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The Role of Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commissions in Combating Corruption in Ethiopia: The Case of Amhara National Regional State Ethics and Anti- Corruption Commission

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**The Role of Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commissions in Combating
Corruption in Ethiopia: The Case of Amhara National Regional State Ethics
and Anti- Corruption Commission**

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June 2018
Bahir Dar, Ethiopia

Bahir Dar University
Faculty of Social Sciences
Department of Political Science and International Studies

**The Role of Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commissions in Combating
Corruption in Ethiopia: The Case of Amhara National Regional State Ethics
and Anti- Corruption Commission**

**A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of political
Science and International Studies in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Master of Art in Political Science**

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Advisor

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DECLARATION

The undersigned Erestu Legese Beyene, here by confirm that this study in the title “*The Role of Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commissions in Combating Corruption in Ethiopia: The Case of Amhara National Regional State Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission*” is carried out by me and any material used in this study is duly acknowledged.

Erestu Legese Beyene

June 2018

This thesis has been submitted for examination with my approval as an advisor for the candidate.

Taye Demssie (PhD Candidate)

June 2018

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS/ ACRONYMS

ACA	Anti-Corruption Authorities
ACC	Anti-Corruption Commission
ACI	Anti-Corruption Institutions
ANRS	Amhara National Regional State
ANRSEACC	Amhara National Regional State Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission
AUCPCC	African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption
CPIB	Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau
CSRP	Civil Service Reform program
EACC	Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
FEACC	Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission
FGD	Focused Group Discussion
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IACAC	Inter-American Convention Against Corruption
ICAC	Independent Commission Against Corruption
ICAC	Independent Convention Against Corruption
ICAC	Independent Convention Against Corruption
IFI	International Financial Institutions
IME	International Monetary Fund
NGO	None Governmental Organization

OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and development
SCPIB	Singapore Corrupt Practice Investigative Bureau
SNNPRS	Southern Nation Nationalities and Peoples Regional State
TI	Transparency International
UN	United Nations
UNCAC	United Nations Convention Against Corruption
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
WB	World Bank

ABSTRACT

Corruption is one of the burning issue and impediments for democratization, good governance and sustainable development in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian government is aware of the severances of consequences of corruption and regarded it as a compulsive necessity to combat it. In response to this the FEACC emerged as a national anticorruption authority for the struggle to create a corruption-free society. This also leads to the establishment of the EACCs in the respective member regional states of the Ethiopian federation. Over the years however, the fight against corruption seems not to have achieved the desirable results. Accordingly, the purpose of this study was to investigate the role of Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commissions in combating corruption in the Amhara National Regional State. Specially, the study intended to; assess the effectiveness of the ANRSEACC, identifies its challenges as well as investigate the strategies the Commission has used to address the challenges. To achieve the intended objectives, this study employed qualitative case study design based on primary and secondary data sources. Interviewees, document analysis and focused group discussion have employed through purposive and available sampling techniques. The data collected are analyzed using thematic analysis. The findings of the study revealed that, the role of ANRSEACC were found to be ineffective. Subsequently, resource constraint (financial, human and technical), limited spatial institutionalization, low public awareness and lack of public trust, problem of cooperation, lack of political commitment among government officials, problems related to whistleblowers and witnesses and operational inefficiency have been identified as major challenges. Whereas, operating alternative mechanisms, working in partnership with the stakeholders, applying comprehensive anticorruption strategies (education, prevention, and investigation) and working on identified focus areas were investigated as main strategies the Commission has used to address its challenges. Based on the findings, the major recommendation is to strengthen the strategies on the basis of identified problems, researches, consistent and coherent manners, broad based approaches and long term perspective to address its challenges and to play effective role in its anti-corruption struggle.

Key Words: Anti-Corruption Commission, Corruption, Effectiveness,

CHAPTER ONE

1. INTRODUCTION

The study focused on the role of the Amhara National Regional State Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission in combating corruption. This chapter states the background, statement of the problem, study objectives, research questions, study significance, scope of the study, operational definitions and organization of the study.

1.1 Background of the Study

In the present day world order, it has been reached to a consensus that corruption is a global concern and a crime that affects human beings across the world (UNCAC, 2004). Scholars have argued that corruption is flourishing in all nations, and is not unique to a single continent, region and ethnic group (Ronald and Chikulo, 2000). It cuts across faiths, religious denominations and political systems and affects both young and old, man and woman alike though it hurts more the poor and the vulnerable (Mitchell, 2014; Berihun, 2013). Corruption exists in democratic and dictatorial politics and feudal, capitalist and socialist economies (Girling, Taylor and Francis, 2002). It is recognized as a major hindrance to enhancing capacity and detrimental to development in general. Corruption weakens democracy and the rule of law, erodes the quality of life and allows organized crime, and other threats to human security (UNCAC, 2004).

As a result, fighting corruption becomes a major concern of the international community. In the late 1990s, many international anti-corruption efforts were launched by various groups, nation states and international organizations such as, the World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), Transparency International (TI) as well as national governments (Bukovansky, 2006). These institutions played a significant role in bringing the issue of corruption to a global perspective and its negative impacts felt worldwide (Dimant, 2013). Later on the most comprehensive international anticorruption instrument were established. The United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) was adopted on 31 October and the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AUCPCC) was also adopted on 11 July 2003 (Bashir, 2006). All these changes show the growth desire to bring global responses to corruption.

The creation of these International Anti-Corruption Institutions has recommended the creation of domestic institutions in each country as an important strategy against corruption (Dimant, 2013). Following this many countries in the world including Ethiopia have introduced policies and legal and institutional measures to prevent corruption through the implementation of specialized intelligence units and Anti-Corruption Institutions (ACI) (Biruk, 2016). The Ethiopian government after analyzing the effect of corruption in the social and economic endeavor of the Country has decided to reform the social, economic and political formation of the Country (Abeje, 2015). From the reform measures taken by the government, the Ethical sub-program culminated in the enactment in May 2001 of the Proclamation establishing the Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (FEACC) of Ethiopia by proclamation No. 235/2001.

Since 2001 Ethiopia joined the international movement against corruption not only by establishing a specialized anti-corruption agency, FEACC but also by ratifying the UNCAC and the AUCPCC. Ethiopia signed the AUCPCC in 2004 and the UNCAC in 2003, but it was only in September 2007 and November 2007, respectively, that the Parliament ratified the two accords which marked the beginning of the institutionalized checking against corruption in Ethiopia (Biruk, 2016; Tewdros, 2009).

As the result of the establishment of the FEACC of Ethiopia, seven of the nine regional states have established their own Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commissions (EACC) having autonomy and budget for fighting and preventing corruption (Arsema, 2010). Based on this the Amhara National Regional State (ANRS) has established the Amhara National Regional State Ethics and Anti - Corruption Commission (ANRSEACC) on 15th of December 2003 by proclamation No.93/2003, which is the focus of this study. The establishment of this organ at federal and regional level with no doubt indicates that corruption has been perceived as an obstacle for development. It also portrayed the readiness of the government to take some measures in order to tackle corruption in the country (Abeje, 2015). Accordingly, the researcher tries to investigate the roles of the ANRSEACC in combating corruption.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Corruption is a universal problem which compromises the quest for development, good governance, and democracy though its degree of severity varies (Capasso and Santoro, 2018).

Corruption has a complex social, political and economic impact that affects all countries and it undermines democratic institutions, slows economic development and contributes to a governmental instability particularly in poor countries like Ethiopia (Kinkino, 2014). Therefore, to have a successful economic, social and political development and prevailing good governance and democracy all countries in the world are started to struggle against corruption. For doing this ACIs are becoming instruments from the global to the local level.

The FEACC and Regional Anti-Corruption Commissions of Ethiopia was also launched for the purpose of combating corruption through investigation, education and prevention, and to address the threat posed to Ethiopian development by corruption (Tewdros, 2009). Despite Commissions have begun applying their mission, they still face many problems and criticisms in the endeavor to achieve success in the fight against corruption. Except few successes many ACIs, particularly those established in Africa are being criticized for lack of effective impact in reducing corruption (Heilbrunn, 2004). Speville (2008), also asserted that many Anti-Corruption Authorities (ACA) fail to have effective role. Although ACIs are established with great expectation and of great importance in anticorruption endeavor, most of them have often been criticized for being ineffective (Biruk, 2016). The issue of effectiveness of the ACCs in running its duties is questionable especially due to the government's involvement in tasks (Berihun, 2013). Because of this, it poses a question over the roles and effectiveness of ACCs in Ethiopia.

Regarding to the studies done on the roles and effectiveness of ACCs, various studies have been conducted at the national level. Mezmur and Koen (2011), conducted a study on the critical assessment of Ethiopian FEACC, by following qualitative methodology. The study pointed out that FEACC's anti-corruption efforts have improved over time, but the Commission has not made noteworthy progress in taming corruption. Tewdros (2009), has conducted a study by saying institutional response to corruption: a critical analysis of the FEACC of Ethiopia by using qualitative methodology. Biruk (2016), also assessed the effectiveness of FEACC of Ethiopia in implementing international anticorruption instruments. But these studies do not give concerns for the case of the regional state anti-corruption commissions.

While corruption is well studied, most of the studies focus on its causes and effects at the societal level. The role of the regional state anti-corruption commissions which is established to fight against corruption was not that much investigated. From the studies carried out at the federal level

one is, The Effectiveness of the Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission of Ethiopia (Arsema, 2010). The study indicated that the FEACC is not effective but, it has gradually improved the effectiveness of its operations and has the potential to become successful. The study also stated that due to time constraints and the lack of available data the study does not cover the seven regional states. This implies that researches should conduct on the regional state anti-corruption commissions. Accordingly, in the Southern Nation Nationalities and Peoples Regional State (SNNPRS) one research is conducted by Kinkino (2014), which assesses the achievements and prospects of the SNNPR Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission. However, there has been no research is conducted that investigate the roles and performance of ANRSEACC in combating corruption. Therefore, the researcher considers a significant contribution to examine the role of the ANRSEACC in combating corruption.

More or less there were research efforts undertaken by scholars focused on the causes and effects of corruption. However, the role of ACCs in Ethiopia still needs the attention of scholars and previous scholars also suggested that role of ACCs as main research area needs to be studied. Thus by taking this and the above mentioned premises, this study focused on investigating the role of the ANRSEACC in combating corruption. The study also tried to find out how much has been done by the commission in combating corruption, what were the problems faced by the commission so far during its work in combating corruption and what are the strategies the Commission has used to address the challenge it faces.

1.3 Objective of the Study

1.3.1 General Objective of the Study

The overall objective of this study was to investigate the role of Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commissions in combating Corruption with a particular reference to the Amhara National Regional State Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission.

1.3.2 Specific Objectives of the Study

The specific objectives of the study are to:

- ❖ Assess the effectiveness of the Commission in combating corruption.
- ❖ Identify the challenges faced by the Commission to fight against corruption.

- ❖ Investigate the strategies, the Commission has used to address the challenges it faces.

1.4 Research Questions

The research questions are:

1. How much is the Commission effective in combating corruption?
2. What are the challenges faced the Commission to fight against corruption?
3. What are the strategies the Commission has used to address the challenges it faces?

1.5 Significance of the Study

This study has the following significances. Firstly, the findings of this study have a decisive role in offering input for the ANRSEACC, staff members, other officials and sharing the experience of ANRSEACC to other ACCs to contribute for the betterment of combating corruption. Secondly, this study may also be used by policy makers, regional government, state council, non-governmental organizations, civil societies and other concerned bodies who want to take immediate and appropriate interventions in the anticorruption struggle. Thirdly, its finding helps the public, the regional government, regional institutions and other stakeholders to become conscious about their responsibilities in the fight against corruption. Further, the study will be a springboard for other researchers to study further relating research on the issue.

1.6 Scope of the Study

The study is geographically delimited to the ANRS. Although, there are three branch offices in Gondar, Dessie and Debre Birhan, this study focuses on the main branch (ANRSEACC) located in Bahir Dar City. This aimed at giving focus to the commission because of its wider responsibilities of coordinating the regional anti-corruption activities. Conceptually, this study mainly concerned with the roles that the ANRSEACC played, its effectiveness, challenges and the strategies the Commission has used in combating corruption.

1.7 Limitation of the Study

This study with no doubt is bounded to have limitations. The first major limitation that the researcher faced was related to obtaining adequate and accurate data from the participants. It was very difficult to get a detailed information and numerical data that is necessary for the study from

staff of the Commission. Participants respond general information about the issue which raised by the researcher. Their reason was they have not the detailed and numerical data because of turnover of staffs and shift of officials from one director to the other. The other limitation was getting customers of the Commission including whistleblowers, witnesses, judges and prosecutors and their willingness to give genuine information. However, the researcher tried his best to overcome the aforementioned limitations.

1.8 Operational Definition

Anti-Corruption Commission: is a specialized entity established by government or non-governmental bodies for the purpose of combating corruption.

Corruption: the working definition of corruption is the improper use of public office for private gain.

Effectiveness: is the degree of achievement of goals and objectives for which the ANRSEACC is established.

Ethics Liaison Units: are units established in public offices and public enterprises with the duty to coordinate ethical issues and advise the heads of the public offices and public enterprises.

Ethics Infrastructures: means bodies, mechanisms, or procedures or the necessary conditions that will serve to reduce substantially unethical conducts and to encourage efficiency and integrity

1.9 Organization of the Study

The study comprises of five chapters. The first chapter introduces the study and as part of an introduction it consists of sub-sections such as the background, problem statement, objectives, research questions, significance of the study, the scope of the study, limitation of the study, the operational definition of terms and organization of the study.

The second chapter consists understanding of corruption including, the definition, types, causes and consequences of corruption, theoretical framework of combating corruption, actors of combating corruption, historical development of ACCs, models of specialized ACIs, effectiveness of ACCs, the challenges of ACCs in combating corruption and finally, the chapter discusses the strategies ACCs used to combat corruption.

The third chapter is the methodological part which comprises, description of the study area, research method, research design, sampling design, data sources, data collection instruments, methods of data analysis, trustworthiness of the study and ethical considerations.

The fourth chapter of the thesis discusses the effectiveness of ANRSEACC, describe the challenges it faces in combating corruption and identify the strategies the Commission has used to address the challenge it faces. The final chapter concludes and forwards possible recommendations based on the findings of the research.

CHAPTER TWO

2. REVIEW OF LITERATURES

2.1 Introduction

This chapter mainly focused on reviewing the related literatures which are pertinent to the study. The first part deals with the understanding of corruption including, the definition, types, causes and consequences of corruption for the purpose of having better understanding of the phenomenon. The second part relates to a theoretical framework. The third part emphasized on the actors of combating corruption, historical development of ACCs, models of specialized ACIs, effectiveness of ACCs and criteria for the effectiveness of ACCs. The fourth part emphasizes on the challenges of ACCs in combating corruption. Finally, the chapter discusses on the strategies ACCs used to combat corruption.

2.2 Understanding Corruption: Definition, Types, Causes and Consequences

2.2.1 Definition of Corruption

Corruption is a difficult concept to define. It is a complex social, legal, economic, politically contested and multifaceted phenomenon enmeshed in vagueness (Johnston, 1996). Defining the concept of corruption varies among scholars; from region to region and remains largely contextual. There have been a number of different attempts to define the concept (Mouthomy, 2006). It challenges universal definition or interpretation because "it is not a discrete phenomenon, separate and distinct from all other forms of political and administrative behavior" (Williams, 1987 p.20). Because of this although, numerous formal definitions exist in different forms, there is no single, comprehensive and universally accepted definition of this phenomenon yet, which applies to all forms, types and degrees of corruption.

Nonetheless, it is difficult to find a precise and complete definition of corruption, by analyzing the conceptualization of the term given by various scholars, international institutions and organizations we can understand that, there are some commonly accepted definitions. Etymologically the word corruption derives from the Latin *corrumpere*, which refers to something

broken, destroyed, spoilt or weaken (Catharina, 2013). And the term ‘corrupt’ invokes a range of images of evil and illegal activities, and it designates that which destroys or damages wholesomeness (Tatishuili, 2013; Danilet, 2009).

The international institutions have employed a working definition since the 1990s. According to WB (1997), corruption is defined as the abuse of public office for private gain. The IMF defines corruption as the abuse of public authority or trust for private benefit (IMF, 2005). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2007), in its Anti-Corruption Practice Note, also defined corruption as the misuse of public power, office or authority for private benefit. Nonetheless, these definition becomes the most widely recognized and commonly used within the public domain, it ignores corruption in private sector. To rectify this limitation, TI a global anticorruption watchdog defines corruption as the abuse of public or private office for personal gain (TI, 2002). In a similar vein, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime define as a crime committed by officials (public or private) abusing of their role to procure gain for themselves or somebody else (UNODC, 2001).

The national proclamation of Ethiopian FEACC (2010), also defines corruption in the following manner:

Corruption is the offering, giving, soliciting or accepting of an inducement, promise, or reward; the making of threats or the use of intimidation, in words or in behavior, exerting influence by the abuse of authority or its inconsistent application; which may improperly influence the actions subsequently taken, or not taken, by a body, its members, or its officers; for the benefit or competitive advantage of self or another (p. 12).

Similarly, different scholars also define corruption from different perspectives. According to Girling (1999), corruption is the abuse of a public position of trust for private gain. Brownsberger (1983), agrees that corruption invariably refer to a misapplication of public goods to private ends. Aduda (2007) in his empirical study defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain. He explains that public office is abused when officials accepts, solicits or extorts a bribe and when private agents offer bribes to circumvent public policies and processes for competitive advantage and profits. But Brownsberger (1983), argues that the notion of what is public, what is held in trust for the people, vary across cultures, thus making corruption a relative concept.

According to Amundsen (1999), Corruption can also be understood as “everything from the paying of bribes to civil servants in return for some favor and the theft of public purses, to a wide range of dubious economic and political practices in which politicians and bureaucrats enrich themselves and any abusive use of public power to a personal end” (Amundsen, 1999 p.1). The other most widely used definition is by; Khan, who defines it as “behavior that deviates from the formal rules of conduct governing the actions of someone in a position of public authority because of private-regarding motives such as wealth, power, or status” (Khan 1996 p.12).

These scholarly definitions, only concerned with public sector corruption to the neglect of private sector corruption. Consequently, for the remedy of this limitation Muthomy (2006), define corruption as, the abuse of not only public office but also private or commercial office for private gain. According to him, it invariably involves giving something to someone in a position of power either in government or in a corporation. Chihamo and Shumba (2007), also propose that, corruption can be defined as the abuse or complicity of private or public power, office or resources for personal gain.

Regarding with the dictionary definitions, the Oxford Dictionary defines corruption as perversion or destruction of integrity in the discharge of public duties by bribery or favor. The Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary also defines it as inducement to wrong by improper or unlawful means. Based on this we can understand that the dictionary definition of the term, itself does not provide single meaning or explanation.

It is evident from the above discussion that there is a wide range of definitions of corruption. To this end for further discussion about corruption the study takes the definition given by WB, the abuse of public office for private gain. This definition is both simple and sufficiently broad to cover most of the corruption types, and it is also widely recognized and commonly used in literatures.

2.2.2 Types of Corruption`

Apart from attempts to define corruption, it is also important to distinguish between various categories or types of corruption to have better understanding of the phenomenon. Because of the absence of universally accepted definition there is no universally valid types of corruption (Biruk, 2016). Depending on this, researchers on corruption have elaborated multiple classifications.

Corruption takes varied forms in different countries and, in most cases, it is very difficult to distinguish one from the other because they are partly overlapping and used interchangeably with other concepts (Shimellis, 2005).

Though universal in its existence, the pervasiveness of corruption varies across nations and organizations. Indeed, there are at least as many forms of corruption as there are human institutions that might become corrupted (Farida and Esfahani, 2006). Corruption manifests itself in one or more of various forms like, bribery, extortion, fraud, embezzlement and other malfeasance by public or corporate officials (Mouthomy, 2006).

Although, corruption manifests itself in different ways and circumstances, there are types which persist in every system; occurs regardless of differences in levels of economic and social development and commonly used (Biruk, 2016; Berihun, 2013; Mouthomy, 2006; Kindra and Stapenhurst, 1998). These are grand corruption, petty corruption, political corruption and systematic corruption.

Grand Corruption: Occurs when a high level government official committed acts that distort policies or the central functioning of the state, enabling him or her to benefit at the expense of the public (Amndsen, 1999). It involves heads of states, ministers and other senior level government officials and it serves the interests of a narrow group of business people and politicians, or criminal elements (Mouthomy, 2006). It refers to bribes paid by businesses or interest groups to government officials or administrative elites in order to gain favorable influence in decision-making. Typically, it includes kickbacks to win large public procurement contracts, embezzlement of large sums of public funds, irregularities in public finances, importing goods without paying taxes and grabbing of public land and government houses (Rose-Ackerman, 1996). According to Desta (2016), state or regulatory corruption entails collusion of public officials and the private sector in order to set up loopholes to bypass existing rules. For instance, due to bribery paid to government officials, certain individual businesses may be allowed to pay lower taxes and win low-level procurement contracts, exchange of resources, access to rents, or other advantages for high-level officials, privileged firms, and their networks of elite operatives and supporters (FEACC, 2010). It is also a form of corruption which pervades the highest levels of a national government, leading to a broad erosion of confidence in good governance, rule of law and economic stability (Amndsen, 1999).

Petty corruption: Is also known as “bureaucratic”, type of corruption encountered by ordinary citizens in their day to day interactions with government bureaucrats when they try to access basic services (Biruk, 2016). It involves payment of comparatively small amounts of money to facilitate routine official transactions, for example customs clearance or the issuing of building permits payments to lower taxes, avoid fines, obtain water, electricity and telephone connections (Mouthomy, 2006). It is an everyday abuse of entrusted power by low and mid-level public officials in their interactions with ordinary citizens.

Political corruption: Is the manipulation of policies, institutions and rules of procedure in the allocation of resources and financing by political decision makers, who abuse their position to sustain their power, status and wealth (Amndsen, 1999). According to Mouthomy (2006), it involves lawmakers such as monarchs, dictators and legislators acting in their role as creators of the rules and standards by which a policy operates. Such officials engage in corruption when they seek unlawful personal benefit and in return provide political favors to their supporters at the expense of the public interest. Political corruption, therefore, can be distinguished from bureaucratic or petty corruption in a sense that it requires the use of political power by political decision-makers to sustain their power, status and wealth.

Systemic corruption: Occurs when corruption goes on for too long persistent and it becomes institutionalized or accepted as the norm and as part and parcel of the procedures of running private and public affairs of an organization or a society at large (Heymans and Lipietz, 1999). Systemic corruption is not a special category of corrupt practice, but rather a situation in which the major institutions and processes of the state are routinely dominated and used by corrupt individuals and groups (Mouthomy, 2006). This type of corruption uses holidays as a mask to give gifts or bribes to government officials. In general, systemic types of corruptions are not viewed negatively. Depending on culture and tradition, systemic gifts are generally prevalent at all levels of society throughout the world (Montesh, 2016). Because of this it influences individual behavior and day to day activities and institutions at all levels of a political and socio-economic system.

2.2.3 Causes of Corruption

The analysis of causes of corruption is a prerequisite for an effective strategy for fighting corruption, as the strategy should take into account the main causes of corruption. Available

literatures show that the causes of corruption are diverse and depend on the different contextual environments. The causes of corruption are usually complex and rooted in a country's policies, bureaucratic traditions, political and economic development, and social history (Shimelis, 2005). Then depending on the views of scholars, the causes of corruption are multi-dimensional including political, institutional, societal, and economical (Biruk, 2016; Berihun, 2013; Shimelis, 2005; Amendsen, 1999).

Political Cause: Politically weak government and lack of transparency and accountability in the public integrity systems are contributing factors for the occurrence of corruption (Dimant and Tosato, 2017; Berihun, 2013). Tanzi (1998), observes that corruption is connected with the political system of the state and especially with its monopoly and discretionary powers manifested in regulations and authorizations. The political causes also arise from the structure and functions of political institutions, and the acquisition and exercise of political power (Amendsen, 1999). So, corrupt political process produces corrupt legislators and executives.

Institutional Cause: Corruption tends to flourish due to existence of poor standards, deficient regulatory institutions, weak enforcement practices, and government policies that generate economic rents (Shimelis, 2005). Institutional failures and deficiencies in administrative culture are ascribed to corruption. It also includes monopoly and wide discretionary powers for public officers, poor accountability, lack of effective and efficient enforcement of the law within the institution, absence of institutional mechanisms dealing about corruption and the absence of press freedom (Berihun, 2013). In addition, under resourced and weak institutions especially courts and ACIs cannot effectively fight corruption.

Social Cause: Societal causes refer to the attitudes and practices of the community towards corruption (Berihun, 2013). Soft social control systems or high tolerance for corrupt activities and deterioration of acceptable moral and ethical values, have been cited by some scholars as the societal causes of corruption (APEC, 2006). The selfishness and greedy nature of human beings within their social life are also the constituting elements of human imperfection which leads to corruption. Consequently, a corrupt society produces corrupt public service. Corruption occurs due to the weakening of social values, with the broader public interest and social responsibility being subordinated to the enhancement of material status in the personal ethics of many (TI, 2002).

Economic Cause: Poverty, income disparities, inadequate wages and salaries in the public sector can be mentioned as driving factors for corruption (Biruk, 2016). But in the current reality highly paid individuals and business men are highly involved in corruption. Those who have high income believes that all things can accomplish by corruption. Taxation manifested in regulations and authorizations, spending decisions in the form of investment projects, procurement spending and extra budgetary accounts are also other economic causes (Tanzi, 1998).

Generally, as we have seen above, corruption is a social, legal, economic and political concept. And the causes are diverse and depends on the different contextual environments. Though the causes are complex depending on the countries policies, traditions, political and economic conditions, based on the views of scholars the various causes can be understood under the major phases including, political, institutional, social and economic spheres.

2.2.4 Consequences of Corruption

As far as the consequences of corruption are concerned many literatures indicate the negative impacts of corruption in various spheres of life (Ju Huang, 2016). Literatures on corruption show that its consequence is not only limited to the economic aspect. It has a wide range of impacts bearing on economic, social, political and developmental issues (Ju Huang, 2016; Kinkino, 2014; Shimelis, 2005; Voskanyan, 2000; Amendsen, 1999).

Economic Consequences: Corruption retards economic growth, bring inequality of income, lower Gross Domestic Product (GDP), lower investment, distortions in budget allocation, distortion of markets and tax cheating (Dominik, 2017; Lambosdorff, 2006). Inequality of income, concentration of wealth in the hands of a few, distorted consumption pattern targeted at meeting the lifestyle of the few and extremely rich urban elite is the other effect of corruption (Pak Hung, 2001). Corruption destroys investors' confidence by making decisions on the basis of corrupt manipulation rather than according to defined and transparent rules (Shimelis, 2005). Corruption can also have undesirable consequences on both the revenue and expenditure sides of the government budget.

Political Consequences: Corruption weakens democracy and good governance. It erodes the institutional capacity of government and hence results in political instability (Voskanyan, 2000). It hinders transparency and accountability and negatively impacts rule of law which makes

difficulties for the government to keep up law and order. Above all, corruption affects the integrity of the political system, development of democracy, weakens the state's legitimacy and in extreme cases, may lead to political instability or even war (Kumar, 2005).

Social Consequences: Apart from economic growth corruption hampers social cohesion, creates social injustice, increases social costs and hurts the poor by depriving citizens of basic services and worsened public sector quality (Kidane and Sinder, 2005). It also leads to an even social service provision including obtaining proper health care, other adequate access to government provided services such as domestic water supply, electricity and sanitation (Kinkino, 2014). It undermines social welfare by redistributing a nation's wealth in a manner that generates tensions or exasperates existing ones (Kidane and Sinder, 2005). Corrupt governments spend less on education and health, and more on public investment where they can easily collect rent (Shimelis, 2005). Corruption therefore, may distort the composition of government expenditure by spending more public resources on those items on which it is easier to extract large illegal benefits.

At the inverse of the negative consequences of corruption, there are arguments against the assertion that corruption is always correlated with negative consequence, rather they argue that the effects of corruption is beneficial. Based on this scholar have argued that corruption can play a positive role in developing countries and may be good where the prevailing system is bad (Klitgaard, 1988). Klitgaard (1988), structured this argument into three: the economist's reminder, the political scientist's reminder, and the manager's reminder.

The economist's reminder: believes that corruption entails efficient allocation of goods and services possible by bringing goods and services in the hands of the people who value them the most (Bayley, 1999). Corruption is beneficial to speed up the economic transaction under certain circumstances such as rigid bureaucracy and poor governance (Meon and Weill, 2010). According to Dominik, (2017), corruption increase efficiency of an economy by avoiding time-consuming bureaucratic processes and useless regulations or ineffective laws. Through corruption individuals may become rich by collecting non-functional money and property and expand investments and create job opportunities, even though the means is wrong. It also increases investment by diverting resource from consumption to investment.

The political scientist's reminder: Politically, corruption increases public participation in public policy, strengthens political parties and enhances national integration by bringing various tribes, regions, elites, or parties together (Shimelis, 2005). Corruption is often used as a tool by political actors to win and maintain political office. It also serves to solve the political problems of maintaining stability, providing access to state services and serving as a mechanism for political redistribution in a challenging environment.

The manager's reminder: When bureaucratic rules are restraining, corruption may be seen as useful by organizations (Shimelis, 2005). Underpaid workers may stay motivated if they earn salary supplements through corruption. According to Mauro (1997), corruption can motivate government employees to work harder and can also help entrepreneurs to avoid bureaucratic impediments.

Generally according to the arguments of the supporters of positive consequences, corruption is the means to solve bureaucratic and other problems that have social, economic, structural and political roots. However, the counterargument which is supporter of negative effect of corruption is more acceptable. In fact, a positive impact of corruption is rarely observed, while negative effects prevail (Dominik, 2017). Evidences with regard to corruption verify that the harmful effects of corruption greatly outweigh its benefit (Ju Huang, 2016). Above all, empirical evidences underline that, the negative impacts of corruption are on the rise.

2.3 Theoretical Framework

There are various theoretical frameworks in an attempt to answer why corruption occurs and what measures should be taken to tackle corruption (Klitgaard, 1988). Different countries apply different strategies to fight against corruption. The reason is that an effective devise working in one country does not fit another country (Shang, 2002). Political scientists argued that no strategy could have drastic effect on curbing corruption (Bashir, 2006). A growing number of authors also argue that because of the inadequacy of theories, anti-corruption efforts have not worked (Marquette and Peiffer, 2015). Even though there is growing arguments regarding the inadequacy of theories contemporary anti-corruption reforms typically follow Principal-Agent and Collective action theories.

2.3.1 Principal-Agent Theory

This model is a well-accepted theory of corruption and has been predominantly used to formulate anti-corruption policies (Kumar Das, 2013). It is also the major theory of corruption within both political science and economics today (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell, 2010).

Principal- agent model is a theory that considers corruption as a problem occurs in an instance when an agent betrays the principal's interest in the pursuit of his or her interest (Stephenson, 2015). In this theory the principal means the political leader who is believed to be honest and delegates his power to the agent (bureaucrats), a subordinate in the hierarchy. This theory situates the analysis of corruption in the interaction and interrelations that exist within and without public bodies and is based on two key assumptions (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell, 2010; Klitgaard 1988).

The first assumption is, encounter exists between principals and agents. Within this assumption, the principal could not always be the political leader. There may be the situation that political leaders are conceptualized to be the agents and the public, as the principal. In both cases corruption occurs when agents betray the principal's interest and engaged in corrupt practices (Bardhan 1997; Klitgaard 1988; Rose-Ackerman 1978).

The second assumption is that, problem occurs when the agents have more information than the principals, which results in an information asymmetry between the two groups of actors (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell, 2010). Due to unbalanced information, the principal is unable to perfectly monitor the actions of the agent, and so the agent has some discretion to pursue their own interests. Both assumptions framed corruption as a problem that occurs when an agent betrays the principal's interest in the pursuit of his or her own self- interest. The theory suggests that solving the problem requires looking into the relation between agent and principal through transparency, monitoring, and sanctioning mechanisms.

The theory asserts that the agents can be prevented from engaging in corrupt behavior through incentives, controls and sanctions (Johnson, 2012). The theory leads, among others, to initiate and apply policies and reforms with regard to payment to civil servants, recruitment and monitoring on agent's performance, greater integrity in the public administration and education of civil servants as part of curbing corruption (Rijckeghem and Weder, 1997). It also advocates

strengthening of civil society and sanctioning those corrupt agents in a bid to combat corruption. Most contemporary anticorruption efforts both at the domestic and international level are framed largely by the principal-agent model. This model highly influenced the works of ACIs.

The most widely used definition of corruption, the abuse of entrusted power for private gain makes this amply clear, as the idea of ‘entrusted power’ implies an agency relationship, and ‘abuse’ implies that the agent is acting in ways that are not in the principal’s interests. While corruption is always a principal-agent problem, not all principal-agent problems necessarily involve corruption. Therefore, using a principal-agent framework to understand corruption is not only appropriate, but probably essential, and the insights derived from principal-agent theory more generally have a great deal of relevance to the study and practice of anticorruption (Stephenson, 2015).

Nonetheless, this theory highly influences the works of ACIs there are criticisms from researchers. There might be instances when actors (principals) have become unwilling to enforce existing laws (Lawson, 2009). Principal-agent mistakenly assumes that there will always be ‘principled-principals’ who are willing to hold officials accountable for engaging in corruption but, principals are not always motivated by principles but by interests (Marquette and Peiffer, 2015). There is also the argument that this assumption is inadequate, especially in systemically corrupt contexts, where corruption is best understood to be a collective action problem instead (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell, 2010). It is in this debate that collective action theory becomes relevant as another alternative.

2.3.2 Collective action Theory

According to collective action theory corruption is viewed as a collective action problem that requires collective efforts to prevent and combat it (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell, 2010). According to this theory, viewing corruption as a principal-agent problem mischaracterizes the issue of corruption completely (Marquette and Peiffer, 2015). The theory purports that the collective or group action influences an individual’s decision in way that makes him or her choose to act corruptly if they expect other people to be corrupt and this leads to the question, ‘If everybody seems corrupt, why shouldn’t I be corrupt’ (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell, 2010). In this case, the cost of acting against corruption outweighs the cost of involving in corrupt practices (Biruk, 2016). The theory points to the role collective trust can play in influencing individual

decisions on whether or not to engage in corruption occur within a wider society, rather than in isolation from the behavior of others (Marquette and Peiffer, 2015).

The collective action theory disregards the dependency of the act of anti-corruption on a specific actors including the assumptions that principals as regulator of controlling corruption; the agents as implementers and small groups speaking out against corruption (Kumar Das, 2013). It assumes that all actors including, rulers, bureaucrats and citizens alike are maximizers of their self-interest (Persson, Rothstein & Teorell 2010). So an effective response to fight against corruption requires a coordinated action of all actors (Kumar Das, 2013). Viewing corruption in this way highlights the collective, rather than individual, nature of corruption. Such collective action is perceived, among the proponents of this theory, as highly desirable to bring about transformational changes with regard to tackling systemic corruption (Rothstein, 2007).

As a criticism of collective action theory Marquette and Peiffer (2015), states that problem occurs when all individual members follow their best interest with in a group or across groups to act collectively towards a common goal. Then group members find it in their individual interest to not contribute at all or to limit their contributions, ensuring that the collective benefit is not realized to its fullest potential.

Both the principal-agent and the collective action theories are not at all communally exclusive, not necessarily competing and contradictory but are usefully complementary (Marquette and Peiffer, 2015). The logical conclusion of these theories is actually that more effective monitoring and sanctioning can increase accountability and reduce corruption (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell, 2010). Both theoretical lenses describe individual rationality, as determinant of engagement in corrupt acts after calculating the cost benefit analysis of engaging in it (Marquette and Peiffer, 2015). Concerning this point of view collective action theory may serve as a supplement in investigating the role of ACCs in combating corruption, although the works of ACCs is highly influenced by principal-agent model.

2.4 Actors of Combating Corruption

Corruption is an extremely complex issue that affects institutions and citizens as well as the different processes in the world. Fighting against corruption therefore has to be carried out through the consolidation of a State's capacities and different actors (Sousa, 2009). According to Rose-

Ackerman (2013), there are four types of international actors of which play important roles in the anti-corruption struggles.

The first, and most obvious, are the aid and lending organizations, International Financial Institutions (IFI), such as the WB, and bilateral donors (Rose-Ackerman, 2013). They sponsor governance and anti-corruption projects in member countries and also seek to avoid corruption in their own lending and grant programs (Sousa, 2009). These institutions support programs that used to reform government service delivery and establish accountable institutions.

The second set is directly concerned with civil and criminal law enforcement across borders which focuses on catching and punishing miscreants using the civil and the criminal law (Rose-Ackerman 2013). The offenders are firms engaged in international business, the firms' managers, organized crime groups, and country leaders who enrich themselves through kickbacks and extortion (Sousa, 2009). These institutions provide information on national legal regimes covering money laundering, asset recovery, and extradition, and they may help train prosecutors and police for domestic anti-corruption work.

The third set of actors are diverse group of international nonprofit institutions with an anti-corruption and good government agenda, including organizations that support investigative journalism and freedom of the press including international medias (Omotoye, 2016). These actors operate variously as pressure groups that seek to put corruption on the reform agenda of other institutions, and as information-providers by exposing corruption and using scandals as a mechanism to raise public awareness (Rose-Ackerman 2013). They may also support research on the causes and consequences of corruption and on the effect of reforms. Hence, the people will push for change.

The fourth includes, international business firms work through some of the nonprofit groups like; TI (Rose-Ackerman 2013). These firms operate with extensive business support and board membership and have an interest in controlling corruption in business worldwide (Omotoye, 2016). Other firms work with business and trade associations, participate in the promotion of codes of good conduct and promote anti-corruption policies.

These International institutions began to promote an anti-corruption agenda intensively in the mid-nineties. International actors cannot legitimately force domestic governments to become honest

and corruption-free (Irrara, 2016). They can induce governmental cooperation sometimes by supporting projects that benefit the elite even though other priorities would better serve ordinary people. By considering this according to Irrara (2016), other actors are expanded including; civil society groups which sometimes promote anti-corruption projects without central government approval usually through monitoring activities, information gathering, or pilot projects and Non Governmental Organizations (NGO) which works at the grassroots with local governments.

Later on the severity of corruption becomes a global problem which affects everyone in the world. It can no longer be ignored, rather, across the globe different actors including, governments, businesses and NGOs are increasing the pressure on eradicating it and bringing those responsible to account (Kinkino, 2014). Consequently, in addition to the role played by the traditional anti-corruption actors, a number of governments have created ACCs, as a new actor charged with identifying, pursuing and prosecuting those responsible for corruption at all levels of society (KPMG International, 2012). Depending on this one of the recent developments in the fight against corruption has been the recognition and importance given to institutions whose primary mandate is anti-corruption functions. These Anti-Corruption Institutions (ACI) also called Anti-Corruption Commissions or Anti-Corruption Authorities (ACA).

2.4.1 Historical Development of Anti-Corruption Commissions

According to TI (2004), a distinguishing feature of the fight against corruption in the 1990s is the increased appreciation of the role played by specialized anti-corruption bodies. While predecessors of these institutional units can be traced back in time, in the form of parliamentary commissions, inquiry committees, special police branches or anti-corruption leagues. The first ACAs date back to 1952 in Singapore (De Sousa, 2009). Since then, ACIs has expanded from the developing to the developed world, and from societies in transition to consolidated democracies, as corruption started to be discussed and condemned all over the globe (OECD, 2007). In the mid-1990s the problem of corruption was recognized as a subject of international concern and drew the attention of numerous global and regional intergovernmental organizations (Tewodros, 2009). As a result, the last decade of this century witnessed a growing collection of international and regional instruments that are designed to enhance the fight against corruption at a domestic level of countries.

Consequently, different national and international ACIs starts to establish. The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (IACAC) was the first international convention aimed at combating corruption and thereby marked the beginning of an international legal regime to combat corruption (OECD, 2007). The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD Corruption Convention) was the second international convention on corruption (Berihun, 2013). Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (CECLCC) is the other one. The UN also adopted a convention fully dedicated for preventing and combating corruption, UNCAC on October 31, 2003. Africa like the other regions of the world also adopted its convention on corruption named AUCPCC in 2003. In 2001 Ethiopia joined this international trend by establishing an ACA in the form of the FEACC and becoming a party to the UNCAC and the AUCPCC in 2003 and 2004 respectively.

2.4.2 Models of Specialized Anti-Corruption Institutions

The question of which model of ACI a particular country should endorse is very difficult to answer (Mitchell, 2014). It is impossible to identify best models or designs for establishing ACI with international standards (OECD, 2008). It is the responsibility of individual countries to find the most effective and suitable institutional solution adapted to the local context, level of corruption and existing national institutional and legal framework. Considering the multitude of ACIs worldwide, their various functions and in particular the arguments about their actual performance, it is difficult to identify all main patterns and models (Kinkino, 2014). However, some trends can be established based on different purposes of ACIs viewed through their functions (OECD, 2008); (TI, 2014). These trends are reflected in different types and models of institutions which are presented below.

Multi-purpose agencies with law enforcement powers: This model represents the most prominent example of a single-agency approach based on key pillars of repression and prevention of corruption: policy analysis and technical assistance in prevention, public outreach and information, monitoring and investigation (OECD, 2008). Notably, in most cases, prosecution remains a separate function to preserve the checks and balances within the system, given that such agencies are already given broad powers and are relatively independent (Mitchell, 2014). This

model is commonly identified with the Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) and Singapore Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (SCPIB) (Mitchell, 2014).

Law enforcement type institutions: The law enforcement model takes different forms of specialization, and can be implemented in detection, investigation and in prosecution bodies (OECD, 2008). This model can also combine specialized anti-corruption detection, investigation and prosecution in one body (Mitchell, 2014). Sometimes the law enforcement model also includes elements of prevention, coordination and research functions (Kinkino, 2014). This is perhaps the most common model applied in Western Europe. Examples of such model include: Norway, Belgium, Spain and Croatia (Office for the Prevention and Suppression of Corruption and Organized Crime) (OECD, 2008).

Preventive, policy development and co-ordination institutions: This model includes institutions that have one or more corruption prevention functions (Mitchell, 2014). According to OECD (2008), these institutions can be responsible for research in the phenomena of corruption; assessing the risk of corruption; monitoring and co-ordination of the implementation of anti-corruption strategies and action plans; reviewing and preparing relevant legislation; elaboration and implementation of codes of ethics; issuing guidance and providing advice on issues related to government ethics; facilitating international co-operation and co-operation with the civil society and other matters. Examples of such institutions include France, the United States, India, Philippines, and Bulgaria (Mitchell, 2014).

According to OECD (2008), one of the best known specialized ACIs is the Hong Kong's ICAC which was established in 1974. The Commission has contributed significantly to Hong Kong's success in reducing corruption. Inspired by this success story, many countries around the world, decided to establish specialized bodies by taking this model to prevent and combat corruption. Accordingly, the model for the Ethiopian FEACC and other regional Commissions is the Hong Kong's ICAC which is a common example of multi-purpose agencies and the universal model with its investigative, preventative, and enforcement functions.

2.4.3 Criteria for the Effectiveness of ACCs

The establishment of ACAs play a wide range of roles in the struggle to combat corruption. Effectiveness for the ACCs is the degree of achievement of goals and objectives for which the

commission is established. The establishment of an appropriate ACI with its framework is significant in and of itself, but its role and effectiveness, should depends on the practice of the institution (Mezmur and Koen, 2011). Therefore, the effectiveness of ACC can be judged in terms of the practical impact of its work on the fight against corruption.

One of the major arguments in favor of the establishment of an independent ACI is the inability of the institution effectively fight and curb corruption. Hence, it is important to see a number of factors that need due consideration in order to enhance the effective functionality of ACCs. Despite the differing characteristics of various ACAs, according to the contemporary literature, there are certain factors that need to be in place for ACAs to function effectively (Biruk, 2016; Arsema, 2010; De Sousa, 2009; Tewdros, 2009; Beshir, 2006; TI, 2004; Pope, 2000). These factors or criteria includes: independence, adequate resources, comprehensive mandate, transparency, adequate power of investigations, and cooperation. USAID (2004), also stated that, without these criteria's, not only any ACCs but also specialized ACAs are vulnerable to failures.




Fig. 1. The criterias used to assess effectiveness of ACCs

Based on this, these factors are discussed below and serves as a parameter for assessing the effectiveness of the ANRSEACC.

1. Independence

Institutional independence refers to the powers given to and exercised by an organization that enables it to operate effectively without interference from any other organization or individual. The independence of an ACA is considered a fundamental requirement for its effectiveness as it allows the institution to act free from influence of powerful individuals and to investigate suspected corruption in all sectors and at all levels of society (Kpundeh and Levy, 2004). According to the UNCAC, Article, 6 and 36, International standards require necessary independence to be ensured for the ACAs with the aim to help them to carry out their functions effectively and be free from undue pressure. Although it is difficult to talk of complete independence, because these bodies need to be supervised by external control, the international and regional anti-corruption instruments propagate that necessary independence be ensured (UNCAC, 2005).

The independence of ACIs can be ensured through an appropriate status of the institution, appointment and dismissal procedure for heads and budget autonomy (UNDP, 2005; Pope, 2000).

- i. Institutional position:** A permanent agency, unit, or commission that exists separately and outside of government agencies has greater independence than established as a unit or department within an institutional structure (Arsema, 2010). If positioned in such as an office, unit or department an ACI's ability to curb corruption may be compromised (Tewdros, 2009). So to become independence ACCs should exist separately as an independent institution.
- ii. Appointment and removal of the head:** The selection process of the head of the ACA should be transparent and based on consensus among different high-level decision-makers (Arsema, 2010). TI recommends that an appointment mechanism that guarantees consensus, through parliament and together with an external accountability mechanism supports to avoid any bias. Parliamentary Select Committee on which all major parties are represented, can reduce the room for abuse or biased activities (Tewdros, 2009). But appointments by a single political figures like, a Minister or the

President are not considered good practice (OECD, 2008). The removal of ACA heads and leadership continuity should also be protected by law against unfounded dismissal.

- iii. **Budget autonomy:** There is perhaps no more decisive measure of institutional independence than budget autonomy (Mezmur and Koen, 2011). Assuring full financial independence, however, is usually difficult, because budget is usually allocated by the government and approved by the parliament in most countries (Tewdros, 2009). Nevertheless, the ACAs budget should be reflected separately in the government 's overall budget there needs to be a law in place that prohibits a decrease in the current year 's budget from that of the previous year (Arsema, 2010). So to become effective and achieving their objectives ACCs acquires independence budget allocation.

2. Adequate Resources

According to the UNCAC (2005), to perform their functions effectively ACAs should be provided with adequate material resources and specialized staff (Article, 6 and 36). The level of human and financial resources allocated to different ACAs varies from country to country. Therefore, their adequacy may be assessed by some more qualitative indicators such as regular increase in financial resources, stability of human resources, academic background, reliability of staff members, and professional training.

International and regional anti-corruption instruments provide that institutions created to fight corruption should have the required financial resources and properly trained staff (Tewodros, 2009). The fight against corruption requires not only well trained investigators and prosecutors, but also forensic specialists, financial experts, auditors, information technology specialists and so forth (OECD, 2007). The number of staff of an ACIs should also be commensurate with the activities it is expected to perform (Tewodros, 2009). So adequacy of financial, human and technical resource is one major criteria for the effectiveness of ACCs.

3. Comprehensive Mandate

Combating corruption by focusing on the core areas of anticorruption activity including prevention, investigation and awareness raising is a broad mandate of ACAs (OECD, 2008). It is essential that attention is given to all three elements, in some of the countries, studied institutions that have focused on investigation and enforcement have been less successful than those who have

adopted a more holistic approach (UNDP, 2005). The mandate of effective anticorruption body will include mandates of other relevant entities involved in areas such as law enforcement, prosecution and the existence of internal anticorruption bodies for example special investigation units within the police (UNODC, 2004).

In addition, ACCs should pursue a well-defined strategy that fits the specific cultural context and realities of the country. The ACCs should also have country specific objectives. Most ACAs are created by copying successful models without taking into account a particular country 's unique political environment, social, and economic conditions and available resources in the context where the ACA will carry out its functions (De Sousa, 2009). This practice does not always result in success and efficiency and can result in a gap between expected results and achievements (Arsema, 2010). So in order to have effective ACCs there should be holistic and coherent strategy, broad or clear mandate and country specific model with realistic and achievable objectives.

4. Transparency

Transparency of ACIs is essential for ensuring their credibility and for building the public's trust (UNCAC, 2005). In practice, transparency is a necessary route to credibility for ACAs (Mezmur and Koen, 2011). Practice of the ACA shows that the main elements of transparency include regular reports presented to the parliament, president's office and government and available to the public as well as public forums such as consultative councils (Tewdros, 2009). So like independence transparency is the determining factor for the effectiveness and long term success of ACCs.

5. Adequate Powers of Investigation

Powers of investigation includes, access to documentation and the power to question witnesses as well as the possibility to prosecute as and where required (Tewdros, 2009). It also includes sufficient internal coordination by integrating different anti-corruption functions. Such an integration of functions must be well coordinated in order for ACCs to operate effectively (Arsema, 2010). The prevention, awareness creation and investigation should work by close together to combat corruption. And prosecutor and investigative officers should also have organization and procedure that cause a respecting of their professional independence.

6. Cooperation

The need to win the cooperation and trust of the public in the fight against corruption is of the utmost importance. Legislation and institutionalization by itself will not be enough to enforce the objective of institutions and assure its effectiveness (Tewdros, 2009). Even comprehensive institutional efforts against corruption are prone to fail without the active involvement of the civil society and the private sector (OECD, 2008). Hence, an important factor impacting the effectiveness of ACCs is building cross sectional and sectoral support and interaction (Johnston and Kpundeh, 2002). Free media and non-governmental watchdogs play a vital role through their capacity to build public awareness and monitor ACA activities (Arsema, 2010). Civil society and the media have very crucial role to play in ensuring the sustenance of corruption-free governance (UNCAC, 2005). So building interactions and cooperation with different stakeholders is one factor for the effective functioning of ACAs.

Having this in mind, this study assesses the effectiveness of the ANRSEACC by using these criteria's. Effectiveness of the ANRSEACC therefore, is its achievements in terms of reducing corruption in the region through awareness creation, prevention, investigation and prosecution for corrupt offences and its performance of fulfilling the above mentioned criteria's.

2.5 Challenges of Anti-Corruption Commissions in Combating Corruption

While differ in depth and length there are different challenges that faces the ACCs in combating corruption. According to different literatures the major challenges that face the ACCs is related with the factors or parameters which used to determine the effectiveness of ACCs that stated above (Kaome, 2014; Arsema,2010; Tewdros, 2009; Bashir, 2006). These challenges include; lack of independence, staffing limitations, negative public perception, weak legal frameworks and slow judicial process, inadequate financial, human and technical resources, lack of transparency, lack of broad and clear mandate, inadequate powers of investigation and lack of cooperation.

In addition to this there are also other challenges including, slow phase in the trial of suspects; much emphasis is given to corruption at higher levels to the neglect of grassroots corruption; inadequate mobilization and lack of integration and participation of the citizenry with the ACCs in the fight against corruption. The overall performance of the institution itself and inappropriate

organizational structures like modelled on foreign models without adequate appreciation of local specificities are also other challenges that the ACCs face in combating corruption.

2.6 The Strategies Anti-Corruption Commissions used to Combat Corruption

Corruption needs to be combated through a multi-pronged strategy because of its nature, magnitude and forms vary from place to place, and measures for curbing it also differ (Shimelis, 2005). There is no single model or practice which suits all countries, and each jurisdiction needs to explore practices drawn from a variety of options (UNCAC, 2003). Therefore, strategy to curb corruption should start from a clear understanding of the scope of the problem and its causes and areas where corruption is most likely to occur (Shimelis, 2005).

In order to apply these strategies firstly, ACCs should identify the major problems or barriers for its anti-corruption struggle (Wing-chi, 2014). In most of the corruption-prevalent countries, they usually share the major problems that are mentioned above under the challenges of ACCs. There are also others including, lack of independence in investigating corruption, public apathy to corruption, widespread corruption in law enforcement agencies, lack of professionalism and determination and lack of strategic partnership in fighting corruption (UNOCD, 2004).

After identifying these problems, the ACCs should come up with a comprehensive anti-corruption strategic plan, and then translate the strategic plan into implementation. For the purpose of this, scholars like Wing-chi (2014); Andrew (2013); ICAC (2009) and experts like Tony Kwok Man-wai former deputy commissioner of ICAC recommend and different countries followed the strategies of the ICAC of Hong Kong model, which is one of the effective ACA. These strategies are the following:

Professional Staff: Fighting corruption is a very difficult task, because it is confronting people who are probably very intelligent, knowledgeable and powerful (Andrew, 2013). Thus the corruption fighters must be very professional in their jobs.

Three Pronged Strategy: this strategy includes, prevention, education and enforcement. As a result, the ACCs should consist of three separate departments for the purpose of effective implementation of these strategies (Andrew, 2013); (ICAC, 2009). The first one is Corruption

Prevention which is responsible to examine the systems and procedures in the public sector, to identify corruption opportunities and to make recommendations to plug the loopholes. The second one is, Community Relations to educate the public against the evil of corruption and to enlist their support and partnership in fighting corruption and the investigative one. The third, Investigation and Prosecution responsible to investigate and prosecute any alleged or suspected corruption offenses committed in public offices and enterprises. To ensure these strategies effectively it is better for ACCs to consider different ways of applying these three pronged strategies (Findlay and Stewart, 1991).

With respect to effective prevention strategy, the ACCs aims at reducing the corruption opportunities in government departments and public institutions. For doing this the following methodology are recommended; enhance system control, enhance staff integrity, streamline procedures, ensure proper supervisory checks and control, transparency and accountability and promote a staff code of ethics (UNOCD, 2004).

There are also a very wide range of education strategies, in order to enlist the support of the entire community in a partnership to fight corruption. It includes: media publicity to ensure effective enforcement cases through press releases, media conferences and interviews, as well as the making of a TV drama series; use of mass media commercials to encourage the public to report corruption (Findlay and Stewart, 1991). It also promotes public awareness about the evils of corruption and as a deterrence to the corrupt; through school ethics education program, starting in kindergarten up to the universities; establish ethics and anti-corruption club; corruption prevention talks and ethics development seminars for public servants and business sectors and wide use of websites for publicity and reference, youth education and ethics development (Andrew, 2013).

According to ICAC (2009), to ensure effective enforcement it is better to considering the following components like; an effective public complaint system to encourage reporting of corruption by members of the public, a quick response system to deal with complaints that require prompt action, properly investigate all reports of corruption irrespective of whether it is serious or relatively minor in nature and publicize any successful enforcements in the media to demonstrate effectiveness and to deter the corrupt.

Partnership Approach: Relying on one single agency to fight corruption cannot make effective. Everyone in the community and every institution has a role to play. There should be a partnership and coordination together between, civil service commission, all government departments, business community, professional bodies, civic societies and community organizations, educational institutions and mass media (Andrew, 2013).

Top Political will, Independence and Adequate Resources: There should be a clear top political will to eradicate corruption, which enables the ACCs to be a truly independent agency (Wing-chi, 2014). The ACCs should be free from any interference in conducting their investigations. The strong political support should also translate into financial support.

The FEACC of Ethiopia in its strategy document also suggested the following means in combating corruption. The first means is giving ethical education and teaching the impact of corruption to the society; the second is making administrative and financial reforms; the third is introducing anti-corruption law and regulation and the last is setting an institution that can implement the law (FEACC).

2.7 The Birth of ACCs in Ethiopia and its Development

After the adoption of the FDRE constitution, overall reform in the socioeconomic and political system of the country was required. One of such reforms was the Civil Service Reform Program (CSRP). The government of Ethiopia began a CSRP to examine the overall management system and operation of the civil service at all levels of government (Arsema, 2010). One of the rationales for the launching of CSRP was to pull the civil service out of rampant unethical practices and ensure transparency and accountability (Biruk, 2016). The ethics sub program was one of the components in the national civil service reform program which was mainly designed to tackle corruption and improve the service delivery (Berihun, 2013). The CSRP through its ethics sub-program culminated in the enactment in May 2001 of the proclamation establishing the FEACC of Ethiopia. This legal framework gave birth to FEACC which is an independent federal government agency with the objectives namely:

- In cooperation with relevant bodies, to strive to create an aware society where corruption will not be condoned or tolerated by promoting ethics and anti-corruption education;

- In cooperation with relevant bodies, to prevent corruption offences and other improprieties;
- To expose, investigate and prosecute corruption offences and impropriety.

The FEACC, has authorized only to operate at the federal level which includes the chartered cities of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa, as regional states have the prerogative to form their own anticorruption bodies under the federal arrangement (Biruk, 2016). Based on this the regional states starts to establish their own EACC to fight and prevent corruption in their respective regions and each regional office has autonomy in managing its own operations and budget (Arsema, 2010). Accordingly, the ANRS government has established the ANRSEACC on 15th of December 2003 by proclamation No.93/2003, which is the focus of this study.

CHAPTER THREE

3. RESESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter outlined the methodology used in the present research. It starts with description of the study area followed by research method, research design, sampling design, data sources, data collection instruments, methods of data analysis, trustworthiness and ethical considerations.

3.2 Description of the Study Area

The ANRSEACC is the institution which is responsible to coordinate the regional anti-corruption movement. The Commission is found in the capital city of the ANRS and it is close to the researcher to have access for adequate information.

The ANRS is one of the nine regional state of Ethiopia. It is located in the Northern, North West part of Ethiopia with the total population number of approximately 20 million having 11 zonal administrations, 140 woredas and nearly 3,429 kebeles (Denny and kassaye, 2013). Geographically, the region has an estimated total area of 170,150 square kilometers and bounded by four regional states such as; Tigray Region in the North, Oromia Region in the South, Afar Region in the East and Benishangul Gumuz in the West (BoRD, 2003). The capital city of the ANRS is Bahir Dar and the name is given because of its nearest to the Lack Tana.

According to the 1994 census, the region's population was 13,834,297 of which 6,947,546 were males and 6,886,751 females. The urban residents of the State number 1,265,315 while its rural residents were 12,568,982 (90% of the total population.) Based on the 1994 census result, of the total population of the State, 81.5% were Orthodox Christians, 18.1% Muslims, and 0.1% Protestants.

Regarding ethnic composition, the majority of the population is Amhara, which is estimated to be 91.2%. In addition, the ethnic composition includes Oromo (3%), Agew/Awi (2.7%), Kimant (1.2%), and Agew/Kamyr (1%) (Ethiopian Government Portal, 2018). Amharic is the working language of the state.

Economically, about 85% of the people are engaged in agriculture. The water resources from Lake Tana and all the rivers found in the region provide immense potential for irrigation development. The annual temperature for most parts of the region lies between 15⁰c-21⁰c. the state receives the highest percentage (80%) of the total rainfall in the country.

Among the different institutions in the ANRS, the ANRSEACC is one and established to combat corruption in the region. ANRSEACC established on 15th December 2003 by the proclamation No. 93/2003 and having its own mission and vision and it is located in Bahir Dar city which is capital city of the region.

Regarding with its organizational structure the ANRSEACC is led by a commissioner, currently Mr. Zigale Gebeyehu. In its structure, the commissioner is supported by a deputy commissioner. The current Deputy Commissioner is Mr. Ewneti Alene. According to the formation proclamation there are also other subordinate Core Work Processes, professionals and departments necessary for works. In the current organizational set up, particularly after April, 2017 the organizational structure is arranged by directorate level and the Commission is organized in to six directorates, three supportive work processes and professionals.

The directorates include;

- Corruption prevention directorate,
- Human resource management directorate,
- Investigation and prosecution directorate,
- Asset registration and disclosure directorate,
- Finance and resource management directorate,
- Public relations directorate.

These directorates are also supported by other three facilitative and supportive work processes including; planning, coordination and evaluation; information communication technology and internal audit supportive work processes. In addition, these directorates and supportive work processes are supported by other professional branches, services and necessary staff.

3.3 Research Approach

In this study the researcher employed qualitative research approach. Qualitative research by its nature is multidimensional which involves interpretation of a subject matter to the given context.

Qualitative approach paves the way for researchers to study the phenomenon in its natural settings and lets them interpret things in accordance with the meaning of the society (Cresswell, 1998). Furthermore, it also examines the decision, attitude, and behavior of people or other phenomenon in depth (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003). To this end, this method enabled the researcher to study the effectiveness, challenges and strategies of the ACCs. Since the research problem by its nature needs an assessment of the experience and awareness of the research participants about the role of the Commission in combating corruption, qualitative research method is appropriate. This method was also appropriate to the focus area in order to acquire reliable and accurate information, to have a better understanding on the issue of investigation and gain well-structured information about the Commission under study.

3.4 Research Design

The study used case study research design. Case study design is essential in order to get bigger insight and generalize theories via with combining the existing theoretical knowledge with new empirical insights (Yin, 1994). So to examine the research objectives case study design is pertinent to seek new insights of the issue relating to the effectiveness, challenges and strategies of the ANRSEACC. The subject to be studied can be a program, an event, a person, a group or institution bounded in a particular time and space (Vissak, 2010). Case study design involves in-depth examination of an individual, a group or institution with the intent to get a true and complete description if the case that the researcher has selected to study (Marczyk, Dematteo and Festinger, 2005). Furthermore, a case study is an exploration of a bounded system or a case or multiple case over time through a detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information rich in context (Creswell, 2007). This study is explored from multiple relevant data sources to study the roles of ANRSEACC in combating corruption. The intent of the researcher is investigating the roles, of the ANRSEACC in combating corruption and employing case study would be the appropriate design. Besides since the study is conducted with in a particular institution (ANRSEACC), case study would be appropriate to deeply investigate the overall role of the Commission in combating corruption.

3.5 Sampling Design

In order to meet the study objectives, participants of this study were from two categories; staffs and customers of the Commission. Accordingly, the participants of this study were the ANRSEACC commissioners, directors, professionals and customers. In order to select the participants, the researcher was employed non-probability sampling technique. From the non-probability sampling, the researcher used purposive sampling. The rationale behind the choice of purposive sampling is due to the fact that it is essential for situations where one needs to reach a targeted sample in a short period of time (Kultar, 2007). The other reason is to gather in-depth information from the participants. The primary consideration to select informant is who can provide best information to meet study objectives (Kumar, 2011). So the researcher believed that purposively selected participants might have a good source of data since they have firsthand knowledge on the subject of the study. Moreover, the researcher used snowball sampling to access potential and inaccessible informants specially whistleblowers, witnesses and other customers because of the sensitive nature of the issue of corruption. In addition, the researcher also uses available sampling to interview the customers who are available in the Commission.

As far as the sample size is concerned Kumar (2011), suggested that for qualitative research, the most significant is the point of saturation where no interview is different in the answers to the questions provided or a point where there is no different information between the research participants. In addition, based on the recommendation of Creswell (2007), the researcher for this qualitative research approach with case study research design interviewees to the data saturation points. Therefore, interview was conducted until the point of data saturation met.

3.6 Data Sources

Both primary and secondary sources of data have been explored in the study. The primary sources consist of interviews and FGD. The empirical part of this research have also consumed different secondary sources such as published and unpublished performance reports of the ANRSEACC, its publications and case reports, proclamations, regulations, guidelines, magazines and journals, different document analysis and review of literature. Moreover, analysis of documents, and review of literature and observation of the researcher have also a relevant place in the study.

3.7 Data Collection Instruments

Denscombe (2003), assert that using multi-methods is relevant for the correlation of findings and for enhancing the validity of data. So in order to meet the objectives of the study, different data collection instruments have employed. These are; Key informants interview, Semi-structured interview, Focus group discussion and document review.

3.7.1 Key Informant Interview

It is a type of interview with individuals who have especial knowledge, experts and talents about the issue under investigation. The researcher conducted interviews with the key informants' who had firsthand knowledge about the objectives of the study. This is due to the fact that interviews are particularly good at producing data which deal with topics in depth and in detail (Denscombe, 2003). Due to this it's the instrument which have been employed to gather qualitative data. Employing key informant interview were pertinent to this study because it enabled the researcher to understand the views of individuals who are well experienced and knowledgeable on the research problem. Therefore, a total of 8 eight key informant interviewees were personally conducted, from these 6 with commissioner and directors of the Commission and the remaining 2 with customers of the Commission.

3.7.2 Semi-structured Interview

Semi-structured interview by its nature needs open ended interview questions in line with the topic to be study and let both the interviewer and interviewee to have opportunity to discuss the topic in the more detail manner (Mothers, Fox and Hunn, 2002). Besides, the researcher has also the freedom to elaborate questions for the interviewee at any time. So semi-structured interview will be appropriate for this study. Thus the total of 11 semi-structured interviews were personally conducted, from these 6 with staff members of the Commission and the remaining 5 with customers. While during the whole interview session, all customers and some of the Commission staffs were not volunteer to be recorded though the researcher told them that the information is intended only for the study purpose. Because of this based on their consent only volunteer interviewees were recorded and important notes have taken and all the interviewees was held at the ANRSEACC except interview of 2 customers which is held at their office.

3.7.3 Focus Group Discussion (FGD)

In order to triangulate the data collected by the above data collection instruments, FGD was employed. FGD allows the researcher to gather crucial qualitative data of the study in-depth. According to Babbie (2010), FGD is a research method that is socially oriented and captures real life data in a social environment and it has high face validity. According to Robson (2000), FGD is also an important type of interview carried out in a group of setting and give additional insight for the study as a result of shared group interactions and ideas. Focus group discussion is important to explore perception, experience and group understanding of a certain topic/issue (Kumar, 2011). Since the researcher wants to know the shared experience and awareness of the staffs of the ANRSEACC with regard to the, effectiveness, challenges and strategies of the Commission, FGD was conducted. Accordingly, one FGD have employed among the staff members of the Commission. Regarding with the number of participants in a group, Dawson (2007), suggested that six to eight participants should be involved. Based on this, the researcher includes six participants in the group and the participants were selected based on their willingness and experience. The discussion was held at the ANRSEACC and during the discussion the researcher are taken the relevant notes.

3.7.4 Document Review

It is also the other important data collecting instrument to this study. According to Denscombe (2003), this method allows to collect huge amounts of data; access to such sources is also relatively easy and inexpensive; and permanence of data, the data that is available in a form that can be checked by others. Thus, the researcher used different relevant published and unpublished documents like performance reports, different publications, proclamations, regulations, guidelines, journals, related workshop manuals, brushers, conference paper, newspapers, magazines, decisions and other key documents which are necessary and related to the study objectives was reviewed.

3.8 Data Collection Procedures

With regard to data collection process first the researcher met the Human Resource Directorate Director of the ANRSEACC in order to get information about how to get permission to collect data from the staffs and customers of the Commission. Then the researcher contacted the deputy

commissioner of the ANRSEACC by showing letter of cooperation written by Bahir Dar University, department of Political Sciences and International Studies to obtain the Commission's informed consent. Then after, the researcher requested participants' willingness by showing the letter of cooperation and by reading the consent form to each respondents. In advance, date of interview arranged for each respondent who were ready for interview on the first contact. To this end, the interview conducted separately until the point of data saturation met. Based on this, twenty-five participants were participated. All the conducted interviews recorded and kept by the researcher.

The interview process was passed through several steps. The first step was introducing the research topic including objectives of interview, confidentiality and consent. Second, beginning interview with soft and background information which used as a spring board to come to key issues. Thirdly, during the interview steps the researcher asked about key research question with subsequent probes and paraphrases. Fourthly, the interview session was end after giving a chance to participant to ask questions and to give comments and finally at the end of each interview session the researcher provided thanks to participants for giving their valuable information by devoting their invaluable time.

3.9 Methods of Data Analysis

In qualitative research methods every moment of data collection is also a time of data analysis and interpretation (Creswell, 2007). After the necessary data have been collected, thematic data analysis was used to analyze the study results. Thematic analysis is a method for categorizing, analyzing, and reporting patterns/ themes within data (Braun and Clarke, 2006). This analysis technique minimally organizes and describes the data set in detail.

In this study the researcher organized the data separately and generated categories, themes and patterns to come to rich detail in line with the objective of the study. To achieve this, firstly all the recorded data notes through interviews and FGD was read repetitively in order to grasp the general idea to develop coding of ideas and to extract significant statement. In the second step develop categories along with the content of interview which is important to avoid repetition of ideas. Thirdly, the researcher was developed themes and merges themes of similar ideas to come to the objectives of the study. A separate file folder was used to categorize ideas or significant statements.

Finally, the research was finalized by writing the description of the text and interpretation of meanings.

3.10 Trustworthiness of the Study

For qualitative research, triangulation using two or more data source is recommended for producing trustworthy and believable findings (Brink, 1993). There are multiple methods of data collection instruments that were employed to generate relevant data to this study. Accordingly, triangulation of the information from various sources was applied as a major means for validating the study. The information collected from commissioner, directorates, staff members and customers of the Commission was triangulated and crosschecked to ensure credibility of the finding. It was because various kinds of ideas generated from these diverse sources triangulated and crosschecked each other. For the sake of assurance, participants of the study were asked about the researchers' interpretation on their response to receive feedbacks from them. Their confirmation might have a significant role to ensure validity and reliability of the study. Brink (1993), also claims that consensual validation from others who are familiar with the topic of the study at various stages of the research process is another means of enhancing validity and reliability. Therefore, in each stage from initial phase to final stages the study has been reviewed by the researcher's advisor and colleagues.

3.11 Ethical Considerations

In conducting research, using ethical guideline is more significant to be valued of the study. Therefore, the researcher first asked the participants' willingness by showing the letter of cooperation written by Bahir Dar University within the explanation of the researcher, about purpose of the study and introduce about who the researcher is. Next to this, the researcher contacted the voluntary participants or respondents by developing confidentiality. In order to ensure confidentiality of the information the audio records were handled with utmost care and not transferred and used for other purpose other than the research objectives. No study participants were included to this study without obtaining their informed consent orally. Participants were also given the right to interrupt the interview process at any time when they feel discomfort. Besides, to protect participants' personal identity, anonymity was safeguarded by giving pseudonyms instead of using their direct names. Since the topic of the study is a delicate issue, from the

respondents the customers of the Commission did not want to their name and work place to be mentioned or quoted anywhere in the study. So there is no appendix with their names.

CHAPTER FOUR

4. DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

4.1 Introduction

This chapter includes the respondents profile and the result of the analysis of data collected through different data collection instruments by following steps of data analysis technique. The data collected through FGD and documents analysis are used to triangulate other data and assure its trustworthiness. And the analyzed data is arranged under themes that reflect the research objectives.

4.2 Effectiveness of the ANRSEACC in Combating Corruption

As it is presented on the literature part there are a number of factors that need due consideration in order to enhance the effective functionality of ACCs. Under this section the researcher assesses the effectiveness of the ANRSEACC based on the response of the participants and document analysis by using the criteria's which used to measure the effectiveness of ACCs. The criteria's which used to assess the effectiveness of the Commission includes, independence, adequate resource, comprehensive mandate, transparency, adequate power of investigation and cooperation (Arsema, 2010; De Sousa, 2009; Tewdros, 2009; Beshir, 2006; TI, 2004; Pope, 2000).

4.2.1 Independence

Anti-corruption struggle of the ACCs can only be effective if it is truly independent and free from undue interference (De Sousa, 2009). The independence of ACCs depends on the institutional position, appointment and removal of the head and budget autonomy (UNDP, 2005; Pope, 2000).

To become fully independent ACCs should exist separately and independently rather than established as a unit or department within an institutional structure (Arsema, 2010; Mezmur, 2009). Accordingly, the ANRSEACC is established by the proclamation 237/2015 as an independent institution. It is not established as a unit or department within an institutional structure but exists separately as an independent government body.

As far as the appointment, tenure and dismissal of the commissioner or the deputy commissioner of the ANRSEACC are concerned, there are provisions on the revised establishment proclamation of ANRSEACC in 2015. According to this provision, both the commissioner and the deputy commissioner appointed by the council of the region proposed with the Head of the Region (Article, 8). The term of appointment of the commissioner or the deputy commissioner shall be for six years; he may, however, be reappointed when necessary (Article, 11). Once appointed, the commissioner or the deputy commissioner may not be removed, except on his own will, from his office unless; he has violated the provisions of the relevant code of conduct; he has shown manifest incompetence and inefficiency; he can no longer carry out his responsibilities on account of mental or physical illness (Article, 13).

According to the interviewees of the customers of the Commission, there is a suspicion that the appointment process may be subject to political interference because of that the head of the region and his cabinets have decisive role in the appointment process and the state council is highly dominated by the ruling party and the head of the region and his cabinets are from the same party. Global Integrity (2010), also reports that appointments to the EACC are not completely independent from the executive domination. As the response of the customers same is true for the ANRSEACC that the appointment of commissioners is based on their loyalty for the ruling party.

According to the FGD discussants, EACC is the institution formed by the government and its purpose is supporting the government in the struggle against corruption rather than challenging the government. So, in order to make the Commission effective it is not mistaken that the head becomes loyal for the ruling government. Nonetheless, if the heads are loyal for the regional executives, they do not have the freedom to ask, question and take measures when they commit corruption crimes. As if, this process paves the way for the regional executives to intervene in the investigative and prospective activities of the Commission. with respect to this customer's states that, the practical aspect needs due considerations, the ARSEACC is not free from undue influences by government officials on its investigation and prosecution activities. Based on this we can say that the appointment of the head of the ANRSEACC is not free from suspicion and opportunities of being not independent. Hence to avoid such like suspicions TI (2014), and other researchers like Tewdros (2009), recommends electing through parliament and Parliamentary

Select Committee. Because it minimizes the possibility of an individual political office holder influence on the activities of the Commission.

The other criteria which used to ensure the independence of ACCs is budget autonomy. For an institution like the ACC to be more independent it must be free of serious fiscal constraints (Mezmur and Koen, 2011). According to the revised establishment proclamation No. 237/2015 of the ANRSEACC the regional government allocate the budget of the Commission and its approvment in accordance with the annual work plan of the Commission (Article 16). The allocated budget should be commensurate with its responsibilities and there needs to be a law in place that prohibits a decrease in the current year's budget from that of the previous year (Arsema, 2010). Based on the report of the Commission with regard to the amounts of budget allocation to the Commission by the regional government, there is an increasing pattern from year to year. However, there is no guarantee that the increment in the allocation of annual budget has been proportional to the increasing volume of works of the Commission.

As it was learnt from the interview of all key informants, budget constraint is a major hindrance to expand the activities of the ANRSEACC. Although the budget allocated to the commission is consistently increasing, the amount is not found to be satisfactory and under resourced to improve the activities of the Commission. In addition, according to the FGD participant's indirectly shortage of budget makes the ANRSEACC unable to work independently. Fiscal independence of ACAs is either the ability to propose a budget directly to the legislature, or a guarantee of budgetary stability (Pope, 2000). But the accountability of the ANRSEACC for the head of the region bounds the opportunity to complain to the state Council regarding with its budget.

The legal framework that grants independence to the investigative and prosecutorial role of the FEACC would have also been extended to the preventive activities of the Commission (Biruk, 2016). Similarly regarding the practical aspect of securing independence in preventive activities, there have been attempts by some heads of institutions to unlawfully influence and intervene in the preventive works of the ANRSEACC particularly with respect to system-review studies. According to 04: "some officials try to undermine the studies on systems and working procedures which aim at identifying loopholes that may lead to corrupt practices in various government offices and public enterprises" (3rd March, 2018). Thus, the independence of ANRSEACC with respect to

corruption prevention has not been assured fully, it needs to be guaranteed both in law as well as in practice.

Therefore, the study concludes that though, it has secured its independence with respect to institutional position and guaranteed by law to be free from any interference on investigation and prosecution activities the ANRSEACC is not fully independent. Because it faced practical problems in budget autonomy, victims of suspicion with appointment of the head and intimidation of the Commission's prevention activities by some government executive bodies.

4.2.2 Adequate Resources

To perform their functions effectively ACCs should have adequate resources (UNCAC, 2005). Nevertheless, to the contrary almost all of the participant's confirmed that, resource inadequacy is the major problem for the effectiveness of the ANRSEACC. According to 03:

The annual budget allocated for the Commission is insufficient to undertake its mission when one considers the size of the ANRS and the cost of fighting corruption. This shortage of budget has had negative effect for the Commission's financial sustainability and for continuity with regard to major anti-corruption activities of the Commission including achieving its plans and objectives, education and training, system- review works, investigations, giving protection for whistleblowers and witnesses, the task of media through distribution of published and written materials, access of vehicle to address far place problems and others (21st Feb, 2018).

In the same manner 02 also states that "When I see the imbalance between the budget and the vast responsibility of the Commission I feel that, is the government establish the Commission for symbol, because all tasks of the Commission are challenged by budget problem" (22nd Feb, 2018). Almost all of the participants of the study share these ideas in common. The gap between the annual budget allocated and required by the commission in each year also supports the responses of the participant. For instance, in the year 2017/18 the budget asked by the commission was 24, 786, 619 birr but the allocated annual budget is 10, 732, 053 birr and for the year 2018/19 the amount of budget the commission's plan to ask is 44, 458, 286 birr but, the maximum limit the commission can ask is 20, 203, 374 birr.

Besides financial resources, the human resource issue is the other key components for the effectiveness of the ACCs. According to the human resource data the number of the staff in general

and the number of the staffers for each directorate is not sufficient, there are only 87 staffs in the Commission. The 02 states that in 2017/18 the Commission asked the recruitment of 34 human powers for the main office but the regional government is not allowed. Then the Commission is forced to continue its work with the existing number of manpower. So, it is difficult to achieve the vast responsibilities of the Commission by using these small number of staffs. When we see the departments which requires enough human power it is unexpected. Based on human resource data, there are only eight prosecutors and seven investigators, only ten asset registration professionals, one public relation professional, two media professionals and low number of educational, training and research professionals.

To perform effectively institutions created to fight corruption should have the required adequate human resources and properly trained staff (Tewodros, 2009). In ANRSEACC not only problem of number but also there is shortage of well-trained staffs and special professionals. According to 004 the investigation and prosecution work requires specialized experts, but there is no specialized expert and even there is skill and knowledge gap within the existing professional's and he revealed that their departments are under staffed and lack the necessary skills to perform at optimal levels.

Therefore, the study concludes that though, adequacy of resource is the major factor for the effectiveness of the ACCs the ANRSEACC is strongly challenged by financial problem, shortage of human resources as well as trained staffs and special experts. So, the ANRSEACC is not adequate resourced to perform effectively in its anti-corruption struggle.

4.2.3 Comprehensive Mandate

There is no single solution in combating corruption. Combating corruption by focusing on the core areas of anti-corruption activities including prevention, education and investigation is a comprehensive mandate of ACAs. Successful ACAs like the Hong Kong's ICAC adopted these three pronged approaches, prevention, education and investigation (Meghar, 2002). The UNDP (2005) also states that, ACAs that have focused on one or two of the three activities have been less successful than those who have adopted a more holistic approach. According to the establishment proclamations of the FEACC and regional ACCs, Ethiopia also adopted these three pronged approaches as a comprehensive mandate. Based on this the ANRSEACC includes these activities

under its objectives and consists separate departments and units each charged with implementing these tasks.

The Corruption Prevention Directorate is responsible to examine the systems and procedures in the public sector, to identify corruption opportunities and to make recommendations to plug the loopholes. According to 04 “the ANRSEACC examined the practices and working procedures in many different public sectors and give recommendations even though there is weakness in the follow up of the implementation of the recommendations. And this activity is profitable and used to save resource and time” (3rd March, 2018). For instance, according to the report of the Commission in the year 2016/17 the Commission protects 16,235,286 (sixteen million two thousand thirty-five two hundred eighty-six) birr and 2184(two thousand one hundred eighty-four) care meter urban land through urgent system-review.

In addition, the Prevention Directorate as a second aspect has been working to create an aware society where corruption will not be tolerated by promoting ethics and anti-corruption education through its education and training department and by cooperation with the Public Relations Directorate. According to 04:

To achieve the educational mandate, the Commission has been employing various mechanisms such as conducting trainings, producing and distributing publications and disseminating messages via radio, television and website for various sections of the society. Pertinent to preventing and combating corruption in 2016/17 fiscal year the commission gives face to face training for 139,793 individuals (3rd March, 2018).

Alongside the preventive and educational activities, the Investigation and Prosecution Directorate also focuses on investigation of alleged corruption offences, pressing charges against suspected corruption offences, freezing and causing the confiscation of assets obtained through corruption and providing protection to whistleblowers and witnesses. The directorate identifies corruption cases through links with police commission, media, complaints by the public, and research on the performance of institutions. The Commission in its 2016/17 report confirmed that, 973 records have been investigated, from these 516 records investigated by the Commission and 457 records by the Police Commission.

According to 01 the Commission has also a well-defined strategy that fits the specific cultural context and realities of the country with regional specific objectives. But according to the existing

realities the ANRSEACC faced with a challenges in carrying out its mandate regarding how to adapt the organization's features to Ethiopia's as well as regional states political, social and economic context. A clear indication of this challenge is the gap between expectation of the public and achievements of the commission. Most ACAs are created by copying successful models without taking into account a particular country's unique political environment, social, and economic conditions and available resources in the context where the ACA will carry out its functions (De Sousa, 2009). This practice does not always result in success and efficiency and can result in a gap between expected results and achievements (Arsema, 2010). Based on interviews with 01, it is clear that achievements have not matched expectations. The reasons for this include a lack of human capacity, limited resources, and unfavorable economic conditions.

Accordingly, the study concludes that the ANRSEACC focuses on the core areas of anti-corruption activity including prevention, education and investigation as a mandate with separate directorates to achieve these activities. Although, the Commission adopted these three pronged approaches as a comprehensive mandate and achieves a good progress, it also challenged by the existence of a great gap between the high expectations of the general public and actual achievements of the Commission.

4.2.4 Transparency

Transparency of ACC is essential for effective functioning by ensuring their credibility and by building the public's trust. Practice of the ACA shows that the main elements of transparency include regular reports presented to the parliament, president's office and government and available to the public (Tewdros, 2009). ACCs must publicize their reports and works to ensure popular accountability. In order to be truly independent, ACAs have to be transparent in its activities (Meghat, 2005) by using broad cast, printed and social medias.

When we assess the performance of ANRSEACC, regarding with its transparency 03 states that the report of the Commission is annually submitted to the state council, and other regional sectors and have also been publicized once a year through annual report magazine. The Commission is also publicize its activities and anti-corruption awareness creation programs by using print medias like, newspapers, annual report magazine and regular magazine called *Finote Migbar* which is published two times a year and brushers; broadcast media like, Amhara Television, Bahir Dar,

Dessie and Debre Birhan FM; social medias like, facebook (www.facebook anrseac) and website (www.anrseac.gov.et) and capacity building training and publications.

In addition, according to 005 the Commission is always open and volunteer to give any information for every legal person. For those who have any information, tip-off and comments the office is open in all working days and there are different accesses including fax (0582220397), phon (0582263740) and Posta (1798). So to ensure transparency the ANRSEACC uses these strategies of disclosing information.

But the data obtained from customers of the ANRSEACC revealed that, the Commission does not give quick response for the cases like decisions of tip-offs and corruption crimes. One customer who came from the place which fare thirty kilometer from Bahir Dar stated that, “information is unreasonably delayed for long and the ways of publicizing cases is not considering the rural and far parts of the region” (5th March, 2018). But in response to this according to the Commission’s 2016/17 report to solve the problem of delaying cases the Commission decides to complete an investigation of tip-off and information within one month unless the nature of the case requires more time.

The other mechanism by which transparency of the Commission be ensured is through asset registration and disclosure. Ethiopia adopted a proclamation to provide for the disclosure and registration of assets in 2010. According to the proclamation, any appointee, elected person or public servant, has the obligation to register and disclose assets. According to the proclamation the assets to be registered include the assets under the ownership or possession of himself and his family and sources of his income and those of his family. The ANRSEACC has been given the mandate to conduct the asset registration and disclosure activities at the regional level. According to 06:

The ANRSEACC has so far registered the assets of nearly 47,000 public servants, appointees, and elected persons. But registration only is not enough the proclamation requires the Commission to undertake verification on the information submitted by the registrants. However, because of the problems including; lack of capacity, man power shortage, lack of practical knowledge on asset verification and absence of an electronic system of asset registration that takes forward activities related to verification the ANRSEACC has failed to do the verification (26th Feb, 2018).

Even though the proclamation states that all information regarding the registered assets shall be open to the public almost all the participant's states that, there are doubts among the society over the readiness of the Commission to make the registered information public. The Commission has been the center of criticism for not making the registered information accessible to the public and the public reiterate that the proclamation is no avail unless the registered information is made public. According to the 06 the main reasons for curtailing an easy access to the registered information is the absence of relevant rules and directives and the Commission maintained that there has to be a compromise between public interest and privacy. For the future there is the direction that there will be automatic on-line access to disclose the registered assets based on appropriate rules and procedures. For the time being the registered information has already been used by the Commission and other justice bodies for investigation purposes and anyone who wants to know the registered assets of the appointee or elected person he/she can easily access up on specific written request impersonal.

So it is plausible to say that the ANRSEACC assures its transparency; by submitting the annual report for the state council and regional governments; by publicizing its activities using printed, broadcast and social medias; and by accepting any information, tip-off, and comments through phone, email, fax and Posta. The Commission also applying registering assets of public servants, appointees and elected persons. However, the Commission do nothing when it comes to the accessibility of the registered information and verification of assets.

4.2.5 Adequate Powers of Investigation

In order to effectively investigate corruption cases ACCs should have adequate powers including; access documents, question witnesses as well as the possibility to prosecute as and where required, freeze assets and seize passports, protect informants, can monitor income and assets, jurisdiction over chief of assets and propose administrative reforms. According to 05:

In carrying out its functions, the ANRSEACC enjoys truly adequate and comprehensive powers of investigation. This includes: receiving and considering allegations of corruption; search and seizure, investigation and surveillance; searching bank accounts and holding and examining business and private documents; requiring suspects to provide details of their assets, income, and expenditure; detaining travel documents and freezing assets in order to prevent flight or laundering; and protecting the confidentiality of an investigation (22nd Feb, 2018).

In the same manner, based on the revised proclamation of 237/2015, the ANRSEACC has the power to investigate and ensure prosecution of corruption offences as well as attempts and conspiracies and protection of witnesses and whistleblowers of criminal offences.

Nonetheless, according to the FGD discussants, the delegation power given for the Police Commission and Justice Bureau of the region for investigation and prosecution cases causes limitation and criticisms for the Commission because of bureaucracies and delay of cases. Though, the reason for this delegation is because of shortage of human and financial resources and to give quick responses for immediate cases and problem of spatial institutionalization. In the same vein, customers complain that the cases delegated for police and justice are not quickly responded. Rather there is delays and even there are judges and prosecutors who receives corruption to accomplish the cases.

Therefore, the study generalizes that the ANRSEACC has adequate power of investigation in principle. However, because of its own problem of financial, human and technical resources the Commission gives delegated power for the other organ and it causes limitations and criticisms.

4.2.6 Cooperation

Building a cross sectional and sectoral coordination and support is an important factor for the effectiveness of the ACCs (Johnston and Kpundeh, 2002). “The major role of the ACC is also facilitating coordination and cooperation between different institutions and the public to fight against corruption” (01, 27th Feb, 2018). The ANRSEACC is mandated to work with various stakeholders and coordinate ethics infrastructures to enhance the participation of the society in combating corruption (Article 20 of Proclamation No. 237/2015).

Accordingly, the ANRSEACC is trying to work in collaboration with various government institutions to promote ethics and enhance the participation of the public in combating corruption. According to 04:

The Commission, has developed relations and working closely with the Educational Bureau in the development of co-curricular activities including forming ethics and civics clubs in various learning institutions for the enhancement of ethical behaviors. Even though because of lack of enough support and follow up by their institution and the Commission most of the clubs are not working at the desired level. In addition, the Commission also forms agreement charters with the Technical and Vocational Training

Bureau, Health Bureau, Agricultural Bureau and Financial and Economic Bureau to work together in combating corruption (3rd March, 2018).

The public mobilization and coordination role of the ANRSEACC can also be assessed by its coordination with media. As the response of 03 the Public Relations department of the Commission works in collaboration with the regional medias including Amhara Television, Amhara Radio, Dessie and Debre Birhan FMs and other press medias. This has helped in giving the Commission visibility in the media and printed press and initiate the public to cooperate in combating corruption.

As the response of 001 in an attempt to enhance the coordination of the Commission to a higher level, the Regional Anti-Corruption Coalition which comprises of government agencies, private sectors, civil societies, religious institutions and others around 129 institutions was formed in 2014. The Coalition is mandated to provide direction in the fight against corruption and to evaluate implementation of anticorruption measures at the regional level. However, based on the interview of customers how many of these members of the coalition are really able to work closely with the Commission is the question to be answered. Supporting with this FGD discussants states that the coalition members are not committed to work with the commission for instance universities including, Bahir Dar University, Gondar University, Wollo University and Debre Birhan University are members of the coalition which do not contribute something for the effectiveness of the Commission. In addition, most of the members of the coalitions are government institutions there is the limitation of giving concern for private institutions and opposition political parties. Therefore, there is limitation with respect to being inclusive and this may undermine the credibility and trust of the Coalition as well as the ANRSEACC to enhance their public mobilization role.

Among the various bodies which the ACCs has been working with are the Ethics Liaison Units. According to 04, “except the ANRSEACC other regional ACCs have the ethical liaison units’ structure and have been working effectively. But in the ANRSEACC the ethical liaison unit structure and working procedure formulates by the proclamation No. 154/2017” (3rd March, 2018). Even though the Commission is on the way of arranging the preconditions the ethical liaison unites does not functional. Therefore, the ANRSEACC’s effort to widen its corruption prevention endeavor through ethics liaison units is not working.

The ANRSEACC has been working in coordination with the Police Commission and Justice Bureau of the region by forming delegation convention charter in January 25th 2018 (005, 26th Feb, 2018). Cooperation with the police helps expedite investigations, disciplinary actions, and the sourcing of information and it also helps to fill a little gaps of shortage of manpower of the Commission.

Based on the response of 02 in addition, to coordinating with other organizations and stakeholders the Commission's directorates developed working in close collaboration with each other. For instance, the Investigation and Prosecution Directorate works very closely with the Preventive Directorate by giving public education services including, educating the public on what corruption is, the consequences of corrupt behavior, and the effectiveness of law enforcement, thereby encouraging people to report corruption. Analysis of the modes of corrupt practices and any systemic weaknesses in corruption cases also helps in the design of more effective preventive measures.

Therefore, the study concludes that the Commission has begun a collaborative effort with different, government offices, enterprises and institutions in the region through various mechanisms. But there is the problem of implementation of agreements, follow up of started works and dis-functional of ethical liaison units. This has brought impact on the ANRSEACC's effort to create a society that would not tolerate corruption and its effectiveness.

Generally, based on the above mentioned criteria's the ANRSEACC is not effective enough. Because all of the parameters are challenged by limitations and criticisms like, fiscal autonomy problem, inadequacy of resource, existence of gaps between the expectation of the public and achievements of the Commission, ineffective laws, limitation in transparency, lack of effective prosecution, lack of modern equipment's and logistics and lack of implementation and follow up of cooperative works. Similarly, the result of Bashir (2006) and Arsema (2010), indicated that the ACAs are failed to perform effectively due to the same reasons.

4.3 Challenges faced by the ANRSEACC in Combating Corruption

In this section the researcher tries to outline the challenges hampering the role of the ANRSEACC in achieving its overall objectives in combating corruption based on the data collected from the participants and document reviews. There are problems which are interrupting the work of

ANRSEACC and making its performance ineffective. And most of the challenges are related with limitations of the parameters that used to assess the effectiveness of the Commission.

4.3.1 Resource Constraints

For the ACCs to be effective, the resources apportioned to it should be commensurate with the responsibilities and competencies with which it is endowed. However, as it is explained above lack of adequate resources including financial, human and technical resources has been one of the serious challenges faced by the ANRSEACC.

Almost all of the respondents confirmed that one of the challenges faced the ANRSEACC is the inadequate finance and human resources. Since the ANRSEACC relies on funding from the regional government, the money allocated to the Commission to carry out its activities is not enough to meet the demand for the Commission's service region wide. In this regard 004 expressed that; "democratic institutions in Ethiopia are not at the top of budget earmarked annually for different spending, with the huge part going to infrastructure development, education, health, military and security sectors" (22nd Feb, 2018). This scarcity of budget allocation could affect the operations of the democratic institutions like ACCs in the country. It has a repercussion to the effort of the institutions, including the EACCs, in operating optimally to combat corruption given its wide mandate.

Likewise, the FGD discussants confirmed that, although the budget of the Commission has seen progressive increase over the years, it is not adequate enough in the face of the wide mandate bestowed to the Commission. And the budgetary situation remains very uncertain and subject to further cuts, which would hamper the Commission's ability to fulfill its mandate. Because of the inadequacy of budget, the Commission is faced with various problems like, shortage of vehicles and lack of skilled staffs in surveillance and intelligence.

Another challenge identified by the respondents was inadequate capacity of the Commission in terms of human resources. Based on the interview of 02, the number of staff complement at the ANRSEACC is not enough to fully implement the vast responsibilities of the Commission. As the human resource data implies there are only 87 staffs in the ANRSEACC which is not sufficient to address the responsibilities of the Commission. But adequate human power is a determinant factor

to successfully implement a specific goal. Therefore, there is no doubt that ANRSEACC achievement affected by shortage of human resources.

Regarding human resources, competent staff is also a major area of concern, which greatly impacted the effectiveness of the Commission. 004 stated that, “ACCs should depend on well-trained personnel including sufficient numbers with highly specialized skills” (22nd Feb, 2008). Staff should also be well-compensated, subject to integrity reviews and endowed with a strong ethic of professionalism, integrity, and high morale value. Maintaining a serious program of staff development is challenging owing to shortage of funding. Because of this the Commission still faces shortage of competent staff in investigation, asset registration and verification, research, education and training, information technology, public relation and media.

The researcher understands that fighting corruption is resource intensive. And resource constraint is the area where most ACAs failed. If ACAs are established, even with good laws, but the resource is not enough, the staff is unprofessional or incompetent to perform the difficult task of combating corruption, unless there are adequate capacity-building efforts, it has little chance of success. So it is plausible to say that resource problem in ANRSEACC has a major impact on the overall implementation of its objectives and effective functioning.

4.3.2 Limited Spatial Institutionalization

Currently the ANRSEACC has three branch offices in major zonal cities of Gondar, Dessie and Debre Birhan. The ANRS is very wide in geography and demography, the Commission’s institutionalization at the regional level and with only three branch office is found to be difficult to achieve the objective of creating a society that does not tolerate corruption. Almost all the participant’s states that, the ANRSEACC is not physical accessible to all sections society of the regional state. The reason is that because of limited special institutionalization.

It is obvious that making the presence of the institutions felt to the public and encouraging people to resort to the institution needs huge resources, which may limit their work and achievement. According to 02:

The ANRSEACC has continuously improving its accessibility through a combination of decentralization, prevention, education and investigation works. However, making accessible to the largest segment of the population of the region is undercut by financial

constraints, which makes the commission unable to open additional branch offices in different parts of the region (22nd Feb, 2018).

The FGD discussants also expressed that, it is believed that access to regional institutions in geographically large region like ANRS is very problematic. The existing branch offices are located in major population areas and major zonal cities. This has a great impact in obstructing the accessibility of the Commission to people living in lower levels of the regional administration. Nonetheless, practically expansion of branch offices has great significance to achieve the objectives of the Commission. And almost all of the participants said that, the Commission must open branch offices to the different zones and lower levels of the regional administrations.

Therefore, the study concludes that in order to achieve the objective of the Commission the existing branch offices is not enough because of the vast geographic and demographic nature of the ANRS. So the Commission's inability to expand branch offices becomes major challenge for the ANRSEACC in its struggle against corruption.

4.3.3 Low Public Awareness and Problem of Public Trust

Almost all of the participants of the study confirmed that, one of the challenges of the ANRSEACC in combating corruption is low public awareness and negative perception towards the Commission. The negative perception causes inadequate mobilization, integration and participation of the citizenry in the anti-corruption struggle of the Commission. Participants stated different reasons for the existence of this problem. According to the informants' interview of the staffs of the Commission, the major public awareness problem is the misperception that the Commission is the only responsible organ to combat corruption. There is also problem of public trust towards the ANRSEACC regarding with fulfilling its mandate due to the slow judicial process, adverse court decisions and lack of evidence for tip-offs.

According to one Customer of the Commission apart from the perception of lacking enforcement powers, there is a general cynicism of the ANRSEACC because of the problem of trust of the public. In the same manner the Commission's 2017/18 half year report confirmed that, there are key factors complicating its work. From these one is the existence of suspicion or lack of faith among the public in relation to education and combating corruption in general. The other is the tendency to distrust the investigation carried by the Commission.

In the same manner other customer stated that, “many of those who teach about corruption themselves are main players of the crime of corruption; no practical change has been seen about ethics more than just a talk and the commission itself is not free from corruption” (5th March, 2018). Other customer also stated that investigating sensitive matters and transparency are among important elements helping the commission to assert their independent status and support their credibility. The limitation in this regard has eroded the Commission’s legitimacy in the eyes of the public and hindering it from being seen as an independent institution to combat corruption.

The FGD discussants also stated that, corruption in Ethiopia and in Amhara region has a social and cultural background and the society appreciates corruption and corrupters by different traditional saying in Amharic language like “ሲኾም ያልበላ ሲሻር ይነድዋል”, which means that an official who has not benefited or corrupted from his or her power while he or she is in power, regrets when he or she lose his or her office, because once when he or she lost the power he or she will not get it later forever. Such belief of the society implies existence of low public awareness about corruption. It may also cause the absence of the principled principals who makes themselves responsible to fight against corruption. In this situation when the public is not fully aware and do not have trust for the ACCs corruption becomes the collective action problem.

Most of the key-informant interviewees indicated that the notion of EACC is a new phenomenon in the ANRS. And the work of the Commission is caught between two sets of expectations. From the public side, there could be unrealistic expectations that the Commission would address corruption problems and minimize opportunities for corruption in a short period of time. From the Commissions perspective, the Commission is expected to assume an active role in combating corruption. However, meeting these expectations would be difficult for the Commission because of lack of experience. In the same manner the FGD discussants also confirmed that initially there were high expectations from the public and the government but the ANRSEACC is an infant Commission unable to meet the unrealistic expectations imposed up on it. This failure increased, the negative perceptions of the public and reduced peoples’ willing to support the Commission.

The study concluded that, there is awareness problem of the society like; considering the ANRSEACC as the only responsible organ for combating corruption and a social and cultural background of appreciating corruption and corrupters. There is also problem of public trust towards the Commission because of slow judicial process, adverse court decisions, unable to meet

expectations, limitation in investigation of sensitive matters, low practical change about ethics more than talk. So awareness problem of the society plus lack of public trust challenges the ANRSEACC in its struggle against corruption.

4.3.4 Lack of Visible Political Commitment among Government Officials

Political leaders' commitment to fight corruption at the highest levels is one of the most important preconditions for success in the fight against corruption. Political will with respect to fighting corruption means political support to make sure that, among other things, the resources, independence and transparency mechanisms required for the ACIs to be successful (Pope, 2000).

Another factor that has been hampering the anti-corruption struggle of the ANRSEACC is unwillingness among heads of various government institutions to cooperate and provide relevant information requested for investigative and prosecutorial purposes. According to 05, "there are even some heads of government institutions that are deliberately hiding the requested information and documents as well as complicating in covert way the efforts to gather evidences" (22nd Feb, 2018). In the same manner 04 also states that, "some officials try to undermine the studies on systems and working procedures which aim at identifying loopholes that may lead to corrupt practices in various government offices and public enterprises" (3rd March, 2018).

Nonetheless, to the contrary the proclamation 237/2015 states that the regional institutions and government officials have the responsibility to cooperate and give information for the Commission. And the government has the power to take measure with respect to enhancing cooperation between regional authorities in providing the necessary information for investigative and prosecutorial purposes (Article 7). The revised establishment proclamation of FEACC (2005) also obligates public offices to cooperate whenever cooperation and assistance is required by the ACCs. Despite these affirmations, the practical aspect has not yet fully materialized. Since no effective sanctioning measures were taken for failure to cooperate, the tendency to cooperate among various bodies was also weak. In general, it seems that the task of fighting corruption should not be left to a single institution has not been well taken by institutions and government officials in the region.

As the collective action theory purports, in order to tackle corruption, transforming the political culture and ensuring trust between the public and administrators at all level is essential. Anti-

corruption commitment not only in words but in action is desirable among the senior government officials to make the EACCs strong in its measures. However, based on the participants' response there is no doubt that, the political commitment towards the fight against corruption in the ANRS has not reached at the desirable level.

In addition to this, customers also state that, there is the case that in ANRS the officials in power are even the ones at forefront when it comes to supporting corrupt individuals by hiding the requested information and documents. The politicians are therefore in most cases the spoilers of many initiatives to promote corruption in the region apart from lack of commitment towards the anticorruption struggle.

According to the FGD discussants, the regional government may have to look into the budgeting process with a view to strengthen the ANRSEACC financially. If the commission is well funded, it implies the government put more attention and committed towards its effectiveness. But the ANRSEACC is underfunded and government officials are not providing necessary support in making rules and financial assistances. The commission largely depends on governmental approval in budgeting and operational rule. Operational procedures are also subject to government intention, and powers of arrest of ACC are conditioned by the courts. This implies that the Commission acquires visible and consistent political commitment from the regional government officials to play its role and to function effectively.

There is also problem of political will from the executive branch to help in supporting the objectives of the Commission. According to 006, an example would be cooperating to provide protections for whistleblowers and witnesses, which would encourage honest civil servants to come forward without fearing retaliation from dishonest managers. There are involuntary institutions and officials when the Commission writes letter of cooperation to provide protection for the whistleblowers and witnesses.

Anti-corruption agencies must be incorruptible through the supervision of political leaders who are not corrupt themselves. This is also supported by the principal-agent theory that argues the principled (principals who are not corrupt themselves) principals account the agents (civil servants and professionals). For example, Lee Kuan Yew governors of Hong Kong took uncompromising attitudes and efforts against corruption though, the efforts of some Asian countries have been

curtailed due to the lack of political will (Quah 1999). Similarly, in the case of ANRS this political commitment is questionable.

The study concludes that the ANRSEACC should not be the only actor to combat corruption in the region. The Commission acquires the commitment and support of different stakeholders. Especially the support from the government, particularly commitment among government officials is essential to prevent corruption and investigate and prosecute corruption offences at the desirable level. However, the Commission is challenged by the activities of the officials who are not politically committed to fight against corruption. The activities include, deliberately hiding the requested information and documents, undermine the studies on systems and working procedures, and unwilling to give protection for whistleblowers and witnesses.

4.3.5 Problems Related to Whistleblowers and Witnesses

With regard to the investigation and prosecution of the crimes of corruption the ACCs should provide reliable legal protection to whistleblowers and witnesses. The ANRSEACC proclamation No. 237/2015 states that the Commission has the power and responsibilities, to facilitate condition of physical and job security protection to whistle blowers and witnesses in collaboration with the pertinent bodies; and give a protection service determined by law (Article 7). Whistleblowers and witnesses fear to give witnesses and expose clear cases of corruption crimes if they do not have reliable legal protection.

According to the interviewee of customers of the Commission weakness in the implementation of whistleblowers and witness's protection law is another factor that has been affecting the effective role of the ANRSEACC. The proclamation states that the Commission should provide effective protection for witnesses and whistleblowers of criminal offences. Despite the existence of such legal framework, the implementation aspect is not enough. For instance, based on the public relation directorate data, the ANRSEACC granted protection for only 176 witnesses and whistleblowers since 2013. In the same vein, 005 states that implementation of the legal frameworks requires huge resource in terms of finance, material and human capacity which cannot easily afford. Besides, it demands the involvement and cooperation of various institutions, which has not been adequate. According to 05, the protection given for the whistleblowers and witnesses is not effective at the desirable level due to capacity problem of the Commission and lack of

cooperation and commitment from institutions. There is lack of willingness from the institutions for the implementation of the decision or the order to provide protection to whistleblowers in their respective institutions. Moreover, according to one customer, officials of some institutions are systematically orchestrating harassment and fabricated corruption offence against whistleblowers and witnesses. “Verifying whether the request for protection is genuine is also a painstaking task for the Commission because there are tip-offs and witnesses based on revenge without full evidences” (005, 26th Feb, 2018).

Due to these problems and lack of effective protection program most witnesses and whistleblowers to date have feared disclosure of their identity. The 006 notes that, “this is one of the factors explaining the low number of citizens coming forward to report corruption or providing tip-offs” (22nd Feb, 2018). It also explains the difficulty in successfully prosecuting current and past corruption cases.

Based on this the study concludes that, the enforcement activity of the ANRSEACC is mostly depends on the whistleblowers and witnesses. However, because of its resource intensiveness and acquiring willingness and cooperation of other institutions problem of protection for whistleblowers and witnesses became challenges of the effective role of the Commission.

4.3.6 Operational Inefficiency

Operational efficiency is inevitable for institutions to achieve their goal they are established for. It refers to all aspects of an institution’s procedures essential to enforce regular programs. Operational inefficiency is very broad though it has an inextricable link with the availability of adequate funding and sufficient human resources (Bashir, 2006). Hence, operational inefficiency may arise when the institution is understaffed and under resourced but overburdened.

Correspondingly, as it is stated above inadequacy of financial and human resources is the critical problem that challenges the ANRSEACC in its anti-corruption struggle. Being highly dependent on government funding is a basic challenge in this regard. Concerning to this 004 states that:

“Since the Commission was a body which questions the wrongful act of the government and its officials it should have a better capacity than other government institutions. But the reverse is true that, shortage of budget is the critical problem of the Commission and

becomes the major causes of operational inefficiency of the ANRSEACC” (22nd Feb, 2018).

Apart from the above major challenges there are also other problems that are considerably hampering the investigation and prosecution activities of the ANRSEACC. One is lack of intelligence and surveillance unit within the Commission. As stated above, the ANRSEACC has been almost entirely dependent on the tip-offs it received from the public to launch investigations. This is mainly caused by the inability of the Commission to employ its own intelligence and surveillance mechanisms in principle and in law that may serve as the basis for enhanced investigation and prosecution.

The other one is lack of continuity of education of the Commission offered for the public. The education is not delivered using cases, practical exercises related to problems and using supportive instruments. Training is given for a short period of time and it is also shallow. One participant has briefly stated this matter: "Because the time allocated for the training is so short, it was not possible to raise practical issues and discuss in depth and suggest solutions” (002, 26th Feb, 2018). 02 also added the challenges like, internet quality problem and lack of consistency in all the activities because of task loads and negligence of the staffs for instance absenteeism in discussion, lack of responsiveness and unwillingness to accept weaknesses.

Generally, the challenges that faces the ANRSEACC which is mentioned above are similar with that of Kinkino (2014). Biruk (2016), also identified resource constraints, problem of public trust, lack of political commitment of government officials and problems related with whistleblowers and witnesses. From the challenges resource constraints, low public awareness and lack of visible commitment among government officials are the most serious challenges that faces the ANRSEACC in combating corruption. The reason is that these challenges are repeatedly mentioned by the participants of the study and becomes the causes for other challenges.

4.4 Strategies the ANRSEACC Used to Address the Challenges

Regarding strategies to address their challenges the ACCs should acknowledge that there is no single solution in combating corruption (UNCAC, 2001). Although the ANRSEACC is hindered by different challenges, it could be able to cope from various challenges by taking various alternatives of resiliencies and coping methods. Based on the responses of the participants of the

study and review of documents of the Commission, the strategies are discussed in the following subsections.

4.4.1 Using Different Alternative Mechanisms

The ANRSEACC uses different alternative mechanisms to address the challenge it faces. According to 01 to solve financial constraints, the Commission uses the strategies of involved in income generating activities. For this purpose, the Commission searches sponsors like external donation and aid and lending organizations, such as the WB and other bilateral donors. They sponsor governance and anti-corruption projects in member countries and also seek to avoid corruption in their own lending and grant programs. According to the Commission's report the Governance and Democratic Participation Program (GDPP) under World Bank funded around two million birr in the year 2016/17 and 2,402,256 (two million four hundred-two two hundred fifty-six) birr in the year 2017/18 for stationary, furniture, electronics, experience sharing, supervision and training purposes. The Commission also get supports from civic society groups which sometimes promote anti-corruption projects.

The FGD discussants also stated that ANRSEACC have been working with the regional institutions to give training for the civil servants with in the training schedule of their own institutions. In addition, the Commission also receives training materials and financial contribution from other regional institutions for instance, vehicle from Regional Administrative Bureau and financial support from Financial and Economic Bureau.

According to 02: "to address skill and knowledge gaps of the staffs the Commission gives training to new staffs within the department in which they will serve. The training includes corruption education and prevention work, law and legal issues and computers, media and presentation skills" (22nd Feb, 2018). "Officers in the Investigative Department also receive training in investigation techniques, cognitive interviewing, confrontation management and firearms" (05, 22nd Feb, 2018).

4.4.2 Working in Cooperation with the Stakeholders

"The war against corruption can only be won if the all stakeholders are responsible and the public tolerance for corruption reduces" (04, 3rd March, 2018). Corruption cannot be seen in isolation, rather it is a societal issue and affects every body. Accordingly, as it is stated above by the

participants the ANRSEACC has been developed cooperation's with different stakeholders to address the challenges it faces in combating corruption.

According to 001 the regional anti-corruption coalition which comprises of government agencies, private sectors, civil societies, religious institutions, higher institutions and others around 129 institutions was formed in 2014. This is one effort of the ANRSEACC for the purpose of providing a platform for dialog among all stakeholders on matters of corruption in the public sphere. Based on the response of 03 the public relations department of the Commission works in collaboration with the regional medias including Amhara Television, Amhara Radio, Dessie and Debre Birhan FMs and other press medias like *Bekur* newspaper.

In order to raise and sustain the public's corruption prevention awareness, the Hong Kong's ICAC launches comprehensive and long-term programs to proactively communicate a culture of probity and integrity, and promote and foster community support. These include community-based programs using mass media and specific programs for targeted sectors of the community, such as youth, business people, or professional and technical personnel in various fields (Wing-chi, 2014). Similarly, the ANRSEACC is also used this community based strategies by using mass media and specific targeted sectors of the community such as youth and women's by taking schools and colleges as a center (04, 3rd March, 2018).

According to 05 for the purpose of addressing human and financial resource problem and for the purpose of giving quick response for cases the ANRSEACC works closely with the Police Commission and Justice Bureau of the region. The Commission has also collaborated with the police in making arrests and taking the suspects in to safe custody. The ANRSEACC formulates the ethical liaison unit structure and working procedure by the proclamation No.154/2017 for the purpose of minimizing special institutionalization problem.

Therefore, an effective response to fight against corruption requires a coordinated action of all stakeholders. Which is also supported by the collective action theory that, disregards the dependency of the act of anti-corruption on a specific actor rather the responsibility of all actors.

4.4.3 Comprehensive Anti-Corruption Strategy

The ANRSEASCC's approach to fighting corruption is based on the main pillars of combating corruption including, prevention, ethics and anticorruption education and investigation and prosecution.

1. Expanding Ethics and Anti-Corruption Education

The most common strategy for combating corruption comprise the expansion of ethics and anti-corruption education. In this regard the ANRSEACC has been striving to create conscious society where corruption will not be tolerated by promoting ethics and anticorruption education through Corruption Prevention Directorate. The directorate carried out many activities by using different modalities of education, namely; conducting training and face to face discussions, producing and distributing publications and disseminating messages via television, radio and website for various section of the society (03, 21st Feb, 2018).

According to 002 a focus on prevention and ethics education is the appropriate approach to change the traditional behaviors of the society that supports corruption by using traditional sayings like *sishom yalbela sishar yinedewal*. So the ANRSEACC works by giving special attention for ethics and anti-corruption education to create a society that do not tolerate corruption. The FGD discussants also confirmed that the ANRSEACC is working on educating the public widely about the worse effects of corruption and creating conducive environment to get public support in the fight against corruption.

According to the response of 001 the trainings that the ANRSEACC has been providing to different segments of the society have two packages namely, awareness creation education and training of trainers. Under the awareness creation education, the training has been provided for one day or two days. Whereas, the training of trainers is given to a relatively longer period, up to five days, and the trainees are supposed to train other fellows in their respective organizations. According to each year reports of the Commission under the awareness creation education package, the ANRSEACC trained the total of 230,715 individuals drawn from various government agencies, learning institutions and associations with in the years of 2016-2018. The Commission has also provided training of trainer for 893 individuals drawn from ethics liaison officers, professional

associations, media organizations, religious institutions, associations of youth and women and other institutions in the last two years.

In addition to trainings the ANRSEACC has also attempts to utilize the media in disseminating ethics and anti-corruption messages. The Commission made possible the production and dissemination of 13 radio and television short messages, 2 radio drama with 26 parts for each and 5 television and 4 radio spots with 49 repetitions carrying anti-corruption messages to the public in the years of 2016/17 and 2017/18. Various publications such as magazine, booklets, brochure, flyers, posters, modules, stickers and newsletters aiming at sensitizing the public about corruption prevention were prepared and distributed with 17,126 copies to the society from the year 2016-2018.

Both principal-agent and collective action theories support this strategy for the fight against corruption. The principal-agent theory argues that, monitoring agent's performance, education of civil servants is part of curbing corruption. In supporting with this the collective action theory argues that viewing corruption from multiple perspectives has led to anti-corruption strategies that aim to change social norms and behaviors through education. The engagement of broader coalitions of actors and institutions which enhances integrity in society can be done through education. So education is one major strategy which helps to make the public more aware and responsible to fight against corruption.

2. Preventing Corruption

Prevention aspect concerns institutional studies, advice to government agencies and reforms aimed at closing loopholes and reducing opportunities for corruption. Based on these aspects prevention enables to easily expose actual or potential corruption and improprieties by putting in place a transparent and accountable procedure. It also helps to reduces the expense the government incurs to administer those criminals who have committed corruption offences.

Under the activities of prevention, the ANRSEACC works on researching and advising about work process of government offices and public enterprises. The Commission also indicate the ways in which work processes that lead to corruption and impropriety should be avoided as well as advised and assisted on the ways in which the work processes should be improved. According to the report, the ANRSEACC has conducted review of the work processes of 11 government offices and public

enterprises and suggested comments for each institution in the year 2016/17 and 2017/18 even though, there is limitation of monitoring and follow up the implementation of the measures. Through urgent system review the ANRSEACC protects 16, 235, 286 birr and 2184 m² urban land in the year 2017/18.

The other activity of prevention is asset registration and disclosure. Registering and disclosing assets is highly important to enhance transparency in the conduct of public affairs and in the prevention of corruption and impropriety. According to 06, the ANRSEACC has registered the assets of nearly 47,000 public servants, appointees, and elected persons with in the last two years. However, the Commission has been criticized for not making the registered information accessible to the public.

Therefore, for the purpose of effective prevention strategy the ANRSEACC like other ACCs aims at reducing the corruption opportunities in government departments and public institutions, through the methods including, enhance system control, enhance staff integrity, streamline procedures, transparency and promote a staff code of ethics. These methods subordinate with the arguments of principal-agent theory that combating corruption requires looking into the relation between the agent and principal through transparency, monitoring, and sanctioning mechanisms.

3. Investigation, Exposing and Prosecution of Corruption Crimes

The ANRSEACC has the responsibility to investigate or cause the investigation of any alleged or suspected corruption offences by public servants, or public officials, or any other persons, specified in the Penal Code or in other laws where they are committed in public offices and public enterprises or in the Regional offices. In this regard according to the report of the Commission over the last five years the commission investigated more than 2151 cases of corruption crime and caused 1129 criminals, sentenced from two months up to 21 years of imprisonment and punished the total of 2,652, 361birr from the criminals.

There is also other practical change that achieved as a result of exposing and prosecution of corruption crimes which gave lessons for other employees. This means because they have learned that they will be punished if they involve in corruption or if they steal. The conception leads to develop the sense of accountability. 004 stated that “when punishments of corruption crimes exposed for the public, other individuals should not stretch their hands the way they wish” (22nd

Feb, 2018). On this issue one customer also explained that “punishing the corrupt promotes the sense of accountability; it has helped people to take care by making them think that they are going to be caught if they commit an illegal act which in turn leads to punishment” (2nd March, 2018).

Therefore, the ANRSEACC strategy of investigative, exposing and prosecution of corruption crimes helps to give lessons for the public, strengthen transparency, oversight, accountability and to perform their duties carefully in the fight against corruption. Which is also supported by the logical conclusion of both principal-agent and collective action theories that, more effective monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms increases accountability and reduce corruption.

4.4.4 Identifying Focus Areas

In order to coping up financial, resource, and special institutionalization problem the ANRSEACC uses the strategy of working by giving priority for the corruption prone areas. According to 04 in order to identify these corruption prone areas the Commission uses pilot study. Accordingly, the following five sectors are strategic corruption prone sectors including, Regional Land Administration, Large Scale Public Procurement and Sale Procedure, Regional Government's Revenue and Tax, Registration of the Property of Government Officials, Elected Representatives and Employees and Government Administration of Justice. In order to implement this strategy, for instance the Commission gives awareness creation training for the staff of Urban Development Bureau and three days training for three hundred purchasing and audit experts in the year 2017/18.

The FGD discussants responds that, the Commission also gives special focus to the youth-oriented awareness campaigns by considering that the youth is more responsible in combating corruption. Nonetheless, education about the danger of corruption should be offered at all places. Based on this strategy according to 2017/18 report, the Commission gives five days training of trainers for three hundred club coordinators who came from Agricultural Colleges, Health Science Colleges, Technical and Vocational Colleges, educational colleges and secondary schools in the region. In addition, “to maximize the participation and role of the youths and females in the anti-corruption struggle the Commission prepares the manual for the youths and females anti-corruption coalition” (04, 3rd March, 2018).

From the strategies the ANRSEACC uses to address its challenges using alternatives, working in cooperation with the stakeholders, applying a comprehensive anti-corruption strategies and

working by identifying focus areas are related with the methods or suggestions of the principal-agent theory. The theory leads among others, to initiate and apply policies and reforms with regard to monitoring on agent's performance, greater integrity in the public administration and education of civil servants as part of curbing corruption (Rijckeghem and Weder, 1997). The theory also advocates strengthening of cooperation of the public and sanctioning those corrupt agents in an attempt to combat corruption. In some extent cooperation and education also relates with the methods of collective action theory. This is based on the assumption that the responsibility to combat corruption is not for only principals or agents rather all the public and stakeholders which can be achieved through education. Because of their complementary nature both theories logical concludes that, more effective monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms increases accountability and reduce corruption. That is why the study at the theoretical framework states that most contemporary anti-corruption efforts both at the domestic and international level are framed largely by the principal-agent model and this model highly influenced the works of ACIs.

Generally, the strategies the ANRSEACC used to address its challenges include, using different alternatives, working in cooperation with the stakeholders, applying comprehensive anti-corruption strategies and working by identifying focus areas. From these strategies, working in cooperation with the stakeholders and applying comprehensive anti-corruption strategies are similar with that of the strategies applied by the ICAC of Hong Kong which is one of the effective ACAs (Wing-chi, 2014). Nonetheless unlike the ICAC, strategies used by the ANRSEACC are not adequate and research based to address its challenges.

CHAPTER FIVE

5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter presents the conclusion of the study based on the findings that draw from the collected and analyzed data and then forward recommendations as remedial action to overcome those challenges or hindrances.

5.1 Conclusions

This study has pursued to investigate the role of Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commissions in Ethiopia by taking the ANRSEACC as the case. Subsequently, the study tried to assess the effectiveness of the ANRSEACC in its anti-corruption struggle, the challenges that faces the Commission and strategies the Commission used to address its challenges by employing case study design of qualitative research approach.

The effectiveness of the ANRSEACC was assessed based on the parameters including, its independence, adequacy of resources, comprehensive mandate, transparency, adequacy of power of investigation and its cooperation with other stakeholders. Accordingly, the findings of the study reveals that even though the ANRSEACC is playing a significant role in combating corruption it is found to be ineffective. The reason is that these parameters constrained by, budget autonomy problem, resource constraints, the existence of gap between the public expectation and achievement of the Commission, limitation of publicizing activities and disclosing registered assets, problem of implementation of different cooperative agreements, lack of follow ups and functionality problem of ethical liaison units.

This study has identified the major challenges that face the ANRSEACC in its struggle against corruption. The limitations of the parameters of the effectiveness are parts of the challenges that faced the Commission. These challenges include; resource constraint (financial, human and technical), limited spatial institutionalization, low public awareness and problem of public trust, lack of visible political commitment among government officials, problems related to whistleblowers and witnesses and operational inefficiency. From these challenges resource constraint, low public awareness and problem of public trust are the most serious challenges for the effective functioning of the ANRSEACC in combating corruption.

Based on the findings of the study, operating alternative funds and supports, working in partnership with the stakeholders, comprehensive anticorruption strategy (expanding ethics and anticorruption education, preventing corruption and other impropriates and investigation, exposing and prosecution of corruption crimes), identifying focus area and working on that, implementing ethics liaison units' structure were investigated as main strategies the Commission has used to address its challenges. But these strategies are not research based and adequate enough to address the whole challenges of the commission. Even there is a gap in the implementation of the existing strategies.

Generally, the role of ANRSEACC in combating corruption is found to be ineffective because of constrained by limitation of effectiveness parameters and other challenges. The strategies it has used to address its constraints and challenges is also inadequate and not research based.

5.2 Recommendations

On the basis of the findings mentioned above the study recommends the different alternative measures to be taken to address the challenges and to make the ANRSEACC more effective. According to the study findings the appointment process of commissioners of the ANRSEACC is victims of suspicion because of provides opportunity for the executives to intervene in its internal responsibilities. So, it is better to make the election through the parliament and parliamentary select committee which includes members of competent parties.

To address the resource constraints, the Commission has used alternative methods however, it was not continuous and timely to deliver its activities. So the Commission should work more on this activity by including within the work plans and justifying their need of support by projects and proposals.

Since fighting corruption is not one-time campaign, it is recommended to disseminate ethics and anti-corruption education progressively among the members of society to promote zero-tolerance on corruption. It helps to save numerous educated and business man powers from prison. It also helps to reduces the expense the government incurs to administer those criminals who have committed corruption offences. So educational campaigns of the Commission should be organized regularly to raise the awareness and consciousness of the public through lectures, seminars, media programs, exhibitions which helps to publicize the activities of the Commission and strengthen its transparency. In addition, including anti-corruption education in the school curriculums,

cooperating with religious institutions to preach about corruption for their followers and including anti-corruption responsibilities in the professional codes of conduct.

It is better for the Commission ensuring the safety of the witnesses and whistleblowers, by establish and implement a functional feedback mechanism. The mechanism should also be capable of providing the public with regular (monthly or quarterly) on what happens to their tip-offs and updates on the investigative and prosecutorial activities. The genuinely of the mechanisms should also examined continuously and transform the mode of receiving the complaints with the advancing technology.

The ANRSEACC is challenged by government officials who are not politically committed and not willing in the struggle against corruption. Though the proclamation No. 237/2015 states the duty of any person, official or institutions to cooperate and assist when required by the Commission in connection with its powers and duties there is no procedure of measurements for those that does not accept the proclamation. Because of this the Commission becomes unable to take effective measures so far. So it is better for the ANRSEACC to draft the procedures of applying measures for those uncommitted and unwilling government officials by cooperating with the state council.

EACCs are a major actor for the struggle against corruption. By considering this, supporting this institution through adopting different strategies that helps to address the challenges should be among the top priority task of the regional government. Accordingly, allocating appropriate budget which considers the mission of the Commission and the cost of fighting corruption should be governments' main concern. The strategies may also apply through adopting specific policy directions; by giving guide for government officials, religious and community leaders, educational institutions, as well as other concerned government organizations, civic societies, NGOs and international organizations to work on the provision of necessary supports.

Higher institutions should also play a role to strengthen the capacity of the Commission. Bahir Dar University, Gondar University, Wollo University and Debre Birhan University are members of the ANRS Anti-Corruption Coalition. But they do not contribute the expected support for the effective role of the Commission. They should provide their support through conducting researches, giving trainings, producing ethical generations and giving concern for the case of corruption and anti-corruption activities in their community services.

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አማርኛ መጽሔቶች

ፍኖተ ምግባር፡ የአማራ ብሔራዊ ክልላዊ መንግስት የስነ-ምግባርና ፀረ-ሙስና ኮሚሽን መደበኛ መጽሔት ቅጽ 13 ቁጥር 14 ሰኔ 2008

የአማራ ብሔራዊ ክልላዊ መንግስት የስነ-ምግባርና ፀረ-ሙስና ኮሚሽን የ2008 በጀት አመት ሪፖርት እና የ 2009 በጀት አመት እቅድ ጥቅምት 2009

APPENDIXES

Appendix I

Consent form for Interview

Dear Interviewee, my name is Erestu Legese, I am a Master's student of Political Science in Bahir Dar University. Right now, I am conducting my Master's degree thesis entitled "The Role of Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commissions in Combating Corruption in Ethiopia: The case of Amhara National Regional State Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission." In order to meet the objectives of my thesis, I am on the verge of collecting data from my participants. Hence, you are the one who could provide valuable information regarding the issue. Therefore, I would like to express my appreciation to your willingness to participate and respond on some questions pertaining to the Amhara National Regional State Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission.

There is no any risk of harm because of participating in the study, except your time till the interview will complete. Surely, your response will be kept confidentially and we can also pause at any time of the interview session if needed.

Thank you in advance for your valuable cooperation!!!

Appendix II

Interview Guiding Questions

Key Informant interviews guiding questions for the ANRSEACC Commissioners and Directorates.

Background information

Sex-----educational status-----work experience-----

1. In your view, what is corruption mean?
2. How do you describe the role of the ANRSEACC in combating corruption?
3. Do you think that the ANRSEACC is effective in combating corruption?
4. What major achievements are registered with respect to preventing and combating corruption by the commission so far?
5. What are the internal and external challenges that inhibit the effectiveness of ANRSEACC in general and the efforts of your department in particular?
6. What are the strategies and mechanisms the commission has used to address the challenges in combating corruption?
7. In your view, what should be done to make the fight against corruption more popular and successful?
8. Is there anything you would like to add?

Semi-structured Interview guide questions for the ANRSEACC staff members

Background information

Sex-----educational status-----work experience-----

1. In your view, what is corruption mean?
2. How do you describe the role of the ANRSEACC in combating corruption?
3. Do you think that the ANRSEACC is effective in combating corruption?
4. What major achievements are registered with respect to preventing and combating corruption by the commission so far?
5. What are the internal and external challenges that inhibit the effectiveness of ANRSEACC in general and the efforts of your department in particular?

6. What are the strategies and mechanisms the commission has used to address the challenges in combating corruption?
7. In your view, what should be done to make the fight against corruption more popular and successful?
8. Do you have anything more to add?

Semi-structured Interview guide questions for the ANRSEACC Customers

1. In your view, what is corruption mean?
2. In your opinion what is the role of the ANRSEACC in combating corruption?
3. Do you think that the ANRSEACC is effective in combating corruption?
4. Is there any significant contribution that ANRSEACC make to combat corruption?
5. What are the challenges that inhibit the effectiveness of ANRSEACC?
6. What are the strategies and mechanisms the commission has used to address the challenges in combating corruption?
7. What strategies and mechanisms do you suggest for the commission to address the challenges it faces?
8. Do you have anything more to add?

Part IV: FGD Guide Questions for the ANRSEACC staff members

Background information

Sex-----educational status-----work experience-----

1. What do you say about the role of ANRSEACC in combating corruption?
2. Do you believe that the commission is effective in combating corruption?
3. Is there any significant contribution that ANRSEACC make to combat corruption?
4. Would you discuss on the challenges that faces the commission in combating corruption?
5. Would you discuss on the strategies the commission has used to address the challenges it faces?
6. What should be done to improve the roles and effectiveness of the commission in combating corruption?
7. Is there anything you would like to add?

Appendix III

The profile of research participants (key informant, semi-structured interviewees and FGD discussants)

A. Key informant interviewees

No.	Code given	sex	Educational status	Work experience	Place of interview	Date of interview
1	01	M	MA Degree	3 years	ANRSEACC office	27/02/2018
2	02	M	BA degree	4	»	22/02/2018
3	03	F	BA degree	3	»	21/02/2018
4	04	M	BA degree	10	»	03/03/2018
5	05	M	BA degree	12	»	22/02/2018
6	06	M	BA degree	10	»	26/02/1018

Key: 01- Deputy Commissioner of ANRSEACC, 02- Human Resource Director of the ANRSEACC, 03- Public Relation Director of the ANRSEACC, 04- Corruption Prevention Director of the ANRSEACC, 05- Investigative and Prospective Director of the ANRSEACC, 06- Asset registration and Disclosure director of the ANRSEACC

B. Semi-structured interviewees

No.	Code given	Sex	Educational status	Work experience	Place of interview	Date of interview
1	001	F	LLB degree	8	ANRSEACC office	26/02/2018
2	002	M	BA degree	8	»	22/02/2018
3	003	M	MA student	3	»	26/02/2018
4	004	M	BA degree	12	»	22/02/1028
5	005	M	BA degree	5	»	26/02/2018
6	006	M	BA degree	8	»	22/02/2018

Key: 001- Educational and Training Officer of the ANRSEACC, 002- Research Officer of the ANRSEACC, 003- Public Relation Officer of the ANRSEACC, 004- Investigator of the

ANRSEACC, 005- Tip-off Officer of the ANRSEACC, 006- Internal Audit officer of the ANRSEACC

C. FGD Discussants

No.	Code given	Sex	Educational status	Work experience	Place of Discussion	Date of Discussion
1	010	F	BA degree	12	ANRSEACC office	28/02/2018
2	020	M	BA degree	12		
3	030	M	BA degree	4		
4	040	M	LLB degree	10		
5	050	M	BA degree	5		
6	060	M	BA degree	8		

Key: 010- Coalition Officer of the ANRSEACC, 020- Human Resource Officer of the ANRSEACC, 030- Research Officer of the ANRSEACC, 040- Research Officer of the ANRSEACC, 050- Asset Registration and Disclosure Officer of the ANRSEACC, 060- Media Officer of the ANRSEACC

