed logistic and financial support for protesters at the time.

#### **4.2.2.3. Internet activism**

The informants (I: 06 and 05) told that, the role of the social media particularly face book had indispensable role to motivate and organize the protesters in one or another means. The direct verbal saying of the informants reads as follows:

We were informed what happened in Oromia region in the last year; we were also victimized by the butcher's action on 13 July in 2016 in Gondar.

Immediately after the unsuccessful kidnapping of Collonel Demeke Zewudu (gallant), we feared that, the security forces would exhaust a number of youths in the city and they did as we had feared. Then we had post the incidents happened on 13 July with certain briefing regarding to unconstitutionality of the action. Immediately, there had been unexpected number of like, share and comments on the post; much of the commentators suggested better to taking collective actions by opposing the government. Then the communication started on how the protest is informed? When we should take the protests? What challenges would happen in the process of the protests? After discussion we had decide to call popular protest on social media on 1 August 2016 if the condition available; if not, we decide to scarify all things we have for our freedom. Although we had asked the city administration to satisfy the legal process of demonstration by add hook groups, the city administration ignored our question. Rather they warned to stop our mobilization. In somehow, their warning had short living influence on the organizers or the add hook groups some of the forefront individuals were hesitated, and obliged to respect the city administration's word. However, hidden groups make post to call demonstration and protest on social Medias. The post tried to motivate all Ethiopians to stand for their freedom by opposing the incumbent government (TPLFs ruling). Then tens and southlands of people joined the protest by holding banners with powerful massages that express the bad feeling of the people on the incumbent government as well as the solidarity of Amhara with other's particularly with Oromo peoples. Immediately, other interested media (like ESAT and VOA) gave coverage by introducing the incidents from abroad. At the end the protest of Gondar become the hot issue of the time and had got international attention which results valued repercussions on Ethiopian politics. We were sure that all of our effort could not be successful devoid of social media; we did all our communication not in hall meeting. But tanks to technology, it was through the use of social media.

The strong control of the main stream media by the incumbent government and the withdrawals of other private Medias from the market mean that people turns their focus towards social media. Primarily, the Ethiopian Diasporas in USA and other parts of the world had played a significant role in Ethiopian politics and shaping political debate through social media like face book, instagram, twitter, and others.

#### **4.2.2.4. March**

One interviewee said that (11):

The coordinators believed that there was better freedom in the neighboring Gonder city where they organized a couple of public meeting for the residents of the city as well as the people from their localities. Most of the mobilizers and the activists were safer in Gondar when the security forces came to arrest them on

July 12th which provoked so much anger from the residents of the wider Gondar. The people expressed their support the act of the WAIC and had tried to save their live from the hands of slaughterer. The people were committed to scarify all things to save WAIC; further they get readiness to protest against the structural violence of the incumbent governments. They were enough matured on how they achieve their goal; the best alternatives was mobilizing others against the ruling by creating common agenda. That was why the people of Gondar asked “Bekele Gerba to be freed” and “the blood spoils in Oromo is also our blood”. It helps to sell the agenda to the Oromo people.



Photo II: demonstration in Gondar on 1/August 2016

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<sup>3</sup> Images are available to one of the informants hand phone (05)

They had prepared banners which express their feeling; they tried to find out necessary materials that heighten the interests of the people to join the protest. They had also brushers which clarify the objectives of the protest as well as to briefing the process of the protests. Electronic music device were available and artistic songs of Fassil Demoz (eyaya belewu), Mehari Degfaw (Gondar), and Yeshambel Belayneh (wolkayit kelele yelem gondarent) were played on the squares of the town to intensify the protest. The legally recognized national flag was banded to wave; instead the former green, yellow and red with no emblem at the center had been waving on the squares and at the front of the demonstrators. Before the mid-day all roads of the town become crowded by the demonstrators to show the grievance on the government without any frustration of the possible measurement of the security forces and the heavy rain of the summer regardless of the differences in religion, sex, age, educational status and any other criterion.

#### **4.2.2.5. Boycott**

Although the August 1 popular protest were exemplary for other parts of the country to show the heat of the people over the government, the incumbent government took unrestricted military measurement in Bahr Dar on August 8/2016 and other areas of the country. Then immediately Gondar people changes the means of protesting from direct demonstration to boycott, sit in, and absent from government office as well as from private institutions by the help of the social media posts. Shops had not opened, transport is absent and some government offices remain closed. Armed military patrols have been sighted on the streets. It is still not known who called for the sit-down strike.

The protest in Gondar was loosely structured; there were not well planned processes, clearly stipulated objectives at first; rather it was ignited by phenomenon. Later on, the protest becomes structured in somehow; on the one hand the face book groups tried to organize the protest. On the other hand, the brushers were distributed to individuals or were posted on the areas where people could read. The kids had played a tremendous role by distributing the brushers secretly since the security officials failed in suspecting them. Amazingly, the government had challenged by its own tactical structure “one to five”. During the boycott protests the government “one to five” arrangement was active in discussing how to protest against the government secretly.



### **4.3. Implications of the rise protests in Gondar**

As the researcher extract different data from different sources through in depth interview, FGDs and document reviews, the popular protests had both the negative and positive implications. The implications perceived differently which extends from nullifying to glorifying it. For some groups and individuals, there is nothing beyond that for media consumptions. There is no change on the grass root level. They argue that, none of the questions raised during the protest answered. However, on the other side, there are individuals who argue that it had glories positive implications which are visible for everyone. To give better briefing, better to see the positive and negative implications of the protests independently in the following discussions.

#### **4.3.1. Positive implication**

##### **4.3.1.1. The rise of Amhara and Oromo Tactical Alliance**

The interviewee (20) affirmed that,

The very simple and genuine gesture from the 31st July Gonder protesters regarding the plight of their Oromo brothers and sisters under TPLF. To be honest, the alliance was long overdue. The people were crying for so long for this date. The elite from both sides failed to coin such a phrase and to bring about such an impact for two and half decades. But, the Gonder commoners at the grass root level finally broke the duck and succeeded what the elite failed to do in the last 25 years. As the saying goes, better late than never.

Demonstrators resent TPLF's domination within the government, and denounced the government's violent repression of the Oromo protests. Amhara protesters displayed an unprecedented level of solidarity with the Oromos, organizing joint marches (for instance during the Grand Oromo protests in August 2016), sit-ins, boycotts, and stay-at-home protests, as well as using other non-violent tactics, such as head shaving and crossing arms above the head. I take my hat off for those thoughtful Gonder protesters who wrote and displayed the slogan. True to the spirit of Ethiopiawinet, the slogan reads: 'The blood spilling in Oromia is our blood too.' The slogan hit TPLF's divisive apartheid policy right at its nerve centre. While the slogan caught TPLF unprepared and shook TPLF in its boots, it reverberates all over Ethiopia. It received a warm reception from the people and showed the elites how things should be done. Put simply the slogan showed the way forward.



During the protests, Oromo and Amhara nationalists displayed signs of solidarity in the face of what they believed to be a common enemy: the TPLF. But there were always questions about the camaraderie and whether it was meaningful and sustainable. Some political elites criticized the relation of the two communities; Bereket Simon (who was the prominent power holder of ANDM) said that, the relation of the two communities is “unsacred marriage”. However, the people from both sides had gave counter attack for Bereket simon as criminal, robber, selfish, murderer, egoistic, bandit, and so forth in the August protest in Bahir Dar city.

All these timely and symbolic slogans, that were coined at the grass root level. The slogans paved the way for the Amhara/Oromo tactical alliance and reminded all the Amharas and Oromo to get back to their common sense. Furthermore the slogans reminded the two cousins to focus on their common troubles, common destiny, shared values, shared history and most importantly their common future.

#### **4.3.1.2. Shifting of leaders**

The EPRDF and its sister parties had shifted leaders in 2017; however, the process were not clear; rather it was as such important to the people. The critical evaluation criteria were not leadership performance; instead it was by the principle loyalty to the party. People were not satisfied by the political reforms (by the language of EPRDF “betiliket metadese”). On wards to the coming of Dr Abiy as prime minister, there were optimum movement of both shifting and lifting of leaders. Let alone the shift at federal and regional levels, a number of local leaders (more than 11) throughout the city administration were replaced; political appointees who exercise with corruption and poor administration had been abolished from their political positions from the high (municipal) level to lower (kebele) power holders. The ‘Deep reforms’ were conducted; but their scope and content remain unclear. For the first time, at the city administration level, the TPLF domination over the other people get official acceptance by the high level politicians.

#### **4.3.1.3. Releasing of politically motivated prisoners**

The swearing of Abiy Ahmed as Ethiopia's Prime Minister on April 2, 2018 has been regarded as a watershed moment in the country's political development; PM Abiy's brief tenure thus far has been marked by a dramatic shift in the country's rhetoric, an increased tolerance for political dissidents and a thawing of tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea over a long-standing border dispute.

On the aftermath of popular protest followed by the coming of D/r Abiy as prime minister, a number of politically motivated prisoners had released including Colonel Demeke Zewude who shoot the first bullet for the protests in Gondar. In addition, a large number of Fano leaders with their suite have got apology from the government. They had well-come ceremony in both Gondar and Bahir Dar. It was considered as a dramatically shift on the government side which was respected by the people of Gondar. The people had exercised relative freedom of speech through their scarification of many gallants and patriots. Demeke Zewudu had affirmed, on the well come ceremony of Mesafint Tesfu and his followers in Gondar city "the current freedom is not the gift as trade license, however it is the result of our relentless efforts"

#### **4.3.1.4. The rise of Amhara nationalism**

Amhara assumed itself as the people with no distinct geographical boundary since it had strong inter-relation with the other peoples of Ethiopia. One informant (II, 15: on May 20/2019) said that, we are first Ethiopian; next we are Amhara; it is our legend which is not dissolved by minimalist. The other informants (I, 06: on April 17/2019) replied that,

Amhara had not hitched of history and patriotic filling. It had save Ethiopia from invaders for long period of time with glorified historical repercussions. But it was not acknowledged in the current ethno- federalism state structure. Rather it is accused as chauvinist and the seeker of old oppressive system. However Amhara people never despaired by the ethnic centrist influences. Yet it had challenged the survival as a people. Then the people obliged to organize on behalf of ethnic line; combined with an Ethiopian identity.

The discussants argued as below:

We Gondar people had a strong collective identity of "Amharaness" as well as Ethiopian national identity. For us Ethiopia could not exist without Amhara; virtually, Amhara could not survive out of Gondar where it had its historical legacies of Amhara as well as Ethiopian from the era of ancient time.

Unfortunately, the enemy of Amhara obliged to make our boarder of identity and forced to leave sense of belonging Ethiopia. In most case the people of Amhara were at the burden of expressing ourselves. As a result, we have lost many things and had scarified what we had including our life. At the end of the day, we briskly work to re-shape Amhara nationalism in the post 2016 by taking the timely group effort as an opportunity.

As the informants said that, if Amhara nationalism grows in prominence, the relationship with Oromo nationalism might be decisive for the country's future. Amhara uprising came due to the people of ethnic Amhara have been regularly complaining discrimination and the government's decision to place a local district, Wolkait community under the administration of the neighboring Tigray regional state. This Wolkait identity question is more than a trigger that brings the birth of Amhara nationalism.

In general the recent protests created modest, much needed openings for dialogue and perhaps a measure of incremental liberalization in a country that will likely remain a developmental autocracy for some time. These openings should now be seized and expanded for the benefit of Ethiopia people and the horn of Africa regional stability.

### **4.3.2. Negative implications**

#### **4.3.2.1. Lawlessness**

A vicious cycle of protests and repression subsequently took hold for over a year concentrated in Amhara and Oromia; the protests that rocked the country are estimated to have resulted in about 3,000 deaths and 23,000 arrests (many have since been released). Despite the fact that initial protests were forcefully repressed, it took the authorities several months to re-establish control, only to see protests and violence flare up several times again. As part of its containment strategy, the government cut off the internet, prohibited the diplomatic corps.

Moreover, the government has neither committed to addressing Tigrayan dominance of top-level command posts in the security forces, nor to conducting a transparent public inquiry into the operations of Ethiopia's security forces during the protests. On balance, it is clear that the EPRDF has kept firm control of both the government and its security forces, while proposing several changes that are probably largely symbolic, and others that could acquire more meaning.

None of this should come as a surprise. To gauge the significance of the concessions, a closer examination of the protests is needed in the context of general transitions from authoritarian rule.

People had expected peace, justice, equity, fairness, freedom, and democracy at the end of the popular protest in Gondar immediately after the coming of D/r Abiy Ahimed as prime minister; the government had granted freedom of expression for the people regardless of their political affiliation, ethnicity, gender, and other social-political stand.

However the people could not properly utilize their freedom; they had beyond its limit. Many groups tried to achieve their goal by using force or treat of force, other than law. The organized group of criminals had looting others privet property at night by using vehicles and military weapons. The informants (I,04) told that, the police could not insured the rule of law even they could not protect themselves from endanger. For instance, the police officers had victimized by the actions of the looting group; two members of the police staff in the city administration had lost their arms and injured by the looting groups.

The interviewees equivocally argue that, there are high transactions of military weapons in the town by individuals and groups having a strong chain. The bullet is being fired at night and even the day time. As they had evidenced mob mentality had been increased among the unemployed youths. Looting, kidnapping and ethnic based violence had become the common talk in the town. As a result the civil and private sectors that provide service for the people had no guarantee for their actions as well as their life. According to informant (02), most newly political appoints fear take risks and responsibilities.

According to the discussants, still there is unclear political conspiracy behind the people of Gondar. There is a secret group who works “Gondar to be unrest and to be battle field”; that is way the recent Kimçant Identity question untimely fired since it was once approved by the Amhara regional government to establish their own administrative system supported by the regional government.

#### **4.3.2.2. Dislodgment of the people**

Although displacement was a common phenomenon in Ethiopia resulted from the negative impact of ethnic federalism, in recent years its intensity become higher out of the popular expectation. Ethiopia suffers from long-standing conflicts driven by ethnic motives, competition for scarce resources, land issues, limited social services, infrastructure and weak governance. Intercommoned violence has in recent years resulted in the displacement of some 2.7 million people, of whom 1.4 million people were displaced in the first six months of 2018 alone, making it the world's highest level of internal displacement in 2018 (Ethiopia humanitarian crisis analysis. 2019). In the year 2019, Ethiopia had more than 3 million displaced people from the whole parts of the country; there were around 55,000 displaced peoples around Gondar from different districts of the central and west Gondar zone as well as from Tegray region. Displacement of the people had influenced the political economy of the country adversely. It creates social unrest; it also increases the need for humanitarian assistance.

The complexity of displacement is shown in the following case.

mekdes Zeleke was a woman who lived in Tegray region in Kefta Humera district for 15 years. Unfortunately, on the 12 September, the group of youth rotates the town and ordered that all Amhara must go out from Humera district. Immediately, she leaved her home where she lived for 15 years and she invest all her assets. She had nothing other than her home; she wanted to sell it but no one was interested to buy with appropriate coast. She had faced complex social and economic crisis; she could not got any support from the Amhara regional government until she did the interview even if she asked the coordinator more than four times. Until that, she was homeless and starved. She said that, although there was oppression before the time being, the recent dislocation was as counter act for the withdraws of Tegrean people from Gondar.

At the same time there are a number of peoples who displaced from Gondar to Tegray region.

For instance, the Tegrean withdraws from Gondar negatively affect the social capital of the town.

#### **4.3.2.3. Increasing tension between ADP and TPLF**

The historical literature of the two political party shows that, they are the sister party which create EPRDF with other two parties. Their relation dated back to the period of unti dergu movement although ADP was named EPDM later on ANDM. The political elites of the two

parties had strong relationship in one or another way. The former influential EPDM and ANDP political elite Bereket Simon (2018)” in his book in titled as “ትንሳኤዙ-ኢትዮጵያ” used to memorize to Meles Zenawi as “my eternally teacher”. This implies two things; on the one hand it implies the proximity of the two individuals and on the other had it implies Bereket Simon had received his political thought from Meles Zenawi. By default, commentators argued that, the TPLF was a master of ANDM inversely the ANDM was also the servant of TPLF.

However, in the recent years followed the change in ANDM, the patron-client relationship between the two parties is changed. ANDM had changed not only its name to ADP, but also it changed the relationship with TPLF. However those changes were not pleasant on the side of TPLF. As a result viable tension is escalated by those statements which released in different time after the meeting of the central committee of the two parties. In the post July 13 popular protest, the ANDM political elites tried to say “no” forced through the popular pressure. On the 14 July the Amhara national governments clearly asked the federal defense force to leave Gondar; it announced that, the regional police force would capture Demeke Zewude and accuse if he is suspected to be guilty. However, the TPLF forces opposed to lift from Gondar temporarily, later a day they were went out. The TPLF repeatedly asked the regional government of Amhara to deport Demeke either to the federal government or to the Tegray regional government yet it was not ok on the side of ANDPs political elites.

Therefore, the tension between the two political parties become immense, and gets its viability officially. A certain declaration proposed by the federal government had a chance to be supported either of their CC statement but not by both. For instance, EPRDF establish the boundary and identity commission to diagnosis the boundary and identity questions though out the country; while the ADP supports the establishment of the BIC, the TPLF strongly oppose it as unconstitutional measurement. Again extending of the general census was supported by ADP while it was opposed by TPLF.

The very recent, CC committees of the two political parties following the death of federal defense force commander in chief and the high political leaders of Amhara regional state shows that the existence of the “word war” between the parties. TPLF accused the ADP for the

accidents; while the ADP throw word bomb as counter attack by narrating the long lived loathing of the TPLF on Amhara people. The ADPs statement read as follows.

የትህነግ /ህዋህት መሰሪ እና አሻጥር የተሞላበት የዘመናት ባህሪውን በማጋለጥ፣ የአማራ ህዝብን ጨምሮ የኢትዮጵያ ብሄር ብሔረሰቦችን ህዝቦች ባደረጉት ቆራጥ ትግል የተገኘውን ህዝባዊ ድል ደግሞ ደጋግሞ በማንኳሰስ እና ፈፅሞ አክብሮት የማያውቀውን እና እራሱ ሲጥሰው የነበረውን ህግ መንግስታዊና የፌዴራል ስርአት ጠበቃ በመምሰል፣ የኢትዮጵያ ብሄር ብሔረሰቦችንና ጭቁን ህዝቦችን በማደናገር ለዳግም ሰቆቃ እንዲዳረጉ እያደረገ ባለበት . . . ከጥፋት ሀይሎች በስተጀርባ መሽጎ አመራር እየሰጠ ባለበት ሁኔታ ለኢትዮጵያ ህዝቦች የለውጥ እንቅስቃሴ መነሻ ተደርገው የተወሰዱ አሳሪና፣ ደብዳቤ እና ጸረ-ዲሞክራቶችን፣ ህዝብና አገር በድፍረት የዘረፉ ሌቦችን፣ በብሄር ብሄረሰቦች እና ህዝብ ልጆች ላይ ኢ-ሰብአዊ ድርጊት የፈጸሙ ተጠርጣሪ ወንጀለኞችን አቅፎና ደብቆ በያዘበት ሁኔታ የትህነግ /ህዋህት ያወጣው መግለጫ የዘመናት አስመሳይነቱን ያጋለጠ፣ እራሱን ብቸኛ የኢትዮጵያ ጠበቃ አስመስሎ መቅረቡ የሞራል እና የተግባር ብቃት የሌለው ድርጅት መሆኑ የሚታወቅ ነው።

In the above ADP’s counter statement for TPLFs announcement, one can understand the true nature of TPLFs. It clearly elaborates the extent how the political elites of the TPLFs oppose the recent political reforms at the national level. In addition, the caption shows that, how they were cruel, brutal, torture, corrupt, oppressive, egoist, criminal and slaughters.

As the informants argued, the ADP is coming now on the truck of ethno- federalism; it speaks for the benefit of Amhara people unusually, which flourished after the protracted popular protests in the region. However, the tension will bring mutual destruction of the two as well as dark future to Ethiopia unless it handled urgently.

Generally, despite of a number of political reforms followed, including the annulment of the state of emergency, a peace agreement with Eritrea, release of political prisoners, the protection of basic human freedom, permission of exiled dissidents to return home, decriminalization of armed opposition groups, the call for financial and democratic reforms. These extraordinary reforms are however not without its drawbacks, challenges and loosening up of state control has opened up for a surge in lawlessness and ethnic violence.

## **CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION**

In this chapter of the study, the researcher confer on the major findings of the research after, a careful thematic analysis of the qualitative data those are extracted from both secondary and primary source through interview, FGDs and document. The researcher had drawn the conclusions in line of the research questions and objectives raised at the begging.

### **5.1. Conclusion**

Whatever the word of explanations about the cause of protest in Gondar are different; the accumulated as well as long living grievance caused by political, economic and social discrimination of the ruling on the people of Amhara taken as tremendous structural factors. To say “on the goiter ear supporter” the “persistent anti-Amhara campaigns” by a few Oromo and Tegrean elites, who portray the Amhara as historical colonizer and victimizer of all other ethnic groups had contributed for the unprecedented wave of popular protests in Gondar that need deep and systemic reform in how federalism is implemented, and in how power and resources are shared in Ethiopia. The detention of Colonel Demeke Zewudu and other WAIC in Gondar fired the first but the most important shot for the rise of protest in Gondar. Thus, the people of Gondar challenged the rule of the government in risk condition and treat of death.

The research findings revealed that the protest in Gondar was loosely structured; there were not well planned processes, clearly stipulated objectives at first; rather it was ignited by phenomenon. Later on, the protest becomes structured in somehow; on the one hand the face book groups inside and outside the country tried to mobilize the people for protest. On the other hand, the brushers were either distributed to individuals or were posted on the areas where people could read. In general, the Gondar protest had used both violent and non-violent means of protesting with changing character. Military insurrections of Fano, property destruction, and blockage were among violent means. Whereas march, internet activism, Diasporas activism, and boycott were among non-violent mechanisms of protesting used in Gondar in 2016. The kids had played a tremendous role by distributing the brushers secretly since the security officials failed in suspecting them. Amazingly, the government had challenged by its own tactical structure “one to five”. In the Gondar protests, all roads of the town became crowded by



the demonstrators to show the grievance on the government without any frustration of the possible measurement of the security forces and the heavy rain of the summer.

The implications of the popular protests in Gondar perceived differently by different observer; While some groups and individuals nullifying it's implication as an action of "terrorists and chauvinists", the other glorifying it as a measurement to destruct the oppressive system from Ethiopia. In my conclusion, there are viable positive repercussions in the political horizon of Ethiopia in the past one and half years after the protracted wave of protest in Gondar collaborating with others. The change is multi-dimensional that includes, the releasing of political leaders, decriminalizing armed and opposition groups by lifting the anti-terrorism proclamation, grunting basic human freedom rights and rehearse of democratic elements. Among all, the very important thing was that, the despot TPLF's political elites who were curving the Ethiopian politics as they want regardless of popular interests had been abscond on Gondar local aspects.

However it difficult to say, it has not a negative counter implications. For instance, The Gondar protest have resulted the displacement of many innocent people from Gondar. The insecurity and political instability of this transition period has catalyzed competitions for power and influence that often manifest in violence. Local power-brokers and politicians have leveraged ethnic identities (particularly the kemant Identity) to make the town unrest. Furthermore, since Abiy took office, there has also been a surge in violent activities in Gondar suggesting that a change in EPRDF leadership is insufficient to ensure an end to violence throughout the town. In short, it could be argued that the pressure on the government for radical change in the structure of rule and political competition was, although high, yet not ultimately significant enough.

- ✓ First and foremost we have testing the dark times under TPLF; the antagonism was largely confined at the elite level. Political elites at all level increase the complexity of the future Ethiopia in general and Gondar issue in particular. Things were/are markedly different when it comes to the public at the grass root level. As a result it is better to have people to people discussion facilitated by artists, popular figures, elders, religious leaders, media workers, and interest groups without any intervention from the government by the name of logistic service.

- ✓ The distorted reading of Ethiopia as a colonial power results the fragmentation current enabled historical wounds to be opened. It ruminates on the sufferings of the past as if they were contemporary events, with the result that the present is shrouded in bitter hatred towards each other. Thus we have to skip from such type of idiotic nourishment at once and for the last, to save this opportunity that leads to democratization of the country. We have to learn the lesson from the past, we have to focus on what unite us than divide us, we have quickly move forward and focus on the bigger picture. The government should provide conditions for national consensus
- ✓ It was clear that the formation of EPRDF as coalition front was the tactical approach of TPLF to exploit the country's resources. By nature, tactical relation will not persist longer; so the coalition of the four sister parties should transfer itself to more strategic relation in order to minimize the political tensions between the elites of the ethnic centered parties. This will end with them in the realization of the national party to the rule.
- ✓ The last but not the least, all Ethiopians had to understand Ethiopia is a museum of different ethnic society with their distinct culture; each ethnic cleavages have a right to express itself naturally as well as in modern democratic society; we have to respect this natural right in modern and democratic manner. There for, ethnic marginalization and oppression that cultivate public grievance should be ended to save Ethiopia from balkanization.

There for, the researcher recommended the following possible solutions for different stakeholders.

**The federal government:-**

- The federal government should resolve the identity questions of wolkyat people and boarder problem between Tegray and Amhara regional governments by considering history, culture and consent of the people regardless of constitutional procedures since it had procedural complexities to alleviate the problem.

- The federal government should work to stop the ever increasing tension between the TPLF and ADP ethnic parties that would be end by establishing national party through comprehensive and round table discussions.
- Resource and power allocation to the regions and ethnic groups should be based on the principles of utility, other than client- patron relations.
- The federal government should establish framework to rehabilitate the displaced societies from Gondar and out of Gondar by mobilizing the mass people all over Ethiopia and abroad.

**Political elites:-**

- Elites from different ethnic groups should be open to solve the problem and must be ready for effective negotiations.
- Political elites by the help of historians have to re-correct the intentionally distorted history of Ethiopia via maximizing the commonalities instead of differences to stop ethnic animosity and mass displacement from different parts of the country. They have to write, speak, and decide free from any biases based on personal, ethnic, religious and kinship affiliations.

**Gondar City administration:-**

- The political appointment and positioning process at city administration level be obliged to be, on the principle of meritocracy, not by personal loyalty to the party and the system.
- The city administration had better to challenge unemployment problem by expanding investment opportunities via abolish the bureaucracy problems from kebele to higher level of the city. . It must solve the questions of the people on time as much as possible by establishing deliverology system.
- The last but not the list, the government would have safeguarded the life and property of the citizens without any hesitation by involving the community at large.

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## Appendixes

Annex: 1

### BAHIRDAR UNIVERSITY

#### FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

#### DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Name:----- sex-----Educational status-----position-----

Place of interview-----Date of interview-----

#### Interview questions for political leaders (4 head executives)

1. What are the factors of popular protest in Gondar in 2016
2. How do you see the unconstitutional external interventions of higher level of politicians on the issue of Gondar?
3. As being the high level of political leaders who are responsible to the people in the city administration, what were the major causes that insist the people to protest against the ruling?
4. How do you see the changes in politics after the protracted popular protest in Gondar?
5. How do you see the former political appointment process? Was it merit based or not?  
How?
6. What was the stand of Gondar city administration regarding to the issue of Wolkaite?  
What should be done to alleviate the problem of wolkaite identity questions?

**Annex: 2**

**BAHIRDAR UNIVERSITY  
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE**

**DEPARTMENT OF POLETICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

Name: ----- sex-----Educational status-----position-----

Place of interview-----Date of interview-----

**Interview questions for head of police office**

1. What do you say about the political intervention on the work of the police during the Gondar protest?
2. Although the work of the police is believed to be none politicized, the rule of EPRDF had along hand to harm the people of Gondar by the name of security and police. What is your opinion regarding to this point?
3. Since there was massive arresting, detaining and harassing of citizens, how you identify the individuals who participate in protest from non-participants?
4. How was the constitutionality and fairness of the federal police measurement at Collonel Demeke Zewudu on July 12/2016 was constitutional and just action?

**BAHIRDAR UNIVERSITY**  
**FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE**  
**DEPARTMENT OF POLETICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

Name: ----- sex-----Educational status-----position-----  
Place of interview-----Date of interview-----

**Interview questions for political activists**

1. What do say about the motives of the popular protest in Gondar since 2005? What was the common agenda of the people that the government missed?
2. Can you explain about the organization and management of the protest?
3. Could you give briefing about the role of media, artists, Diasporas, youths, opposition party leaders and members, as well as model individuals in the protests?
4. What is your opinion regarding to the implications of Gondar protests? Give details about the national and regional implication of the protests.

## **Annex: 4**

**BAHIRDAR UNIVERSITY**  
**FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE**  
**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

### **Guide line checklist for FGD**

1. How do you see the achievement of protest in Gondar? What was the national and regional implication of the protests?
2. What do you say about the motives for popular protest in Gondar since 2005?
3. What are the basic factors for protests? Which one is more triggering cause?
4. What do you say about the willingness and commitment of the participants in the protests in Gondar?
5. What are the implications of Gondar protest since 2016?

Annex: 5

ባህርዳር ዩኒቨርሲቲ

የማህበረሰብ ሳይንስ ትምህርት ዘርፍ

የፖለቲካ ሳይንስና አለማቀፋዊ ጥናት ትምህርት ክፍል

ለከተማ የፖለቲካ አመራሮች የቀረበ የቃለ መጠይቅ መነሻ ጥያቄዎች

ቃለ መጠይቅ የሚደረግለት ስም-----ጾታ-----

የተሰማራበት የሙያ መስክ-----ሃላፊነት-----የትምህርት ደረጃ-----

1. በእርስዎ እይታ ለጎንደር እና አካባቢው ለተቃውሞው መነሻ ምክንያቶች ሊሆኑ የሚችሉ የመንግስት ችግሮች ምን ምን ሊሆኑ ይችላሉ ብለው ያስባሉ?
2. በሀገራችን ህገ-መንግስታዊ አሰራር በየደረጃው ያሉ የመንግስት እርከኖች የራሳቸው የሆነ ስልጣን እና ሀላፊነት እንዳላቸው ተቀምጧል። ይሁን እንጂ የታችኞቹ የመንግስት እርከኖች ስራቸውን በተቀመጠው አግባብ እንዳይሰሩ ህጋዊ ያልሆነ የበላይ አካላት ጣልቃ ገብነት እንዳለ ይነገራል።እንደ ዞን ከፍተኛ አመራርነትም ጉዳዩን እንዴት ይመለከቱታል? በእርስዎ ወይም በባልደረባዎቻችሁ ላይ የደረሰ ገጠመኝ ካለ ቢነግሩኝ።
3. እርስዎ እንደ መንግስት ከፍተኛ አመራርነትም የጎንደር ህዝብን ለአደባባይ ላይ የተቃውሞ እንቅስቃሴ እንዲያመራ ያነሳሱት ኢኮኖሚያዊ እና ፖለቲካዊ ምክንያቶች ምን ምን ናቸው ብለው ያምናሉ? ከዚህ ጋር አያይዘው የበለጠ ገፊ ምክንያት ነው የሚሉት የትኛው ሊሆን ይችላል?
4. ከጎንደር ህዝብ የተራዘመ የአደባባይ ላይ ተቃውሞ በኋላ የመጣውን ለውጥ እንዴት ይመለከቱታል? በለውጥ ሂደቱ የጎንደር እና አካባቢው ህዝብ አገኘው የሚሉት ጥቅም ምንድን ነው ብለው ያስባሉ?
5. ባለፉት አመታት የህዝብ መሪዎች የሰሁመት አሰጣጥ ሂደት ምን ይመስል ነበር?
6. የወልቃይትን የአማራ ማንነት እንዲሁም የወሰን እና ድንበር ጉዳይ እነደ አንድ የህዝቡ የተቃውሞ መነሻ ምክንያት አድርገው የሚቆጥሩ ሰዎች አሉ።ከቅርብ ጊዜ ወዲህ የክልሉ መንግስተም ጠንክር ያለ አቋም እንዳለው ይደመጣል፤ በእርስዎ እንደ ዞን ከፍተኛ አመራርነትም ምን አይነት አቋም እንደተያዘ ቢያብራሩልኝ? ጉዳዩን በዘላቂነት ለመፍታት የተቀየሰ ስልት ካለ አክለው ቢያብራሩልኝ?



Annex: 6

ባህርዳር ዩኒቨርሲቲ

የማህበረሰብ ሳይንስ ትምህርት ዘርፍ

የፖለቲካ ሳይንስና አለምቀፋዊ ጥናት ትምህርት ክፍል

ለከተማ የፖሊስ አመራሮችና አባላት የቀረበ የቃለ መጠይቅ መነሻ ጥያቄዎች

ቃለ መጠይቅ የሚደረግለት ስም-----ጾታ-----

የተሰማራበት የሙያ መስክ-----ሃላፊነት-----

1. በጎንደር የህዝብ ተቃውሞ ወቅት መንግስት በፖሊስ ስራ ላይ የነበረውን ጣልቃ ገብነት እንዴት ይመለከቱታል?
2. ምንም እንኳን የፖሊስ ስራ ከፖለቲካ ጣልቃ ገብነት ነጻ ነው ቢባልም ባለፉት ጊዜያት ፖለቲከኞች በፖሊስ ስራ ላይ የነበራቸውን ጣልቃ ገብነት እንዴት ያዩታል?
3. በጎንደር ከተማ የተቃውሞ እንቅስቃሴ ወቅት በጅምላ የታሰሩት የአብዛኞቹ ክስ አመጽ በማነሳሳት እና በመንግስት ላይ በማመጽ የሚል እንደነበር እንደነበር ይታወሳል። ፖሊስ ይህን ማስረጃ በማሰባሰብ ሂደት ላይ በግልጽ የተሳተፉትን ካልተሳተፉት የለየበት መንግድ እንዴት እንደነበር ማብራሪያ ቢሰጡኝ?
4. እርስዎ የነበረው የፖሊስ ህግ የማስከበር ተግባር ሙሉ በሙሉ ህጋዊ እና ህገ መንግስታዊ ነበር ብለው ያምናሉ?

## Annex: 7

### ባህርዳር ዩንቨርሲቲ

#### የማህበረሰብ ሳይንስ ትምህርት ዘርፍ

##### የፖለቲካ ሳይንስና አለማቀፋዊ ጥናት ትምህርት ክፍል

በፖለቲካ ውስጥ ንቁ ተሳታፊዎች ለሆኑ የቀረበ የቃለ መጠይቅ መነሻ ጥያቄዎች

1. የጎንደር ህዝብ ከ2008 አ.ም ጀምሮ በመንግስት አገዛዝ ላይ ተቃውሞ እንዲያነሳ አነሳሽ ምክንያቶቹ ምን ምን ናቸው ብለው ያምናሉ?
2. የጎንደር ከተማ ህዝባዊ ተቃውሞ እንዴት ሲደራጀና ሲመራ እንደነበር ማብራሪያ ቢሰጡኝ?
3. በተቃውሞ እንቅስቃሴ ወቅት የመገናኛ ብዙሀን፣ የአርቲስቶች፣ በውጭ ሀገር የሚኖሩ ኢትዮጵያውያን፣ የተፎካካሪ የፖለቲካ ፓርቲዎች አባልና ደጋፊዎች እንዲሁም የከተማው ወጣቶች ሚና ምን እንደነበር ማብራሪያ ቢሰጡኝ?
4. የጎንደር ከተማ የተቃውሞ እንቅስቃሴ ያስመዘገባቸው ስኬቶች እና ያመጣው የፖለቲካ እና የኢኮኖሚ ለውጥ በእርስዎ እይታ ምን ይመስላል?



## Annex: 9

### ባህርዳር ዩንቨርሲቲ

### የማህበረሰብ ሳይንስ ትምህርት ዘርፍ

### የፖለቲካ ሳይንስና አለምቀፋዊ ጥናት ትምህርት ክፍል

ለቡድን ተኮር ውይይት መነሻ ጥያቄዎች

1. የጎንደር ህዝብ የተቃዋሚ እንቅስቃሴ ውጤታማነት እንዴት ታዩታለችሁ? ሀገራዊ እና ከባቢያዊ እንድምታው ምን ይመስል እንደነበር በማንሳት ሀሳብ ስጡበት።
2. ህዝቡን ለተቃዋሚ ያነሳሱት መሰረታዊ ምክንያቶች ምን ምን ናቸው ብላችሁ ታምናላችሁ?
3. የተቃዋሚው መሰረታዊ ምክንያቶች ናቸው ከሚባሉት የጎላ አስተዋጽኦ ሊኖረው ይችላል የሚሉት የትኞቹን ነው?
4. በተቃዋሚ ሰልፍ ላይ ሲወጡ ነበሩት የማህበረሰብ ክፍሎች ምን ያክል አላማውን የተረዱናቸው? አላማውን ለማሳካት ምን ያክል ቁርጠኝነት ነበራቸው?
5. የጎንደር ህዝባዊ እምቢተኝነት ያመጣቸዉ ለዉጦች ምን ምን ናቸዉ?

## Annex: 10

Personal profiles of interviewee and their code

Code given by the researcher	sex	Educational status	Date of interview	Consumed time for interview		Position/work	remark
				time	minute		
IP-01	M	Phd holder	25/04/19	-	28	Mayor	
IP-02	M	Degree holder	26/04/19	-	37	ADP head	
IP-03	M	Degree holder	28/04/19	-	16	V. head of C.G. zone	
IP-04	M	Degree holder	30/04/19	-	18	Police office head	
IS-05	M	Degree holder	17/04/19	1	05	high school Teacher	
IS-06	M	Ma holder	17/04/19	-	55	high school Teacher	
IS-07	M	TVT diploma	21/04/19	-	40	Private business man	
IS-08	F	TVT diploma	21/04/19	1	10	Private business	
IS-09	M	Ma holder	21/04/19	1	25	NGO worker	
IA-10	M	Grade 12	22/05/19	-	13	Private business man	
IA-12	F	Grade 10	22/05/19	-	25	Private business man	
IA-13	F	Degree holder	22/05/19	-	33	Private business man	
IA-14	M	No grade	22/05/19	-	45	Civil servant	
IA-15	M	Degree holder	22/05/19	-	19	Religious leader	
IA-16	M	Ma holder	20/05/19	-	54	College teacher	
IA-17	M	Grade 12	20/05/19	-	35	Private business man	
IA-18	M	TVT diploma	20/05/19	-	15	Private business man	
IA-19	M	Grade seven	20/05/19	-	25	Private business man	
IA-20	M	Degree	20/05/19	-	23	Private business man	

## Annex: 11

### Profiles of FGDs

Specificati on code	Sex	Education al status	Work office	Date of Discussion	Time consumed	Place of discussion
FGD-01	M	Ba degree	Civil service office	10/06/2019	3 hours	Wallia general secondary and preparatory school
FGD-02	M	Ba degree	Civil service office			
FGD-03	M	Ba degree	Worker \$social afairs office			
FGD-04	M	Ba degree	Worker \$social afairs office			
FGD-05	M	Ma degree	Education office			
FGD-06	F	Ba degree	Education office			
FGD-07	F	Ba degree	Trade and investment office			
FGD-08	M	Ba degree	Trade and investment office			
FGD-09	M	Ba degree	Administrative office			
FGD-10	M	Ba degree	Administrative office			

## Annex: 12



*Activist Nigist Yirga who has been jailed for participating in a peaceful protest in Gondar, Ethiopia char Investigation Bureau. She was kidnapped in Gondar in September and soon brought the ged with terrorism after spending over four months in Maekelawi Federal Police Maekelawi. Nigist Yirga is known for a viral photo, wearing a t-shirt showing portrait*

## Annex: 13



ETHIOPIA HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT·MONDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 2016 ( Translated from Amharic) Following the July arrest and detention of representatives of the Wolqait Amhara Identity Committee in Gonder by the government’s Antiterrorism Taskforce, protests erupted in many areas of the Amhara region. The first of these protests took place on August 1st in Gonder town.



Annex: 14



Gondar town partially during the sit in protests.



Banners in partially on the August 1/ 2016 protest of Gondar.



Bahre Selam Hotel, which is located in Kebele 18 locally called Maraki, was one of the victims of the unrest that occurred in Gondar.



17 September 2016, more than 400 shops and business centers in Gondar.